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Abstract 
In a basic outlook shared by Islam and Judaism, addressed in this study, man is 
born as man and woman as woman, so that manhood and womanhood are natural states 
entailing different personalities, rights, and responsibilities. In other words, in both the 
Islamic and Jewish worldviews, man and woman are created differently in order to 
accomplish different tasks, which are finally aimed together at the single objective of 
obeying and encountering God. This basic conception is faithfully reflected in the 
numerous detailed regulations of these two law-centered traditions. A study of gender 
issues in Islam and Judaism is thus bound to take into account how the status of the 
genders is defined in the tradition; how the different positions prescribed for men and 
women are thought to serve humanity in its journey to God; and whether those positions 
entail superiority and inferiority. 
In light of this outlook the present study offers a critical appreciation of the views 
on gender of two prominent clerical authorities, one each from the Muslim and Jewish 
traditions: Ayatollah Morteza Mutahhari (1920-1979 CE) and Rabbi Joseph Dov 
Soloveitchik (1903-1993 CE). This thesis constitutes the first attempt to draw a 
comparison of gender thought at the heart of Judaism and Islam in modern times, through 
two influential scholars devoted and loyal to the original principles of their religions. 
A properly critical account of thought requires examination not only of context 
and structure, but also apparent limitations and inconsistencies. That has been the 
approach taken here, in contrast - in the case of Mutahhari at least - to existing literature, 
which tends to be admiring. The thesis has also, however, tried to discern the affective 
qualities of the gender thought of the two scholars; comparison has been especially useful 
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in this regard. Thus I have suggested that Mutahhari’s ideas about women along with 
those of Soloveitchik are ultimately in harmony with their sense of the tradition and its 
fundamental spirit; this is the basic impulse for both, rather than systemization. I have 
also suggested that difficulty in appreciating the feelings of women sets limits on the 
understanding of both scholars; but they are far from being misogynistic, and feel very 
genuinely that women are valuable as human beings and have vital, respected roles in 
religion and society. This leads to the subject with which I close the thesis: the reception 
of Soloveitchik and Mutahhari’s gender thought by women. 
The thesis also draws attentions to two outstanding differences in the thought of 
Mutahhari and Soloveitchik: their mode of approaching gender and the ways they see 
their traditions responding to evolving times and circumstances. In brief, Mutahhari’s 
approach and tone is more defensive, polemical and political than that of Soloveitchik; 
and Soloveitchik seems less ready than Mutahhari to contemplate change in the tradition 
in response to changes in society or pressure from the broader Orthodox and non-
Orthodox Jewish community. However, when we consider, as should be the rule in 
comparative studies, both figures together in their contexts, we see that Mutahhari’s 
openness to change was somewhat theoretical, since he lived at a time before the 
consolidation of the Islamic Republic of Iran when official religious ideology did not 
hold much formal power over women’s or people’s lives. By the same token, 
Soloveitchik’s discourse should be read against the background of his actions, which do 
show that he was willing to admit evolution in the Halakhah as long as what he 
considered basic principles were preserved, as well as in light of his attitude toward 
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women’s learning, which demonstrates his ability to contemplate change that would 
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Introduction 
Awareness of differences between men and women is as ancient as humanity; but 
gender studies and the interdisciplinary study of gender is a concern of modern times not 
more than several decades old. Gender studies may refer to the social and cultural 
construction of femininities and masculinities, rather than the entire state of being male or 
female1 - as Simone de Beauvoir said, "One is not born a woman, one becomes one"2 - or 
it may refer to examination of the role that biological states of maleness or femaleness 
play in social constructs of gender.3 
A third view, historically many centuries removed from the social-scientific study 
of gender, considers gender differences in man and woman to be essential in nature, 
while also emphasizing that these differences are part of a divine plan. This is the view of 
traditional Judaism and Islam, each of which claims to possess a religiously authentic 
understanding of human beings. Both traditions view gender differences as divinely 
planned measures in the creation of humanity and the immutable basis of distinctively 
different social roles for men and women. 
In this basic outlook shared by the two traditions addressed in this study, man is 
born as man and woman as woman, so that manhood and womanhood are natural states 
entailing different personalities, rights, and responsibilities. In other words, in both the 
Islamic and Jewish worldviews, man and woman are created differently in order to 
accomplish different tasks, which are finally aimed together at the single objective of 
                                                          
1
 Stephanie Garrett, Gender (London: Tavistock Publications,1992), vii. 
2
 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2011), Vintage eBooks, 899. 
3
 For the effect of biological differences on social constructs, see: David P. Barash and Judith Eve 
Lipton, Gender Gap: The Biology of Male and Female Difference (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 
2002). 
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obeying and encountering God. This basic conception is faithfully reflected in the 
numerous detailed regulations of these two law-centered traditions. A study of gender 
issues in Islam and Judaism is thus bound to take into account how the status of the 
genders is defined in the tradition; how the different positions prescribed for men and 
women are thought to serve humanity in its journey to God; and whether those positions 
entail superiority and inferiority. 
The present study examines the views on women and gender of two prominent 
clerical authorities, one each from the Muslim and Jewish traditions: Ayatollah Morteza 
Mutahhari (1920-1979 CE) and Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik (1903-1993 CE). I will 
begin with a brief biographical sketch of each figure. 
Morteza Mutahhari was born in 1920 in the town of Fariman, near Mashhad in 
northeast Iran. After finishing his primary education, he moved at the age of thirteen to 
the ancient shrine city of Mashhad to attend the hawzah (a seminary or centre for Islamic 
learning) located there. In 1937, Mutahhari decided to settle in Qum, the chief seminary 
town of Iran, where he remained until 1952. This decision was the first step in the 
formation of his intellectual character, in which two distinguished hawzah figures, 
Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989 CE) and Allameh Tabatabai (1892-1981 CE), played a 
major role. From these scholars, he received not only a formation in the Shiite juridical 
tradition, but also training in and a love for philosophy, a focus that can be seen clearly in 
his own writings in which he employs philosophy to formulate an approach to modern 
problems more flexible than that allowed by law. Mutahhari attended Allameh 
Tabatabai's classes on Avicenna and materialist philosophy, as well as Ayatollah 
Khomeini's lectures on ethics. When Ayatollah Khomeini initiated a series of classes on 
 Zolghadr 3 
irfan4 (mysticism), Mutahhari was among the small elite group who attended. These 
gatherings lasted until 1951 and established a close link between Mutahhari and 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Among the factors that contributed to their association was the fact 
that they both had a vision of Islam as a comprehensive, total system of life and belief, a 
worldview profoundly influenced by the Islamic philosophical and mystical traditions. 
Both also believed profoundly in political and social change.5 
In 1952, despite Mutahhari’s promising future in the hawzah, he decided to leave 
Qum. He went to Tehran, the great capital city of Iran, where he accepted an appointment 
as a professor of Theology (ilahiyat) in the School of Theology of the University of 
Tehran, the most prestigious academic institution in the country.6 This decision greatly 
affected Mutahhari’s intellectual and social life, as well as the Iranian clerical and even 
non-clerical intellectual communities. Mutahhari’s migration to an academic post in 
Tehran was significant because of the very large gap at that time between the hawzah and 
the university. The University of Tehran, as the word ‘university’ (danishgah) suggests, 
is a basically secular institution, while the designation ilahiyat, which I translate 
‘Theology’, indicates a historical and philosophical orientation to religion rather than the 
purely believing approach of the seminary. As a brilliant hawzah scholar who was also 
open to new ideas and questions and had acquired a good knowledge of Western 
philosophy and materialism, Mutahhari contributed to bridging the gap and creating a 
                                                          
4
 Arabic and Persian romanization is according to the Library of Congress system; although dots and 
macrons indicating special characters are not represented, since this thesis is not a philological work and 
concerns Judaism as well as Islam. Hebrew terms are rendered according to what seems to be the usual 
romanization in the English-language texts and sources used. 
5
 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State:  Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London; New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 76. See also Husayn Shafi‘i Darabi, Yadavarah-i Ustad Muţahhari (Qum: 
Chapkhanah-i Mihr, 1360 [1981]), 10-20. 
6
 See Martin, Islamic State, 75-76. 
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conduit between the two worlds. He heightened respect for traditional training and 
knowledge in the university at a time when interest in the Islamic heritage was on the 
rise, while Mutahhari's activities served to interest his fellow hawzawiyun (those who 
study and teach in the hawzah) in a constructive relationship with academia. 
Gradually, Mutahhari attracted the pious students and professors of the university 
to himself, a phenomenon that led to the formation of various Islamic associations among 
the students and faculty such as the Islamic Association of Doctors and Islamic 
Association of Engineers. He taught classes on subjects such as the Quran and philosophy 
to these groups; a number of his published books are actually transcripts of these lectures, 
which he subsequently revised on the basis of notes made by himself or his students. 
Mutahhari’s lectures in the university marked the beginning of a writing career that saw a 
tremendous production of material aimed at a wide audience, much of it concerned with 
social and political issues. His lecturing and writings were a great departure from the 
complicated Arabic-based production of the hawzah, centered on law and meant for a 
limited, elite audience. He finally composed literally hundreds of books and articles on 
different subjects in this style, even writing a two-volume storybook for children titled 
Dastan-i Rastan (Tales of the Righteous). Mutahhari’s lectures and writings, including 
but not limited to the most popular, were driven by a desire to see the place of Islam 
secured in the modern world; and this is also the case with his writings on gender. 
Although Mutahhari’s works attracted many minds and souls, they also inflamed 
a fierce animosity against him. The reason for this animosity can be traced back to his 
attacks on three approaches: Marxism; traditional Islam; and 'iltiqat - literally, ‘gathering’ 
or ‘gleaning’, referring to the addition of non-religious to religious thought. In the social, 
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political and intellectual climate of his time, Mutahhari perceived each of the three as a 
manifest danger both to the faith of the people and Islamic thought itself. As the critiques 
of these tendencies, which emerge constantly in Mutahhari’s writings and speeches, 
helped to negatively form his approach to the tradition overall, I will briefly consider his 
objections to each in turn. 
 Marxism in Iran was promoted by the Communist Hizb-i Tudeh (Party of the 
Masses) and was principally aimed, as in other parts of the Muslim world, at youth. 
Mutahhari believed that the appeal of the Tudeh for the younger generation lay in its 
association with heroic rebellion against exploitation, whether class-based or associated 
with colonialism and imperialism (two prominent problems and concerns in the Iran of 
his time). He perceived, in other words, that the attraction of Communism and leftism in 
general was more emotional than intellectual. He firmly rejected the view that Marxism 
had arisen in part as a result of the weakness and obscurantism of religion. Mutahhari’s 
response was two-pronged: he offered, as suggested above, a comprehensible, socially 
and politically relevant Islam; and he also used the intellectual equipment afforded him 
by philosophy to attack, in texts written in a much more elite style, the intellectual basis 
of Marxism. By far the best known of the latter is Mutahhari’s The Principles of 
Philosophy and Method of Realism, which uses the traditional Shiite commentarial style 
to counter the premises of Marxism. Of all the ulema, Mutahhari launched the most 
effective attacks against Marxism and materialism; and he did this by direct criticism and 
 Zolghadr 6 
refutation of their ideas, rather than simply asserting the truth and moral superiority of 
Islam.7 
By traditional Islam (the second target), Mutahhari meant a religion that 
accommodated itself to the current situation with no sensitivity to the corrupt social, 
political and cultural system, and with no motivation to fight to change the situation. 
Mutahhari believed that traditional Muslims because of their superficial understanding of 
Islam, prevented it from playing an active role in society. This was not a call for political 
Islam as such, but rather for consciousness, relevance and activism. 
Mutahhari also criticized his fellow ulema for not doing enough to present the real 
Islam, i.e., the socially aware and problem-solving Islam he envisioned, to the people and 
especially the young. As a result, he thought, youth had become drawn to the more active 
and apparently relevant Marxism. To put it a different way, Mutahhari saw what was 
attractive in Marxism, and perceived that it rather belonged to Islam; and specifically to 
Shiite Islam, since although he spoke about Islam in general, his thought and images were 
profoundly Shiite and he was preoccupied with the situation of Islam in Iran with its 
overwhelmingly Shiite-majority population. 
Finally, by iltiqat, or eclecticism, Mutahhari meant the approach of those who 
would mix elements from non-Islamic schools of thought with Islam and introduce a new 
version of a so-called "modern Islam". Mutahhari had in mind not only a general trend in 
modern Islamic thought, but particular currents in Iranian society. This included groups 
such as the Mujahidin-i Khalq (“Warriors of the People”, a militant movement that 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., 92-95. 
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blended Marxism and Islam) and Furqan (“Criterion”, an anti-clerical group). With his 
extreme sensitivity toward any violation of Islamic beliefs, Mutahhari detected a 
deviation of these groups from what he considered to be "authentic Islam". He constantly 
monitored their books, newspapers and lectures and analyzed their ideas. It is fair to say 
that Mutahhari devoted much of the last five years of his life to clarifying and refuting the 
views of these groups.8 
Of the three approaches outlined above, Mutahhari found the last the most 
dangerous because it had the advantage of applying an Islamic label to its own views, so 
that, he thought, believers would not immediately reject them (an advantage that 
Marxism lacked); while on the other hand, such groups were actively involved in social 
and political change and therefore had a great potential for attracting the young (an 
advantage currently lacking in traditional Islam). 
 Mutahhari’s ceaseless battle against what he considered to be non-Islamic ideas 
masquerading as Islam resulted in his assassination organized by the group Furqan in 
1980.9 Thus the development of his thought and its possible impact on events was cut 
short immediately after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. It may be said that he had 
hardly begun his work and did not finally have the opportunity to demonstrate the 
potential of his ideas. His writings did, however, acquire a heightened prestige by being 
associated with a noted Martyr of the Revolution (shahid). 
The life of Joseph Dov Soloveitchik also spanned the great changes of the 
twentieth century, including in his case the shift of the center of Western Jewry from 
                                                          
8
 Ibid., 93-94. 
9
 Darabi, Yadavarah-i Ustad Muţahhari, 308. 
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Europe to North America. He was born in 1903 in Pruzhana (Poland), a decendant of a 
Lithuanian rabbinical line. His father Rabbi Moshe Soloveichik (1879-1941 CE) was a 
renowned Talmudist who held various positions in the rabbinate before he moved to the 
United States where he became the head of Rabbi Issac Elchanan Theological Seminary 
(RIETS) in New York beginning in 1929. New York City was a great centre of Jewish 
and Eastern European Jewish immigration in those times. 
Soloveitchik completed his primary education in a traditional system of education 
with private tutors. Around 1922 in his late teens, Joseph Dov Soloveitchik did, as he 
himself pointed out, acquire the equivalent of a Gymnasium, i.e. advanced academic 
secondary education.10 In 1924, he proceeded to the Free Polish University, where he 
studied political science. 
Soloveitchik's entry into university marked his first exposure to the serious study 
of a secular discipline. He was keen to broaden his education, and became increasingly 
attracted to philosophy. He entered the University of Berlin in 1926, and began his 
studies there in that very field. The young Soloveitchik was intrigued by the Neo-Kantian 
school and wrote his dissertation on Herman Cohen (1842-1918 CE), whose new 
interpretation of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804 CE) made him known as 
the founder of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism. Soloveitchik received his 
doctorate in 1932. Remarkably, during his university years, Soloveitchik also continued 
intensive study of the Talmud. 
                                                          
10
 Aaron Rakeffet – Rothkoff. The Rav: the World of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, (New Jersey: Ktav 
Publishing House Inc, 1999), 25. 
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In 1931 Soloveitchik married Tonya Lewit (1904-1967 CE), who shared a similar 
background, having been raised in Eastern Europe and having then sought higher 
education in Western Europe. The Rabbi’s wife was the holder of a Ph.D in education 
from Jena University in Germany. Then in 1932, the young Soloveitchik family 
emigrated to the United States. Soloveitchik settled in Boston, Massachusetts, where he 
remained for the rest of his life. He was already well known among the Orthodox 
community in the United States. Not only because of his family's illustrious  rabbinical 
heritage but also his personal capabilities and intellectual accomplishments, he served in 
various communal, rabbinic and academic positions in Boston, and later, in New York. 
Soloveitchik’s main achievement in Boston, however, was in the area of Torah 
education. He founded the Maimonides School, an institution that was much more than 
the other Jewish day schools existing at the time. The Maimonides School, Farber states, 
became “a critical hinge in Boston's modern Orthodoxy because it articulated a 
philosophy that promoted traditional observance, modernity, and Americanism.''11 The 
determination of Soloveitchik to bring Orthodox Judaism into modern times while 
remaining faithful to the tradition was fully reflected in this important institution. 
Through the hard work and dedication of Soloveitchik and his wife, the 
Maimonides School played a major role in the establishment of Boston's modern 
Orthodox community.12 The institution was home to Soloveitchik's innovative and 
revolutionary decision concerning women's egalitarian Talmud education when the high 
school was founded in the Maimonides school in the late 1940s. He later advocated more 
                                                          
11
 Seth Farber, An American Orthodox Dreamer: Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Boston's 
Maimonides School, (New Hampshire: Brandeis University Press, 2004), 70. 
12
 Ibid., 9. 
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intensive Talmud education for women by establishing the Stern College for women at 
Yeshiva University in New York. 
Soloveitchik served in different areas of Jewish religious life in Boston such as 
supervising of kosher slaughtering (shechita); but his main and prime focus was 
academic and intellectual activities. He was appointed head of RIETS at Yeshiva 
University in New York in 1941 to replace his late father Rabbi Moshe Soloveitchik and 
continued teaching there until 1986, when his poor health did not allow him to carry on. 
During this period, Soloveitchik ordained as many as two thousand rabbis, some 
of whom were amongst the most influential leaders and figures of modern Orthodoxy, not 
only in the United States but also the wider Jewish community. Soloveitchik may thus be 
considered one of the founders or sustainers of Orthodoxy in America and the twentieth 
century overall. 
A constant theme of the Rabbi’s life and learning was pursuit of the modern along 
with traditional learning. This move began on a personal level in early stages of his 
academic and intellectual life in Berlin, and continued at the religious and communal 
level through his Yeshiva years. Soloveitchik initially chose to master modern secular 
knowledge by pursuing a university education in Berlin, all the while deepening his 
knowledge of the Talmud and traditional practices. This dual study continued during his 
years at Yeshiva University, when in addition to his Talmudic lectures, Soloveitchik 
stressed the combination with secular scholarship and deepening of Western civilization 
through the exchange. Serious consideration of the modern world can be regarded as a 
lasting influence of Soloveitchik on the shaping of modern Jewish Orthodoxy. 
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Soloveitchik passed away in 1993 after a period of illness. The life of the Rabbi 
was longer than that of the Ayatollah, and he had more opportunity to develop and 
institutionalize his thought. Nevertheless, we can see a common trajectory in a brilliant 
beginning in traditional learning, a personal awareness of new knowledge and 
determination to acquire it, attraction to philosophy, and final synthesis.  The two figures 
are also similar in that they intended, as this thesis will also illustrate, not to produce a 
new thought but rather to renovate and defend traditional knowledge in order to make it 
endure. 
This thesis, as far as I am aware, constitutes the first attempt to draw a 
comparison of gender thought at the heart of Judaism and Islam in modern times, through 
two influential scholars devoted and loyal to the original principles of their religions. It 
seems surprising, given the similarities of Judaism and Islam in law and other aspects, 
that more work on women and gender embracing the two traditions has not appeared. A 
short review of the literature that does exist will serve both to describe this gap in 
academic study and situate my own work. 
Judaism and Islam are brought together in regard to women and gender mostly in 
a context that also includes other faith traditions. Comparison of these two particular 
religions is usually not, in other words, a particular concern, but occurs as part of the 
larger study of women and religion. Writings that have adopted something closer to a 
comparative approach have relied on parallels in the Torah and the Quran that have 
shaped the gender approach of these two theistic, Abrahamic, and law-centered traditions. 
These parallels pertain to either doctrinal or legal issues, and the literature has 
accordingly compared the traditions on these two grounds. 
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Works with a doctrinal approach examine fundamental conceptual issues such as 
the creation and supposed sin of Eve. One of these is Haddad and Esposito’s Daughters 
of Abraham: Feminist Thought in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2001)13 which 
attempts to place the three Abrahamic traditions together. The aim of Daughters of 
Abraham seems to be to suggest that there are parallel feminist movements in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam; but the book is a collection of essays rather than actual exercises 
in comparison. The introductory essay by one of the editors (there is no conclusion) does 
assert that the common thread of the three feminisms is “empowerment”; the focus or 
point of comparison, in other words, is the activity and impact of feminism, rather than 
the various traditions. What Men Owe to Women: Men's Voices from World Religions 
(2001)14 is a compilation of male voices that address gender justice in world religions, 
including Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Taoism, 
Buddhism, and Native American and African traditions. The objective of the male 
scholars is to find the resources within these religions that support the empowerment of 
women. Again, this book is, like most other literature discussed here, more a 
juxtaposition than comparison; we notice again that the common thread is feminism or 
modern gender thought, rather than elements in the traditions themselves. This focus is, 
of course, a natural one, since feminism, for all its differences, is in some respects a 
global movement. The book Abraham's Children (2005)15 is different only in that it is 
                                                          
13
 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, eds., Daughters of Abraham: Feminist Thought in 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2001). 
14
 John C. Raines and Daniel C. Maguire, eds., What Men Owe to Women: Men's Voices from World 
Religions (Albany: State University Press of New York Press, 2001). 
15
Norman Solomon, Richard Harries and Timothy Winter, eds., Abraham's Children: Jews, Christians 
and Muslims in Conversation (New York: T &T Clark, 2005). 
 Zolghadr 13 
somewhat dialogical;16 it treats some of the same material by bringing together essays by 
leading scholars of each faith to address key issues, including but not limited to gender. 
A small amount of similar work has also been done in Arabic and Persian. One 
example in Persian is "Azadi, Jinsiyyat, Adyan-i Ilahi (Freedom, Gender, Divine 
Traditions)" (1384[2005])17 an article by an Iranian Muslim scholar that investigates the 
limits of liberty in regard to gender in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, known by 
Muslims as the “heavenly” or “divine” religions. The author relates the “freedom” of 
women to religious views about her creation and first sin, on the basis of the Bible and 
Quran. I have not, however, come across comparison or juxtaposition in Arabic and 
Persian that brings together experts or participants in the various traditions. This is no 
doubt a reflection of the relatively underdeveloped state of the study of religions on the 
one hand, and inter-religious dialogue or communication on the other; although Iran and 
the Shiite religious establishments are probably most advanced in the Muslim world in 
this area. 
 Another work that might be mentioned here is Eve and Adam: Jewish, Christian, 
and Muslim Readings on Genesis and Gender (1999)18. Although merely a source-book, 
Eve and Adam is useful in that it brings together nearly a hundred excerpts from more 
                                                          
16
 Shari Goldberg discusses dialogues and dialogical scholarship between Muslim and Jewish women 
in her upcoming dissertation, “When Beruriah Met Aisha Textual Intersections and Interactions among 
Jewish and Muslim Women Engaged with Religious Law”. Notice of the dissertation in: Bulletin for the 
Study of Religions 39, 1 (2010): 22-24. See also, Judith Plaskow and Aysha Hidaatullah, “Beyond Sarah 
and Hagar Jewish and Muslim Reflections on Feminist Theology”, in Muslims and Jews in America: 
Commonalities, Contentions, and Complexities, eds. Reza Aslan and Aaron J. Hahn Tapper (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). I am grateful to Ms. Goldberg for both references. 
17
 Roya Matin, "Azadi, Jinsiyyat, Adyan-i Ilahi, " Majallah-i Banuvan-i Shí'ah 3(Bahar 1384[2005]): 
49-68. 
18
 Kristen E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing and Valerie H. Ziegler, eds., Eve & Adam: Jewish, Christian, 
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than two millennia to show that how social, political, and religious debates over gender 
and power have depended upon the story of Adam and Eve and their descent from heaven 
to Earth. 
Hagar, Sarah, and Their Children: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives 
(2006)19 reminds the reader that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all trace their 
beginnings to Abraham. The authors look at narratives of Abraham and his wives, Hagar 
and Sarah, noting that they have received little attention even though the stories are 
pivotal to the three traditions. In this book, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scholars 
discuss Hagar, Sarah, and their children, from Ishmael and Isaac to their many 
descendents. The authors begin with an overview of the three religions, from their 
scriptural beginnings to contemporary questions, including womanist and feminist 
perspectives. 
One work that attempts serious comparison is Women, Religion, & Space: Global 
Perspectives on Gender and Faith (2007).20 The author examines the role of religion in 
defining space for women and their regulation within it. Islam and Judaism are the 
subjects of two very different essays in the book rather than directly placed together; but 
themes treated in the introduction: of exclusion, segregation, and attempts to enlarge 
allowed space, do throw light on one commonality of the two traditions. Jacob Lassner’s 
Demonizing the Queen of Sheba: Boundaries of Gender and Culture in Postbiblical 
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Judaism and medieval Islam (1993)
21
 is another pioneering work that traces the exchange 
of tales of the Queen between the two related traditions; the book is primarily, as the 
author says, a study in “cultural diffusion” and “inter-communal relations”22, but also 
includes insights about how the two traditions travelled similar paths in constructing the 
Queen as a powerful female in conflict with dominant males. 
Gender in Judaic and Islamic law - rather than in narrative as in the examples 
immediately above - receives attention only in scattered articles and chapters, despite the 
broad similarity of the two legal traditions. Radford’s ''The Inheritance Rights of Women 
under Jewish and Islamic laws'' (2000),23 for instance, gives a brief overview of the legal 
systems of Judaism and Islam and the place of women in both. The author goes on to 
provide a fairly detailed description of the ways in which the laws of Judaism and Islam 
govern the inheritance rights of wives, mothers, daughters, and other female relatives.  
The author’s conclusion is that, although classical Islamic law afforded women more 
property and inheritance rights than in Judaism, the situation in modern times has been 
reversed due a series of state reforms along with attempts by the Orthodox to find greater 
rights in the traditional Law, while Muslim women are often not even afforded the rights 
originally granted by the Quran.24 Radford’s article, along with Rispler-Chaim’s piece, 
“Islamic Law and Jewish Law on Deserted Wives/Missing Husbands” (2000),25 
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published in the same year on Judaic and Islamic law concerning deserted wives, 
thoroughly investigates the two sets of laws to arrive at a conclusion that throws light on 
the trajectory of both traditions, and is a good model for future work.
26
 An older and 
broader, but still useful article is Judith Romney Wegner’s “Status of Women in Jewish 
and Islamic Marriage and Divorce Law” (1982);27 Wegner also touches on similarties and 
differences in law reform up to the 1980s when the article was written. Haggai Mazuz’s 
recent article on menstruation, “Menstruation and Differentiation: How Muslims 
Differentiated Themselves from Jews Regarding the Laws of Menstruation” (2012), in 
Judaism and Islam, which  argues that Muslim laws regarding menstruation were part of 
an attempt to differentiate Islam from Judaism,
28
 demonstrates the potential of 
historically contextualized comparison. Faith and Fertility: Attitudes Towards 
Reproductive Practices in Different Religions from Ancient to Modern Times (2009)29 
outlines each tradition's core beliefs and values and explores their influence on moral and 
ethical perspectives surrounding the issue of fertility. Faith and Fertility does not 
compare Islam and Judaism directly, so that it is left to the reader to infer differences and 
similarities and the significance of both. The book’s approach, however, has a virtue 
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similar to that of the work on women and space mentioned above in that it uses an 
important dimension of women’s lives as it is practiced among diverse traditions, 
including Islam and Judaism, to invite readers to think comparatively. Some useful points 
of comparison regarding gender and law can also be extracted from Neusner and Sonn’s 
Comparing Religions through Law: Judaism and Islam (1999).30 
Comparison of the position of women in different religions inevitably elicits an 
apologetic or polemic approach. Although such literature is not strictly academic, 
awareness of it alerts the scholar both to the pre-conceptions of a potential audience and 
need to avoid the same pitfalls. One Muslim example in English is Women in Islam 
Versus Women in the Judaeo-Christian Tradition: The Myth & the Reality (1995).31 
Originally commissioned or produced by a Saudi organization and widely reproduced on 
the internet (e.g. www.al-islam.org/women_islam_juchr/), this book begins by recounting 
the story of Eve and then goes on to examines issues such as inheritance and veiling. The 
objective of the author is to correct the views of Westerners about Islam subordinating 
women, the conclusion being that both the mistreatment of women in contemporary 
Islamic societies and Western conceptions of women invite oppression and exploitation, 
while Islam, if properly understood, is ideal for both women and the family. The Persian-
language ''Barrasi-i Tatbiqi-i Talaq dar kitabha-yi Asmani: Quran, Tawrat va-Injil 
(Comparative Examination of Divorce in Divine Scriptures: the Quran, Torah, and New 
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Testament)'' (1386[2007]),32 though more subtle, has a similar flavor in that it compares 
the Quranic and Muslim model of divorce with Jewish and Christian laws in idealized 
fashion, without taking into account practice or reality in general. 
Muslim polemical literature generally takes as its target or “mirror opposite” the 
position of women in the West overall or sometimes Christianity (the two often being 
equated, even though authors are aware that Western countries are strongly marked by 
secularism). Judaism does not seem to be a particular target. It should also be 
acknowledged that there is a very extensive Western non-scholarly literature on the 
supposedly inferior position and “oppression” of Muslim women; although here the goal 
seems to be to assert the superiority of Western civilization or secularism, rather than 
Christianity. 
This overview of literature on women in Islam and Judaism suggests that the 
work of comparison has just begun. We notice not only a scarcity of real comparative 
scholarship, despite some promising beginnings, but a tendency to concentrate on 
feminist movements and struggles. My work, in contrast, considers contemporary 
traditional clerical thought, surely a very important part of both traditions. It is interesting 
that no attempt (again, as far as I am aware) has been made to compare Jewish and 
Muslim thinkers.
33
 Doing so, I believe, provides a more panoramic view of gender 
thought than focusing on single issues or aspects. Comparing two figures globally does, 
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however, present challenges. I will outline my approach to these following a short review 
of literature concerning Ayatollah Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik individually. 
Scholarship about Mutahhari’s gender thought can be divided into material 
published in and outside Iran. This, as will become clear, is not a matter of geography but 
different approaches. 
Mutahhari's gender views are deeply rooted in the Shariah. Optimum conformity 
with the teachings and principles of Shariah is thus a key element in his thought. 
Ayatollah Mutahhari also strives, however, to be responsive to the “needs of the times” 
(muqaziat-i zaman) and modern concerns. This dual commitment seems to have appeal 
for a broad spectrum of scholars and writers in Iran. Except for extreme traditional and 
secular views, writers and intellectuals in Iran have found Mutahhari's gender thought 
consistent, to a large extent, with their own views and sentiments. 
Among the two extremes, the traditionalists disliked Mutahhari's openness 
towards modern concerns, such as his views reflected in his Mas'alah-i Hijab (The Issue 
of Hijab) (1379[1980])
34
 which sparked resentment among traditionalist ulema and 
caused Mutahhari to react by penning a piece he called Pasukhha-yi Ustad (The Mentor’s 
Response) (1386[1988]).35 Though severely critical of Mutahhari’s gender teachings and 
principles as a whole, the traditionalists have not, however, continued their critique in 
writing after his death, possibly because of lack of interest and an audience. The same 
may be said of secularists. 
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Thus Persian-language literature relevant to Mutahhari's gender thought comes 
chiefly from those who essentially agree with him and elaborate on his outlook without 
contributing much real analysis. Different aspects of Mutahhari's views on issues such as 
equality versus similarity between men and women, family laws, and the full humanity of 
women in Islam are discussed in this manner in numerous works, three typical 
representatives of which are described below. 
Manzilat va-Huquq-i Zan (Woman's Station and Rights) (1389[2010])36 regards 
Mutahhari’s work, as it states in the preface, as part of the "valuable heritage of Islamic 
thought'' as well as a "comprehensive, balanced, wholesome, reasonable and substantial 
intellectual framework which can lead today's and tomorrow's youth to a secure path."37 
The author groups a variety of women's issues raised by Mutahhari under the headings of 
“woman's station and individuality” (manzilat va-shakhsiyat-i zan) and “woman's rights” 
(huquq-i zan). The author's contribution, as confessed in the preface, is limited to a 
convenient re-statement; the result is a brief introduction, sponsored by an organization 
called The Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought. 
Our second example is titled Duvist va-Chihil Asl-i Khanvadigi dar Andishah-i 
Mutahhari (Two Hundred and Forty Principles Concerning the Family in the Thought of 
Mutahhari) (1388[2009]).38 The objective of this book also seems to be to present 
Mutahhari's thought in a more accessible style; in effect, to canonize them. The book is 
very popular, having gone into a ninth edition in just a few years. The author has 
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succeeded in transforming Mutahhari's scholarly-clerical discourse into a handy guide to 
successful family relations. While serving to perpetuate some of Mutahhari’s ideas and 
perhaps give them practical application, such treatment may have also contributed to a 
lack of critical examination that might otherwise have resulted in a more profound 
understanding of Martyr Mutahhari’s progressive gender views. Critical examination of 
Mutahhari’s philosophical works published in Iran in recent years by scholars such as 
Ahad Faramarz-Gharamaliki has not at all diminished respect for his scholarship and 
resulted, in fact, in a better understanding of his philosophical views. More critical 
examination of his gender thought is likely to be of similar benefit. 
Though written mainly by authors of Iranian origin, literature appearing outside 
Iran has different traits. For one thing, it generally appears as part of an examination of 
post-revolutionary circumstances in Iran. Thus Mutahhari is portrayed as a leading figure 
in the pre- and post-Revolutionary intellectual, cultural and social environment; and his 
gender views are discussed as a part of his overall worldview. Mutahhari's views about 
women do not seem to be an independent subject of interest for these authors. One 
example is Dabbashi’s Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the 
Islamic Revolution (2006).39 Dabbashi introduces Mutahhari, among eight other 
influential figures, as ''the chief ideologue of the Islamic Revolution''. He discusses 
several key elements in the Ayatollah’s thought, his views on the position of women 
being one. Dabbashi concludes that Mutahhari’s discussion of women centered around 
his distrust and suspicion of the West, along with firm belief in the superiority of Islamic 
gender arrangements. 
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Davari’s The Political Thought of Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari (2005)40 
similarly portrays Mutahhari as ''an Iranian theoretician of the Islamic state''. The book 
takes a biographical approach by recounting Mutahhari's political and academic life, so 
that discussion of his thought concerning women and philosophy enters the scene only 
occasionally. The author does unfold the saga of Mutahhari's encounter with both 
''secularists'' and ''traditionalists'' on the issue of women in general and the veil in 
particular. He tells the story of the Ayatollah’s encounter with secularists in the person of 
a judge who proposed changes to certain Shariah-based family laws, and describes his 
strong reaction (according to the author, he was the only member of the clergy to openly 
object) to a film sponsored by the ruling Pahlavis mocking the sexual relations of 
religious families and piety of religious institutions. Mutahhari's encounter with the 
traditionalists was most dramatically displayed in his answer to criticism of his “Issue of 
Hijab” and his reaction to the view that opposed women covering with a scarf and long-
sleeved smock (known in Iran as manteau), instead of the traditional chador (literally, 
“tent”, an enveloping outer garment or open cloak) and rubandeh (a long, face-covering 
garment similar to a burqah worn by Iranian women in the past). 
Writings on women in Iran sometimes refer selectively to Mutahhari; those 
focusing on the post-revolutionary period rarely fail, in fact, to mention him. Two 
examples are the edited volume Women, Religion and Culture in Iran (2002)41 and 
Valentine Moghadam’s Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle 
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East (2003).42 These do not however, seem to offer original contributions concerning 
Mutahhari in particular. 
One work that intersects the two categories in that it was presented in Iran by a 
non-Iranian scholar is Lynda Clarke’s article titled: "Ayatollah Mutahhari and Women: 
Construction of Liberal-Conservatism'' (2004),
43
 part of a collection derived from the 
annual International Conference of Hikamt-i Mutahhar. In her piece, Clarke refers to 
elements of conservatism and liberalism which, she believes, both shaped Mutahhari's 
approach to gender. By conservatism and liberalism, Clarke does not seem to mean 
exactly what these terms might imply in politics, i.e. that Mutahhari's conservatism led 
him to unreasonably persist in traditional doctrines regardless of their viability, or that he 
was a liberal in a secular sense. It appears that Clarke thought of Mutahhari as 
“conservative” in the sense of being persistent in keeping the principles of Islamic 
doctrine intact, a stance perhaps more properly referred to in Persian as “usul-gira’i” 
(principalism). By liberal, she certainly did not mean that Mutahhari was ready to make 
concessions on the fundamentals of Islam. What was rather meant is that Ayatollah 
Mutahhari was prepared to make progressive and innovative modifications within the 
bounds of the Shariah. These two aspects, I would suggest, may be described together as 
"usul-gira’i-i pishru'' (progressive principlism). Clarke's suggestion that Mutahhari could 
be characterized as '' liberal-conservatism'' nevertheless sparked harsh criticism in the 
Iranian audience. 
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The literature on Rabbi Soloveitchik and women is somewhat more substantial. 
There is, for instance, a good deal of writing that discusses or seeks to resolve the Rabbi’s 
apparently inconsistent stances on women's education and prayer groups. A constant 
theme of scholarship on Soloveitchik is to reconcile the descriptors “modern” and 
“orthodox” in the phrase sometimes applied to him, ''the authority figure of modern 
Orthodoxy''. Soloveitchik's positions on women's education and prayer groups become 
points of references in debate as to whether Soloveitchik should be seen as a traditionalist 
who was acquainted with modern philosophical knowledge and modern questions, or a 
modern figure who was ''anchored in the sea of Talmud and the Brisker tradition'', as 
Moshe Sokol puts it.44 
Thus, for instance, Twersky’s "A Glimpse of the Rav" (1996)45 acknowledges 
Soloveitchik's position on intensive Talmud education for women, while arguing that his 
reaction to the mechitza controversy is strong and forceful enough to disprove that the 
stance on education was motivated by modernity. The author argues that Rabbi 
Soloveitchik's position on women's Talmud education is rather motivated by his Torah 
intuition. Wurzburger’s, ''Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik as Posekh of Post-Modern 
Orthodoxy'' (1994),46 in contrast, argues that in the long run, Soloveitchik's approach 
''holds the greatest promise for those seeking to combine commitment to halakha with a 
selective acceptance of the ethos of modernity.”47 While the author believes 
Soloveitchik's position on women's education to be modern, going so far as to 
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characterize his objection to the use of modern historic and textual scholarship as ''highly 
sophisticated post-modern critical thought'', he does not view the Rabbi’s position on 
women's Talmud education as a sign of concession to modernity. The author of 
"Modernity and Traditionalism in the Life and Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik'' 
(1994)48 seems to express a similar view, not only viewing Soloveitchik’s position on 
women's education as a modern move, but also welcoming his awareness of modern 
conditions and praising his "personal blend of traditionalism and modern elements”, 
which, he judges, “contributed to his success".49 
The author of Women at Prayer: a Halakhic Analysis of Women's Prayer Groups 
(2001)50 considers Soloveitchik's views on women's tefillah as part of a study of women's 
prayer in general. He includes the views of two medieval Talmud scholars, Maimonides 
(1135-1204 CE) and Nahmanides (1194-1270 CE), along with those of Soloveitchik and 
Feinstein (1895-1986 CE). Following examination of Soloveitchik's thoughts on women's 
prayer in general and women's prayer groups in particular, the author concludes that 
Soloveitchik does not oppose women's tefillah as a whole. He accuses opponents of 
women's tefillah of extending of Rabbi Soloveitchik's rejection of some practices of the 
groups to the whole issue. 
Soloveitchik’s deliberations on woman's creation and attributes have generated 
interest from quite a wide audience. Wolosky’s "The Lonely Woman of Faith'' (2003)51 
demonstrates the appeal of this aspect of the Rabbi’s thought. While admitting that 
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Soloveitchik’s analysis cannot be called feminist, Wolosky finds that his reading has 
''surprising implications for feminist theory'' and “oddly intersects with a variety of 
feminist discussions.”52 Having detected a number of parallels between the views of 
Soloveitchik and those of certain feminists, the author concludes that his typology is 
“generic, not gendered”, since the attributes of Adam the first are shared by both male 
and female in the first account, while the qualifications of Adam the second are similarly 
shared by male and female in the second account.53 In Wolosky’s view, this means that 
attributes are not essentially gendered; they are only meant to situate the human being in 
the world. That such views have been expressed by a halakhic scholar has promising 
implications for feminists, according to the author. The author believes that the 
covenantal relationship between man and woman in the second account, which is defined 
by Soloveitchik as “existentially mutual”, also approximates feminist analysis. She 
asserts that the model presented by Rabbi Soloveitchik for “self” and “community” as 
dialectical tension “opens an avenue between feminist and Jewish discourses, pointing 
both in redemptive directions.”54 
David Hartman’s The God Who Hates Lies: Confronting and Rethinking Jewish 
Tradition55 examines Soloveitchik's fundamental thoughts on gender. Though himself a 
student of Soloveitchik, Rabbi Hartman was known56 as a relatively liberal figure in 
Orthodoxy and does not refrain from criticizing his teacher. A chapter headed ''Where 
Did Modern Orthodoxy Go Wrong'' investigates what Hartman considers to be his 
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“mistaken halakhic presumptions”. The author criticizes Modern Orthodox Judaism in 
general for having been static in many respects and refusing to move and grow despite 
moral imperatives and simple logic. This, in the view of the author, has resulted in harm 
to many people, including women. A prime example is said to be Soloveitchik's position 
on the aguna issue. Soloveitchik, the author believes, failed to tackle the problem because 
of his faithfulness to an ancient presumption about women that no longer holds true. This 
presumption and Soloveitchik's commitment to not allowing its modification, Hartman 
regrets, has made the aguna crisis irresolvable. 
The secondary literature on Mutahhari and Soloveitchik is of unequal quality. I 
have also found it to be of limited use for my work, especially in the case of Mutahhari. 
My approach, in any case, is centered on analysis of primary texts; although it should be 
said that these texts are not necessarily written by Mutahhari and Soloveitchik for 
publication but consist, for the most part, of lectures gathered and edited by their 
followers and pupils. This is a widespread custom in traditional circles in both Judaism 
and Islam. 
Such a study requires a cogent basis for comparison. Comparison of the views of 
the Ayatollah and Rabbi is made possible by parallel elements existing at two levels: 
first, their individual concerns and accomplishments; and second, the impact of external 
factors such as prevailing social, and cultural circumstances. Although these two levels 
cannot be sharply divided and are at times intertwined, I will separate them here in the 
introduction for analytical purposes. 
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Parallels between Mutahhari and Soloveitchik at the individual level are evident 
both in their overall thought and views in regard to gender. First, both profess an 
uncompromising devotion to the principles of their tradition; to put it differently, they see 
themselves as traditionalists. Second, each at the same time acknowledges that it is 
necessary to attend to contemporary circumstances and exigencies. They may have been 
traditionalists, but neither was hide-bound. Third, neither Mutahhari nor Soloveitchik 
hesitate to make use of different branches of human sciences such as psychology and 
sociology, and above all classic and Western philosophy. They each take from modern 
knowledge what they find meaningful and useful. And last, but certainly not least, both 
the Ayatollah and the Rabbi pay a great deal of attention to the concept of humanity. The 
Human Being is a central – perhaps the central - theme in the religious thoughts of both 
figures, and this theme in turn deeply informs their views of Woman. 
Within this frame, Mutahhari and Soloveitchik both place as key issues woman's 
creation, the purpose of that creation, the first sin, female spiritual capability and the 
origin and purpose of gender differences and roles. While they do not necessarily share 
views on these matters, the mere fact that they are common concerns facilitates 
comparative examination. Finally, the central theme running through their discussions on 
women in particular and gender in general is the significance and the centrality of the 
family. For Mutahhari and Soloveitchik, the family is the foundation of a godly society, 
and woman's rights and responsibilities are reflected upon mainly in light of 
strengthening family relations. 
Parallel external factors facilitating comparison have already been suggested in 
the short biographies of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik. Though from different worlds, both 
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lived through roughly similar intellectual and social circumstances. They passed a major 
part of their scholarly life in a period after World War II in which religious belief systems 
came under fierce attack; both East and West saw the rise of Marxism, atheist 
existentialism, and secular feminism (though the last had less impact in the Muslim 
world). All of this threw into question not only the validity but very feasibility of 
religious views on women. 
In the midst of such circumstances, the two religious scholars felt compelled to 
defend their respective traditions by resisting, countering, or in some cases selectively 
coming to terms with modern views.57 It may be said that they attempt to redefine the 
principles of their religious worldviews in ways that respond or at least attend to the 
concerns of modern times; but always with great care to avoid distortion for the sake of 
compatibility with contemporary views and values. The Ayatollah and the Rabbi found 
the issue of women to be especially sensitive in this regard, because it was felt to be a 
vulnerable point through which non-religious approaches could potentially gain 
influence. Mutahhari and Soloveitchik both feared the emergence of a misguided and 
misleading reading of their traditions’ teachings about gender. 
At the same time, both scholars were caught between conflicting currents in their 
communities. Liberal elements criticized Mutahhari and Soloveitchik (the latter more 
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than the former, for reasons given above) for being orthodox,58 while their views in 
general and approach to gender issues in particular stirred criticism and even what may 
be described as backlash from mainstream traditional scholars. They were accused both 
of being too moderate and too traditionalist. 
Last, it should be noted that gender qua gender was not the primary or 
fundamental concern of either scholar. Ayatollah Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik 
certainly were concerned with women’s rights, and they were aware of social and 
intellectual developments that advanced or sought to advance the status of women. This 
concern, however, sprung from a conviction that their respective traditions, if understood 
correctly (i.e., the way they understood them), acknowledged women's rights and gave 
them an ideal position. Thus their views are necessarily embedded in their traditions, and 
their discourse on women's individual, social, and spiritual positions does not necessarily 
address let alone conform to concerns raised in current non-religious gender thought. In 
order to appreciate Mutahhari’s and Soloveitchik’s worldviews, this should not be 
thought of as a limitation, but rather particular orientation. 
The thesis consists of three chapters. Chapters one and two discuss the views of 
Mutahhari and Soloveitchik on women and gender, including the theoretical and practical 
aspects of their thought. By “theoretical”, I mean the creation of woman, the purpose of 
her creation, her first sinful act, spiritual capability, and male-female differences; in other 
words, an overall worldview. By “practical”, I mean views concerning women's position 
in the family and society and how these are affected by Islamic and Jewish law. In this 
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regard, Mutahhari's views on veiling and Soloveitchik's views on education and prayer 
groups will be specifically examined. These two chapters are rather long. I tried dividing 
them into the ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ as described above, but found that this 
fragmented my subjects’ thought, without giving the compensation of making 
comparison easier, since they configure and express their concerns differently. Their 
similarities and differences and the significance of each do not lie on the surface and are 
better appreciated when the views of the two thinkers are presented as a whole. To put it 
another way, the gender thought of each figure must be seen in context of their thought 
overall, and I found I was able to portray the context better in this format. 
The placement of the chapters on the two figures should also be explained. It 
might seem more logical to place Soloveitchik first rather than Mutahhari, since 
Soloveitchik was born somewhat earlier, belongs to the tradition prior in time, and is 
more likely to be a ready reference point for Western readers. I have started with 
Mutahhari instead because he remains the more ready reference for me, despite the 
opportunities I have had to study Judaism. Nevertheless, I have tried to give Soloveitchik 
almost equal consideration; the chapter on Soloveitchik is in fact somewhat longer as he 
elaborated his thought more, probably because he lived much longer than Martyr 
Mutahhari (ninety as opposed to sixty years) and was able to lead a quiet, scholarly life. 
Mutahhari, on the other hand, was constantly involved in politics – including a month in 
prison – before his life was finally cut short. In order to make the work accessible to 
readers familiar only with either Islam or Judaism, I have added notes explaining even 
common terms (e.g. ijtihad, Halakhah) relating to both traditions. 
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The third and final chapter of the thesis is the core of this study. In this chapter, I 
hope to place specific features of the two worldviews in comparative perspective while 
looking at Ayatollah Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik’s visions of their respective 
traditions as seen through the lens of the issue of women. The goal is to use the thought 
concerning women and gender of each figure to throw light on the other; that is, not 
simply to point out similarities and differences,
59
 but use these as a starting point for 
further discussion. In David Freidenreich’s article, already referred to in the notes above, 
surveying comparative approaches to religion over the last few decades, he refers to an 
ideal approach that allows one to “learn from parallel cases” by creatively examining 
“particular aspects of individual traditions” while being careful to “compare elements 
from multiple religious traditions only after examining them in their original contexts” 
[emphasis in the original].
60
 This is the method I have tried to apply, while also using 
comparison to reveal interesting absences and “offer possible explanations for problems 
encountered in the study of a single tradition.”61 
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Chapter One: Woman in the Thought of Ayatollah Mutahhari 
I will begin this chapter by situating Ayatollah Mutahhari in the landscape of 
modern Islamic gender thought. This is particularly important for Western readers who 
may not be familiar with Islam and the variety of views circulating in the tradition. Issues 
related to women, and gender, are intensely debated in Islam. There is little consensus not 
only among feminists, but also within traditional religious circles. Nor are religious and 
feminist discourses in Islam necessarily exclusive of each other or completely opposed. 
They naturally have different emphases and objectives; but they are also similar in some 
ways since they are stimulated by the same social and cultural change, and Islam is seen 
by both to be a key issue. It is true, however, that most religious discourse is markedly 
defensive. Its chief aim is to defend the tradition in the face of current gender awareness 
and feminist critiques that insist on women's rights and gender equality. This 
characteristic is also displayed in the writings of Ayatollah Mutahhari. 
The central principle that unites the diverse currents within religious discourse is 
that gender roles and rights are to be defined in the framework of the Quran and Islamic 
law. Feminism, on the other hand, posits women's rights and gender equality as an 
independent principle. Uncompromising adherence to these two principles represents the 
extreme point in each spectrum, and using them as boundary marks allows for a better 
understanding of other currents within each camp. At the same time, diversity within 
each discourse allows for the emergence of some cross-discourse, i.e. exchange between 
the two chief currents. This is also, as we shall see, evident in the case of Ayatollah 
Mutahhari. 
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The extreme current of the traditional religious approach to gender involves not 
only reliance on the Quran and the Hadith, but a thoroughly patriarchal understanding of 
these two scriptures. The extreme approach does not seem to view gender issues as open 
to debate and discussion. It engages in discussion solely for the purpose of maintaining 
its hold on Muslims and assumes itself to be the sole legitimate representative of Islamic 
thought. The Wahhabis, a group dominating religious discourse in contemporary Saudi 
Arabia, represent this approach, which has led to a national policy that promotes 
seclusion and a limited social role for women.
62
 This outlook is greatly indebted to 
medieval thought. Two representatives of this thought frequently cited by traditional 
scholars are Ibn al-Jawzi (d.1200 CE) and al-Ghazali (1058-1111CE). Ibn al-Jawzi 
speaks of women in his book Kitab Ahkam al-Nisa (“Book of Rulings on Women”) in 
terms of "immoral seduction, shameful nakedness and indiscriminate lust.” He advises 
that women be “imprisoned” in the house, “for like female snakes, women are expected 
to burrow into their homes."
63
 The views of al-Ghazali, one of the most prominent and 
influential theologians, jurists, and mystics of Sunni Islam, are reflected in his Nasihat ul-
Moluk (“Advice For Kings”). According to al-Ghazali, most women are of dubious 
morality and limited intelligence. He likens them to animals, warning readers to "be 
aware that women's characteristics are of ten kinds, each of which is similar to the 
attribute of an animal."
64
 He actually goes on to name ten animals and explain why a 
woman is comparable to each. Those rare women who share the characteristics of a ship, 
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on the other hand, enjoy al-Ghazali's praise: "And a woman of the character of a ship is 
blessed, for there is a benefit in each part of a ship. Such a woman benefits all; she is kind 
to her husband, family, neighbors, and children, and she obeys God. Be aware that a 
virtuous and covered (mastur) woman is one of God's bounties bestowed on a man."
65
 
Extreme conservative discourse depends much on the idea that women have a certain 
innate, negative nature and character; this idea, as can be seen from the material just 
quoted, begins in the mediaeval sources. 
This traditional outlook does not, however, mean that misogyny necessarily 
colours all traditional discourse today. For one thing, nearly all scriptural material used to 
support misogyny is from the hadith rather than Quran. The hadiths are an oral tradition 
that preserves the ethic and attitudes of the Muslim community over the centuries, so that 
it is not surprising to find much woman-negative material, as well as some woman-
positive statements apparently reflecting different voices. The writings of Ayatollah 
Mutahhari demonstrate a thorough commitment to the gender views of the tradition, but 
they are not marred by misogyny. 
There is also a wide spectrum of feminist discourse in Islam, ranging from secular 




 and Leila Ahmed,
68
 
promote women's rights and equality without necessarily being concerned with the 
religious implications of their views. Here we see, as noted above, the effect of women's 
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rights and gender equality as independent principles. Figures such as the British-Iranian 
academic Ziba Mir-Hosseini, on the other hand, aim to reconcile feminism with religion 
and espouse an “Islamic feminism” (a term applied, it should be noted, largely by non-
Muslims). For Islamic feminists, equality is still a basic principle, but one that can also be 
discovered in religion. 
Reactions to the issue of veiling are an indication of the variety of approaches 
within feminism. Feminists have squared women’s rights with veiling in quite different 
ways. Nawal El Saadawi, for instance, speaks of "veiling the brain", referring to a young 
relative who, in her view, had been intelligent and brave until she put on the veil. After 
that, according to El Saadawi, it became impossible to conduct a normal discussion with 
her.
69
 El Saadawi’s opposition to Muslim covering is best reflected in her pronouncement 
that: "women who wear the veil and say they choose to do so are either lying or 
ignorant."
70
 However, few feminists these days hold El Saadawi’s view. Fatima Mernissi 
questions the use of the veil, claiming that there is no Quranic evidence indicating that it 
is an Islamic obligation,
71
 while El Saadawi does not seem to be concerned with the 
Quran at all and simply rejects veiling as a practice that violates women's rights. Leila 
Ahmed, on the other hand, although she originally rejected covering for Muslim women 
by arguing that it was a requirement only for the wives of the Prophet,
72
 has in a recent 
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publication accepted that it is a valid “choice” that should be left to individuals.73 The 
variety of approaches taken by El Saadawi, Mernissi, and Ahmed demonstrates diversity 
within “pure” feminism. 
Islamic feminism maintains a twofold focus on both feminism and Islam. It holds 
that women's liberation and rights should be defined and determined in the framework of 
Islamic belief. Mir-Hosseini elaborates on what that means in her view:  
The term Islamic, when attached to another –ism, just means 
finding legitimacy in Islamic text and sources. In this manner, the 
word “feminism” in Islamic feminism cannot be used to signify a 
lack of religion, nor can the term “Islamic” within Islamic 
feminism be used to signify Islamists.
 74
 
Mir-Hosseini and other Islamic feminists such as Amina Wadud
75
 approach women's 
issues from within Islam. Unlike secular and quasi-secular Muslim feminists, such as El 
Saadawi, Mernissi, and Ahmed, they believe that Islam has the potential to address 
women's issues in ways that promote gender justice and equality. Mir-Hosseini and 
Wadud both believe that the system of Islamic law or Shariah has contributed to gender 
inequality and injustice; but unlike secular Muslim feminists, they do not choose for this 
reason to distance themselves from the tradition altogether. Rather, they remain in the 
system and push it towards a reading of the Shariah in which women, as Mir-Hosseini 
puts it, are "treated as second-class citizens in the fiqh [law] books that came to define the 
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terms of the shari'ah."
76
 With a similar objective of encouraging change within the 
bounds of the Shariah, Wadud refers to “the subtleties of reforming [Islamic] laws for 
equality and justice, not just for today but forever… [and] addressing the tension in 
certain Quranic passages” concerning justice and equality.77 
There is another current of thought concerning women and Islam that attempts to 
secure progress on women’s issues while adhering to Islamic teachings. While aiming at 
a certain reform in response to social and cultural changes, this type of thought is highly 
conscious of the need to defend Islamic teachings on gender issues from accusations that 
they are the reason for women's inferior position in Muslim societies. This approach is a 
mediate one; it cautiously avoids being labeled traditionalist or fanatic, while vehemently 
rejecting feminism as an import from the West. According to this view, Islamic gender 
values and teachings possess all that is necessary to define women's rights and roles. In 
its definition of gender roles and rights, this approach relies a great deal on the idea of 
male and female differences as determined by nature and the complementary gender 
roles. 
Ayatollah Morteza Mutahhari represents this approach in the context of Shiite 
Iran. It is instructive to compare Mutahhari with the Indo-Pakistani Sunni thinker Abu al-
Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979). Mawdudi relies on similar assumptions concerning the 
inherent natures of the sexes and complementary roles, for instance in his well-known 
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and widely translated Purdah: Veil and the Status of Woman in Islam.
 78
 Mawdudi’s view 
is distinctly different from the traditionalist outlook described above in that he stresses 
the equal worth and humanity of man and woman in Islam,
79
 attributing ideas about the 
inferiority and evil of women to other traditions such as Judaism and Christianity. He 
firmly rejects what he believes to be the Western approach toward woman in which she is 
expected to enjoy equality with man in all areas at the expense (so he thinks) of 
undermining her natural qualities and differences with man. 
Mutahhari’s thought and logic on women's issues is similar to that of Mawdudi in 
many ways. Although there is no concrete evidence of influence, it seems likely that he 
was influenced by him, particularly in his System of Women’s Rights in Islam (Nizam-i 
Huquq-i zan dar Islam). There are, at the same time, many disagreements between the 
two, concerning women's covering and space and other issues. For instance, as is evident 
from the title of his book, Mawdudi argues for the necessity of veiling, which for him 
includes confinement and covering of the face, while Mutahhari goes exactly in the 
opposite direction by arguing against both on the grounds that they compromise women's 
mobility and freedom. It is principally the issue of social presence or space, crystallized 
in different views of covering that divides the two. 
The approaches of Mawdudi and Mutahhari to scriptures are also different. In his 
interpretation of the Quranic verses on satr (covering), Mawdudi relies heavily on the 
traditions (hadiths) of the Prophet – in fact, mostly of the Prophet's Companions, since 
there are so few hadiths on clothing attributed to the Prophet himself. Mutahhari, on the 
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other hand, refers mainly to the Quran along with carefully selected traditions of the 
Prophet and Shiite Imams. Mutahhari’s reliance on the Quran rather than hadith is in fact 
key to his relatively moderate discourse, since nearly all scriptural material used to 
support misogyny is from the hadith rather than Quran. Mutahhari is critical of hadiths. 
He often discusses the authenticity and applicability of hadith texts, as traditional 
scholarship allows. Mutahhari is in fact a pioneer in confronting what is known in Persian 
as “akhbarigari,” i.e. excessive attachment to hadith. Mawdudi is less cautious regarding 
hadith, allowing him to construct a less moderate but still scripturally justified discourse 
on women. 
This brief sketch of different perspectives ranging from secular to extreme 
traditionalist sheds lights on Mutahhari's position in the spectrum. He manages to 
distance himself from both traditionalism and feminism, while drawing, in some ways, on 
both. The chapter begins by examining how Ayatollah Mutahhari defines women's 
position through the Quran and then goes on to his discussion of women’s individual and 
social rights and responsibilities, including the issue, very important for him, of veiling. 
In order to understand Mutahhari's motivation in writing on women, one has to go 
back to the mid-1960’s when he began contributing articles to a well-known women's 
magazine called Zan-i Ruz (Today's Woman).
80
 In an introduction to his major work on 
women, The System of Woman's Rights in Islam, Mutahhari explains how he found 
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himself writing articles for a magazine that was mainly voicing feminist approaches. He 
knew that simply writing in such a publication was likely to provoke negative reaction 
from his religious audience. Nevertheless, he accepted a suggestion by a fellow 
clergyman to reply to a discussion that appeared in the magazine in 1966 which largely 
favoured changing Iranian civil family laws from an Islamic to more secular model. The 
magazine agreed to publish Mutahhari's responses to an article written by a pro-reform 
judge by the name of Ebrahim Mahdavi-Zanjani, and these were subsequently gathered 
and published in book form.
81
 Mutahhari's writing in Zan-i Ruz and his permission for the 
publication of the articles in book form are evidence of his desire to reach a wider 
audience, and especially women. That a member of the clergy would attempt to reach out 
to a female audience is intriguing in itself. 
This was Mutahari's first public discussion of women's issues in Islam, though it 
was, he says, the result of years of studying women's rights in Islam as one of his main 
research interests.
82
 Mutahhari's mere agreement to write in Zan-i Ruz demonstrates his 
willingness to go against the mainstream. He explained his motives as follows: 
It is not my intention to defend the civil law, and certainly not my 
intention to claim that it is a comprehensive law that conforms 
with Islamic laws and correct social criteria, as I myself have some 
criticism of the civil law… Very often I witness calamities and 
tensions in family relations, and I believe that there should be 
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fundamental reforms in this regard. However, contrary to [some 
extreme traditionalists], I do not say that Iranian men are innocent 
and the blame rests entirely on civil law and its following of 
Islamic jurisprudence. Changing the civil law is not, in my 
opinion, the only way to reform. I therefore intend to examine the 
Islamic laws pertaining to marital rights and the marriage 
relationship that have been criticized … I will argue that these laws 
are, in truth, legislated in accordance with subtle psychological, 
natural, and social considerations. I will argue that men and 
women are equally honored and respected in these laws. I will also 
argue that Islamic law, if administered correctly, ensures sound 
and healthy marital relations.
83
 
Thus Islamic laws concerning gender, which are chiefly reflected in family law, do not, 
in Mutahhari's view, contribute to women's legal, social, or cultural problems in Iran. The 
problem, as far as there is one, lies elsewhere and should be tackled at the level of 




1. Woman in the Quran: Towards an Altered Attitude 
Mutahhari’s fundamental premise in discussing the Quran is that it provided 
humanity with a new approach to women, significantly changing woman's status 
compared to her position in pre-Islamic position.
85
 Mutahhari, in other words, considers 
the Quran to be a revolutionary document. As a philosopher and theologian, he also goes 
beyond the legal aspects of the Quran and Shariah, that is partly based on it, to discuss 
the philosophical and theological grounds for the Quran's views on women and gender 
relations. He does, to be sure, address legal issues such as marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance, but definitely not as his primary purpose or in a legalistic fashion. 
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On the other hand, Mutahhari emphasizes that the Quran's liberating view of 
women is reflected in the application of Shariah laws. The idea that Shariah is a window 
to gender egalitarianism is in a sharp contrast to the approach of Muslim feminists such 
as Mir-Hosseini, who considers the Shariah as often treating women as second-class 
citizens. Shariah marks the great dividing line between the Ayatollah and “Islamic 
feminists”. 
The subjects through which Mutahhari develops his understanding of the position 
of women in the Quran are women's creation, the first sin, and spiritual capacity. These 
topics actually do not receive great attention in the text of the Quran, apart from a limited 
number of verses that obliquely address creation and Eve's share in humanity’s fall from 
grace. Mutahhari's focus on these episodes seems to derive from his conviction that the 
treatment of these episodes in the Bible places women in a negative light, while (so he 
argues) the Quran presents a more correct view.
86
 His motivation, in other words, is 
partly polemical. 
1.1 Creation of Woman 
In Mutahhari’s view, the Quran’s account of creation provides a firm indication of 
the status of women as defined in the scriptures. Thus he declares: 
In the Quran unlike in other scriptures [evidently referring to the 
Bible], there is no mention of woman being created from material 
inferior to that of man and certainly no mention of the first woman 
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being created of Adam's left side. There is no humiliating approach 
to woman's nature and her creation in Islam.
87
 
In Mutahhari’s interpretation, the Quran says that Adam and Eve were created from the 
same essence, as in the following verse: "It is He [God] who created you from a single 
person [nafs, which may also be translated as self or soul] and made of that self a mate of 
the same nature in order that it might find tranquility with that mate" (Q. 7:189). In 
support of this view, Mutahhari also cites a verse that refers to the whole of humanity: 
"Among His signs is [the fact] that He has created spouses for you from among 
yourselves so that you may console yourselves with them. He has planted affection and 
mercy between you; in that are signs for people who reflect" (Q. 30:21). 
Mutahhari may have been influenced in this interpretation by his teacher Allameh 
Tabataba’i, who in his Quranic exegesis al-Mizan takes the further step of asserting that 
man and woman were created not only of the same essence, but also simultaneously. 
Concerning Quran 39:6, "He created you [all] from a single person: then created, of like 
nature, his mate", Tabataba’i emphasizes that Adam and Eve share the same level of 
humanity because they were created from the same nature, and that the Arabic word 
thumma (then) in this verse does not indicate any priority in humanity of Adam over Eve. 
Tabataba’i believes that the word "then" in this verse is simply used to recount the events, 
and not to imply that Eve was made from part of Adam's body or that she was necessarily 
created after Adam.
88
 Tabataba’i here rejects the idea held by some other Muslim 
exegetes, including, surprisingly, the contemporary Iranian Shiite scholar Nasir Makarim-
i Shirazi who is otherwise known for his relatively progressive gender approach. 
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Makarim-i Shirazi interprets the verse as indicating that: "God created Adam and then 
created his wife from the remaining clay. The creation of Eve was subsequent to the 
creation of Adam and before the creation of Adam's children."
89
 
Mutahhari's response to the ontological question of how woman was created is 
followed by the teleological question of why she was created. Mutahhari's response is 
found in his discussion of the wider issue of the purpose of human's creation. Women, 
Mutahhari understands from the Quran, are as human as men, and thus they must have 
been created for the same reason humans were created. Mutahhari further argues that 
according to the Quran, the whole universe is created for human beings (insan), a 
Quranic word that is a gender-neutral in Arabic, as in Quran 76:2: "We created human 
beings (insan) from a drop of sperm.”90 Mutahhari further emphasizes that the Quran 
never excludes women from being human, so that women are as much the goal of 
creation as men. In other words, women as part of the human population (al-nas, another 
Quranic gender-neutral word) to whom the Prophet was sent and for whom the Quran 
was revealed; they are part of this audience. Thus Mutahhari writes: 
There exists another humiliating view [in the Bible] of woman, 
based on which woman was believed to be created for the benefit 
of man. Islam has never accepted such an attitude and expresses 
the purpose of creation in clear terms. Islam says explicitly that the 
earth and heavens, clouds and wind, and plants and animals were 
all created for the sake of human beings; but it never says that 
woman was created for man.
91
 
Based on his gender-free concept of human beings, Mutahhari then goes on to argue that 
the Quran promotes mutual benefit and support between the spouses. In Mutahhari's 
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understanding of the Quran, man is created for woman as much as woman is created for 
man. This he gleans from the verse of the Quran, which reads: "They [wives] are your 
garments and ye are their garments" (Q. 2:187). The metaphor of a garment in this verse, 
says Mutahhari, extends to the covering by the spouses of each other’s weaknesses, 
providing mutual support, comfort and protection, and adorning each other’s dignity and 
self-respect. 
Mutahhari makes much of the inferior position of women in Arabia before Islam, 
where a woman was treated, he says, as if she were created for men. This attitude, 
Mutahhari believes, was reflected in laws regulating spousal and gender relations that 
effectively made women chattels. He recalls that in pre-Islamic Arabia, a woman could 
be transferred to another owner or even inherited by the relatives of her deceased 
husband. The Quran, Mutahhari declares, takes a stand against this practice where it 
states: "You are forbidden to inherit women against their will”, while the same verse goes 
on to say: “Nor should ye treat them with harshness, that you may take away part of the 
dower you have given them… [and] live with them on a footing of kindness and equity” 
(Q. 4:19). Mutahhari is also concerned with women's right to enjoy the fruits of their 
labour, which he finds in a phrase of Quran: "To men is allotted what they earn, and to 
women what they earn”(Q. 4:32). 92 
Mutahhari warns that the attitude that woman are created for the benefit of men 
and effectively belong to them should not be viewed as existing only in the past. He 
speaks about unfair treatment of women by their husbands that is rooted in the same 
attitude, and he reprimands men who treat women for neglecting the message of the 
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Quran.
93
 Thus the fault for current conditions is not to be found with Islam, but (male) 
Muslims. This message no doubt had considerable appeal for the Ayatollah’s female 
audience. 
Mutahhari also criticizes the West for profiting from women.
94
 In his view, 
having women work in inappropriate and undignified circumstances and exhibiting them 
under-clothed or in fashionable attire are simply modern forms of abuse. Whereas in the 
old system, it was mostly the husband who mistreated his wife, in modern times, 
according to Mutahhari, women are abused by the whole system. Mutahhari criticizes the 
West for abusing its own female citizens; but his chief concern, he says, is for women in 
the Muslim world who have become victims of westernization in the name of 
modernization. 
Mutahhari’s views of the West seem rather severe. It should, however, be noted 
that his critique of the West lacks the intense polemic tone that exists in, for instance, the 
work of Mawdudi, since he equally and even to a greater extent criticizes Muslims 
themselves for their adulation of the West and its extravagances. He criticizes Muslims 
who put all the blame on the West instead of addressing the cultural problems of the 
Muslim community. Nor does he reject all manifestations of Western culture as 
inherently evil; what is inappropriate, in his view, is blind imitation of the West. Thus he 
warns that Muslims should: 
approach the Western style of life watchfully and selectively; that 
is to say, use and adapt Western knowledge, industry, and 
praiseworthy and imitable social ways while avoiding adoption of 
customs and lifestyles that have brought misery and affliction on 
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Westerners themselves. [This would prohibit] changing Iran's 
[presently Islamic-based] civil laws and [traditional] family 
relations to conform with European laws.
95
 
The difference between this view of Western society and that of extreme traditionalists is 
considerable. Mutahhari does, however, agree with traditionalist Muslim scholars, such 
as Mawdudi, that the Western lifestyle undermines moral values in man-woman relations. 
In the view of both, the Western lifestyle involves unrestrained, ultimately immoral 
relationships between men and women in the name of equality, ultimately leading to 
undermining the foundations of family life. Again, these characteristics of the West do 
not, however, deter Mutahhari from acknowledging its positive accomplishments, among 
which he counts social services and women's education: 
It is regrettable that some ignorant individuals suppose that as 
social services are being conducted efficiently in the West, so are 
family issues and problems similarly addressed and solved. Such 
persons imagine that this is due to our own deficiencies… and that 
we should compensate by following and imitating the West. This is 
a hollow illusion; they [Westerners] are much worse off than we 
are…. Except in the area of women's education, they are in much 
worse shape in regard to gender issues.
96
 
Note Mutahhari’s focus in each case. The source of mistreatment of women in the West 
is presumed to be society or the economic system; while in Islam or Iran, it is said to be 
husbands. Perhaps Mutahhari judged that families and marital relations were weak in the 
West as a result of free gender relations, so that he does not bother to mention the 
problem of husbands, since the concept of a sustainable Western-style family seemed 
remote. In a traditional Muslim society such as the Iran of Mutahhari's era, on the other 
hand, where women were still commonly found in the home, mistreatment of women in 
workplaces might have been considered a remote possibility not worth elaborating on. It 
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is unlikely, in any case, that Mutahhari had any real knowledge of the condition of 
Western women or even Iranian women who worked, whether from the upper or lower 
classes. His principal aim was to persuade and outline ideals rather than address practical 
realities. 
According to Ayatollah Mutahhari, the ideal is to be found in the teachings of the 
Quran. In the Quranic model as understood by Mutahhari, woman and man are created 
for each other, while the whole universe is created for both as they are completely equal 
in their humanity, for which reason they are referred to as al-nas (humans) or insan 
(human being) rather than in gendered terms. In the Quranic view, as expounded by 
Mutahhari, love and affection, rather than sexual desire, also bonds the two sexes. It is 
interesting that, while traditional Islamic law fully recognizes sexuality in marriage, the 
Ayatollah presents a rather idealized and chaste view of the institution. 
Mutahhari's exegesis is, like most interpretative endeavors, selective. This is seen 
in his treatment of Quran 7:189 already quoted above: "It is He who created you from a 
single person and made that self a mate of the same nature, in order that the self might 
find tranquility with that mate". Mutahhari’s highlighting of the egalitarianism of the 
verse undermines the phrase immediately following that addresses the purpose of Eve's 
creation, that the self (i.e. Adam) find tranquility in her. Turning aside from this phrase, 
he instead brings in the verse (again quoted above) that uses the metaphor of a garment to 
characterize the ideal relationship between mates. This introduces a potential difficulty in 
that Quran 7:189 is the only occasion in the Quran where a specific purpose for Eve's 
creation is mentioned; but Mutahhari chooses to ignore the difficulty in favor of proving 
the equal humanity of women and thus the superior attitude of Islam. Allamah Tabataba’i 
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states in very clear terms that God created a wife (zawj) for Adam (seen by him as the 
father of humankind) in order that Adam might enjoy tranquility, while he does not 
mention Eve's finding tranquility in Adam.
97
 Mutahhari cannot afford to follow this view, 
even if it comes from his intellectual and spiritual mentor. 
1.2 Woman's Historical Sin 
In Judeo-Christian lore, according to Mutahhari, Eve was the first to commit the 
sin of disobeying God's command not to eat from the fruit of a specific tree. Not only was 
Eve deceived easily by Satan, but she also tempted Adam. Thus in the view of Judaism 
and Christianity, woman and not man was the first sinner. Although the temptation of 
Eve is certainly not unknown in Muslim literature,
98
 its absence in the Quran is often 
mentioned by Muslim polemicists as evidence of a better Islamic attitude toward women, 
and Mutahhari is no exception.
99
 
Regarding Eve as a temptress is not the end of story, Mutahhari warns, because 
these characteristics are then considered to be typical of women in general. Mutahhari 
maintains that the outlook presented in the Jewish and the Christian scriptures has 
affected attitudes and even literature by making woman the object of sin and cause of 
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evil; woman comes to be considered a medium through which Satan deceives man.
100
 
Setting aside the attribution of this view solely to Judaism and Christianity, we might 
credit Ayatollah Mutahhari with some cultural insight here. His motivation, however, is 
essentially polemical; he believes that by presenting a different account of the story of 
Eve and Adam, the Quran aimed to change that attitude. In the Quranic account, 
Mutahhari stresses, Eve is present, but not as a temptress. The dual form of the Arabic 
verb assigns the action to both Adam and Eve, and thus the verse, according to 
Mutahhari, is meant to  explicitly refute the idea found in Judaism and Christianity that 
Eve caused Adam to commit the first sin of humankind and thereby brought about their 
fall from Heaven to Earth.
101
 The relevant verse reads: "So Satan whispered to them to 
show them both their private parts which had gone unnoticed by either. He said: ‘Your 
Lord only forbids you this tree so that you will not become two angels or you both 
become immortal’” (Q. 7:20). Mutahhari believes that the verse is careful to declare 
women’s innocence by emphasizing that both Adam and Eve were tempted by Satan and 
were equally guilty of disobeying God’s order: 
The Quran tells the story of Paradise, but it nowhere says that the 
Devil or Serpent misled Eve and Eve then misled Adam. It neither 
blames Eve nor exonerates her. The Quran (7:20-21) says: We said 
to Adam: Take residence in Paradise both you and your spouse and 
eat the fruit thereof freely wherever you wish, but go not near that 
tree lest you become wrongdoers. The Quran puts the pronouns in 
dual form whenever it speaks of the Devil's temptations, so that it 
says: ‘Then Satan made a suggestion to them [both], then he led 
them [both] on with guile, and he [Satan] swore to them [both]: I 
am a sincere advisor to you [both]’.102 
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Mutahhari, in my view, would have done well also to tackle the misogynous teachings of 
renowned Muslim scholars of the rank of al-Ghazali and Ibn al-Jawzi. He was surely 
aware of them. Perhaps he avoided a thorough critique because he was trying to reach a 
popular audience, so that his argument had to be direct and simple. He also no doubt 
preferred to maintain a dichotomy between Islamic and non-Islamic gender views; his 
aim, again, was persuasive rather than critical. 
1.3 Woman's Spiritual Capability 
Mutahhari asserts that the idea that women are not capable of the same spiritual 
achievements as men is also refuted by the Quran. His prime proof-verse is Quran 49:13, 
in which taqwa (piety or virtue) is emphasized as the sole criterion in determining the 
superiority of one individual over another, regardless of “tribe” and “nation” (perhaps 
what we would call these days race and ethnicity). The verse reads: "O mankind, we 
created you from a single [pair], of a male and a female, and made you into nations and 
tribes that you may know each other. Verily the most honored of you in the sight of God 
is the most righteous.”103 In Mutahhari’s view, the meaning of the verse also includes 
gender, i.e. that taqwa and not gender is the criterion for being “honored in the sight of 
God”. Another similar verse (Q. 33:35) emphasizes that proximity to God and being 
rewarded by Him are solely the result of an individual's faith and good deeds. In this 
verse, gender is specifically mentioned: 
For Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for 
devout men and women, for true men and women, for men and 
women who are patient and constant, for men and women who 
humble themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for 
men and women who fast, for men and women who guard their 
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chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah's 
praise: for these, God has prepared forgiveness and great reward. 
Mutahhari also adduces as evidence that the Quran means to reject the idea that women 
are spiritually inferior; that the narratives it contains about women who serve as role 
models are for all humans and not just other women. Pointing to Pharaoh’s wife, Moses’ 
mother, and Jesus’ mother, Mutahhari declares that the spiritual heroes of the Quran are 
not only men. Mary is especially significant in this respect because of her high spiritual 
achievements, which amazed even Zakariya, the prophet of her time.
104
  Mutahhari 
further argues that religious history in the Quran is both male and female (muthannath), 
women having played both indirect and direct roles.
105
 By indirect role, Mutahhari means 
that women always influence men, including husbands, sons and other male relatives; 
when a man makes history, there is inevitably a woman behind the scenes who influences 
him.
106
 One might think this view of Mutahhari’s, at first glance at least, to be an attempt 
to practice the methods of women’s history. 
Mutahhari asserts that women mentioned in the Quran have played a direct role in 
religious history as well. He cites the instances of Eve, Sarah, Hagar, Asiah (the wife of 
Pharaoh), Moses' mother, his sister, and Mary (Maryam), Jesus' mother. He also mentions 
Fatimah, one of the daughters of the Prophet, and Khadijah, his first wife. 
However, although Mutahhari acknowledges the spiritual achievements of women 
and their indirect and direct roles, he is unable to point to independent roles. As is clear 
from the examples he gives, prominent women in the three Abrahamic religions were 
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significant due to their connections to important men. Some of the women Mutahhari 
mentions are not even named in the scriptures, but known only through these 
connections; these include Eve (whose name, Hawwa, only emerges in tradition outside 
the Quran), Pharaoh's wife, and Moses’s mother and sister. Though these women are 
praised in the Quran, the shadow cast over them by males cannot be ignored. 
Mutahhari is aware of the problem and explains the relative lack of independent 
standing for women by separating spiritual and social standing. Borrowing from Islamic 
mysticism, he introduces the notions of a "[descending] journey from God to man” (in 
Arabic, sayr min al-haqq ila al-khalq) and “[ascending] journey from man to God" (sayr 
min al-khalq ila al-haqq). He explains women's position in the two phases as follows: 
Islam does not differentiate between man and woman in their 
journey towards God. It rather differentiates between them in the 
journey from God to people and in bearing the responsibility of 
prophethood, for which it considers man to be more suited.
107
 
Women's ineligibility for prophecy and presumably other formal positions is therefore 
not, according to Mutahhari, a sign of spiritual incapability, but only a result of gender 
differences that determine roles and positions in different aspects of the tradition.
108
 
Woman is capable of making the first journey towards God on an equal footing with man, 
since there is no social role to be played. She is not, however, entirely fit for the second 
journey in which one has to deal with the public and deliver messages and teachings 
collected in the first journey. Here Mutahhari does not struggle with the apparent 
limitation of the Quran, but accepts and perhaps even welcomes it. 
2. Gender Differences: The Origin and Applications 
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As a scholar determined to defend the Quran and assert that it “dignifies” women, 
Mutahhari could finally not afford to overlook its role in law. Although Islamic law is 
created largely through Hadiths, it nevertheless has a Quranic basis, while the law is often 
criticized for the restrictions it imposes on women. How does Mutahhari manage to 
reconcile these characteristics of traditional religious law with the ideal of gender 
equality he expounds on the basis of the revelation? One would expect the Ayatollah to 
be in a position to effectively address this question, as he was primarily a jurist.
109
 
Mutahhari approaches the problem by referring to the notion of human rights in 
general. He maintains that the only legitimate source of the rights of human beings is "the 
book of creation" (kitab-i takvin).
110
  This is essentially a philosophical rather than 
exegetical or legal argument; Mutahhari’s ability to move the discussion to philosophy 
(for which there is much more scope in Shiism than Sunnism) serves him well at this and 
other difficult junctures. According to Mutahhari, only creation itself is able to tell us 
what the rights of humans are and what relations should exist between men and women. 
He criticizes views that tend to neglect this universal or cosmic standard and rely instead 
on man-made documents such as The Declaration of Human Rights produced by the 
United Nations. 
Mutahhari’s attitude to the UN Declaration is interesting. He actually praises it for 
acknowledging human dignity and rights. However, he believes that the Declaration, and 
similar man-made documents, have failed to present a full and correct picture of human 
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beings,
111
 so that while their spirit is admirable, separate articles are often mistaken. This 
failure, in Mutahhari’s view, is due to over-reliance on limited human perspectives, 
which could have been prevented had they been informed by divine sources of 
knowledge. 
Thus Mutahhari seems to acknowledge the merit of certain secular concepts and 
instruments of human rights while asserting that Islam, along with, apparently, religious 
traditions in general, espouses the same values but in a better and more complete fashion. 
From Mutahhari’s perspective, his views are therefore not opposed to concepts of 
universal rights, but he merely ''corrects'' them. He is consequently able to appreciate the 
intention of the Declaration to provide humans of different races, nations, and even 
genders with human rights, while also criticizing the same document for failing to 
recognize that God, as the Creator of humans, knows best about rights and 
responsibilities.
112
 It is interesting indeed that Mutahhari feels compelled to acknowledge 
the Declaration, which he seems to honestly admire. This is not something one is likely to 
hear from traditionalist Muslim clerics even today. The Ayatollah does not, however, 
accept complete equality for women; rather, he draws the line at the sensitive boundaries 
of gender. 
In the view of Mutahhari, it is finally the ‘Book of Creation’ that best defines 
gender characteristics, roles, and rights as part of the arrangements for human 
characteristics and rights in general. By referring to takvin, which seems to imply a kind 
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of religious social science or natural rationality, Ayatollah Mutahhari is able to both 
escape particular laws and confirm their basic pattern. Thus he declares: 
It is evident that the only authoritative source of the knowledge of 
human rights is the great and valuable book of nature itself. Only by 
referring to the pages of this great book we can understand the 
common rights of all humanity and ascertain the legal position of 
men and women towards each other.
113
 
Note as well that Mutahhari's argument for gender laws derived from the Quran is based 
on the argument that man-made laws have failed. Troubles in society and between the 
sexes are thought to point to a basic problem, for which God (or His “Creation”) must 
have a solution. In answer to critics of the Shariah who accuse Islamic laws of 
undermining women's rights, Mutahhari says that it is rather they who seek to undermine 
women's distinctive natural attributes and aptitudes, which are the very basis for Islamic 
gender laws as legislated in the book of "takvin". The solution, in other words, is not to 
change or strike the Shariah, but fully realize it. 
Traditional Shiite discourse relies on both revelation (embracing the Quran and 
the Hadiths of the Shiite Imams), called naql or “transmitted [material]”, and Reason or 
aql. Being rationalists, Shiites believe that religious truth may be gained through both; 
although by aql, they do not traditionally mean free reasoning, but ratiocination 
disciplined by a strict logic. Mutahhari appears to depend a great deal on Reason or logic, 
although he does not make this explicit, so it is difficult to tell if it is a conscious method 
or merely a result of his philosophical bent. Other Muslim scholars, including non-Shiites 
such as Mawdudi, adduce rational arguments; although again, this does not involve 
formal procedures, but the laying out a kind of inexorable social and psychological logic. 
                                                          
113
 Ibid., 180. 
 Zolghadr 58 
Modern Muslim discourse often resorts to pseudo-science, and this may also have 
prompted Mutahhari to rely heavily on rational arguments. 
Whatever the reasons behind his methods, Mutahhari does often resort to 
arguments with a sociological, psychological, or physiological flavor. He phrases 
traditional ideas about the nature of the sexes and what is right and good for families and 
societies in rational or quasi-scientific terms; and then goes on to assert that these are 
verified in the scriptures. (Here it may be significant that in Shiism, aql is thought to be 
confirmed in naql and vice-versa; this is called the rule of mulazamah or “going 
together”.) Thus he maintains that women and men are created physically and 
psychologically different. The purpose of these differences is not, according to 
Mutahhari, to grant one party privileges over the other or suggest that either is inferior. 
The differences are rather meant to provide their possessors with sufficient means and 
opportunities to fulfill their potential. 
It is important for Ayatollah Mutahhari that the different attributes of man and 
woman are not acquired, but planned and implanted in nature itself. They are not 
dependent on history, society, or geography; they are not accidental. Rather, God placed 
them in nature, according to His plan. Mutahhari maintains, in fact, that every creature on 
earth is placed in its proper orbit or sphere. Human beings, however, have a special 
position, and the prosperity of all the earth, including men, women, and human society, 
depends on them remaining in their proper orbits. To disturb the fine balance of gender 
relations is to disturb the world. 
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To express the importance of men and women maintaining their own naturally 
determined paths, Mutahhari uses the metaphor of the sun and the moon, each of which 
must move in its own orbit in order for the whole universe to function properly. The 
moon and sun deviating from their pre-planned orbits would cause chaos and destruction 
to themselves and the universe as a whole. The Ayatollah also adduces a verse from the 
Quran: "The sun dares not overtake the moon nor does night outpace the day; each floats 
along in its own orbit"(Q. 36:40). He could hardly have phrased the imperative of 
traditional gender roles in stronger terms. 
To this imperative, Mutahhari adds a strong and at the same time somehow vague 
and general concept of "prosperity" (sa‘adat), said to be secured by men and women 
maintaining their pre-planned positions. “The main condition for man and woman's 
prosperity and in reality the prosperity of human societies”, he asserts, “is that they both 
move in their own orbits and none of them deviate from their natural and instinctual 
paths.”114 The condition is absolute; there cannot be a middle option that does not require 
all men and women to maintain their orbits while not spoiling “prosperity”. 
If by prosperity Mutahhari means economic fortune, the import is that right 
gender roles are also the basis of a flourishing economy, something that Mawdudi makes 
explicit in his Purdah. Ayatollah Mutahhari may be referring instead, however, to the 
mystical idea of the Perfect Human (Arabic: al-insan al-kamil), which plays a role in his 
other thought and writings.
115
 Perfect human beings, in the view of Mutahhari, are those 
who develop their capabilities fully and also evenly. The concept is a mystical, 




 For Mutahhari’s though on the Perfect Human, see Abdallah Nasri, Hasil-i Umr: Sayri dar 
Andishah-ha-yi Ustad Mutahhari (Tehran: Daftar-i Nashr-i Farhang-i Islami), 1383 [2004], 321-324. 
 Zolghadr 60 
individualistic one that applies particularly to the personality of the saint-like figure 
known as wali (Persian: vali), but Mutahhari takes from it a lesson for society and gender 
relations. 
Mutahhari further believes that to enable human beings to function appropriately 
in their orbits and fulfill their responsibilities as “God’s vicars on earth”,116 they have 
been gifted by God with the requisite faculties and abilities. He emphasizes that these 
faculties are placed in the nature of every human, regardless of gender. By virtue of these 
gender-free faculties, both men and women possess certain rights, even if individuals 
(whether male or female) differ in the degree they actually develop faculties, based on 
their individual abilities as well as opportunities or obstacles. 
Mutahhari points out that the same source that created human beings and 
privileged them with gender-free faculties entitling them to rights has made them dual-
gendered, and must have had a reason for doing so. Thus, in addition to human faculties, 
each gender has been given particular attributes that distinguish it from the other; 
although, Mutahhari insists, these gender- related or secondary faculties (if we may call 
them such) have nothing to do with the basic humanity of humans. In other words, they 
do not reduce, increase, or have any other effect on the human essence. In short, 
according to Mutahhari, nature has given similar human faculties to both genders along 
with their respective rights, as well as specific qualities attached to each gender's nature 
that also entail, as we shall see, different rights. 
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Thus in Mutahhari’s view, men and women are radically the same in regard to 
their human essence, but necessarily and it seems quite completely different with regard 
to gender. Every human being is born with maleness or femaleness, and these qualities 
are not merely anatomical, physical, and psychological (though these dimensions are 
certainly included), but involve gender-specific roles and rights that go with male and 
female attributes or faculties. Gender is, in effect, an attribute of society, not to say of the 
cosmos. 
The theory laid out above is crucial for Mutahhari’s rationalization of the 
gendered laws of the Shariah, as these are said to accord with the gender-specific 
attributes of men and women. It also fits with Mutahhari's other principal conviction: that 
humans must be provided with a solid "family foundation" in order to ensure their 
survival, protection and well-being. This is also said to be one of the intentions of nature 
and its Creator in endowing men and women with different natural qualities, whether 
physical, psychological or emotional, along with corresponding responsibilities. 
According to Mutahhari, the sense of unity and cooperation between man and woman 
that is necessary for the functioning of the family is strengthened by their differences. 
Differences also attract them and make them desirable to each other;
117
 divine wisdom, it 
appears, has perfectly coordinated gendered biology and psychology with an ideal 
sociology. Mutahhari even introduces an analogy from biology in which the positions of 
husband and wife in the family are likened to those of different organs of the human 
body. Each organ, Mutahhari says, has been given a special position in the human body 
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and plays a different role; but they are all finally needed for the life and well-being of a 
person. 
Mutahhari also introduces science or pseudo-science, mainly from Western 
sources available to him through translation, as proof of the necessary link between 
biology and psychology. He remarks, for instance, that if a woman was to have the same 
physical and emotional features as a man, she would be very unlikely to attract a man, 
just as a man who has the same feature as a woman could hardly expect to be the object 
of a woman’s attention. Same-sex attraction is evidently excluded from Mutahhari's 
discussion, either because it deviates from the “natural” path of gender relation, or simply 
because he did not consider it important or happen to think of it. 
Ayatollah Mutahhari is, at the same time, careful to stress that the relationship 
between husband and wife is based on affection, and not merely a somewhat mechanical 
law of nature. He is much more conscious of this than Mawdudi. Thus he states: 
The law of creation has constituted and built man and woman 
according to such a pattern that they are attached to and seek each 
other, but not in the way in which they are attracted to other things. 
The interest that a human being has in other things arises from his 
self-interest, in other words, a human being wants things for 
himself. He sees them as a means: he wants to sacrifice them for 
himself and for his comforts. But the attachment of a husband and 
a wife is in such a way that each of them wishes the well-being and 
comfort of the other, and is happy in forbearance and self-denial 
for the sake of the other.
118
 
This, of course, is an idealization. In this particular passage, Mutahhari does not address 
non-ideal situations such as forced marriages or marriages in which the wife's function is 
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only to serve her husband's needs. Idealization rather than tackling real problems does 
seem to be characteristic of traditionalist religious thought concerning women. We are, 
however, able to give Ayatollah Mutahhari somewhat more credit, as he does address 
those issues elsewhere. He stresses that he despises forced marriage when he discusses 
the father's authority in his daughter’s marriage,119 and he thoroughly criticizes the 
behaviour of men who view women as servants and objects.
120
 
To provide scientific support for his analysis of natural differences between men 
and women, Mutahhari refers to Alexis Carrel (1873-1944 CE), a French surgeon and 
biologist who in his work Man the Unknown not only acknowledged man and woman's 
natural differences, but also allowed that these lead to different responsibilities and 
rights.
121
 The work is obviously outdated and was accessed through translation, since 
Mutahhari knew no Western languages; but it seems that it was important for him that his 
exposition be regarded as rational and scientific in order for it to appeal to a modern 
audience. 
Mutahhari occasionally also uses Western “scientific” sources as a foil.  He refers, 
for instance, to Ashley Montagu (1905-1999 CE), an anthropologist who penned a work 
called The Natural Superiority of Women.
122
 Although Mutahhari praises Montagu's 
research on women's natural characteristics and qualifications, he rejects any attempts to 
assert the superiority of either gender. He stresses that gender differences are designed to 
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support family life rather than make it the scene of a battle over who is superior. 
Mutahhari's use of Montagu’s work seems to be a rhetorical turn, since it inclines the 
male audience to agree with him, while also allowing him to appear more mindful of 
equality than a Western “authority”. 
Mutahhari is also at pains to demonstrate that he is in favour of some kind of 
movement of women’s rights; although for him, this movement involves a return to or 
more perfect realisation of an Islamic ideal that is also proved by “science”. The gender 
laws of the Shariah, he declares, are "woman's Islamic white revolution", a revolution he 
believes will serve humanity in general as well as women in particular by allowing both 
to move freely in their own orbits.
123
 This view is inspired by his conviction that Islam 
originally came, as explained above, as a revolution for women that brought them rights 
not only absent from 7
th
 century Arabia, but most other regions of the world. Mutahhari 
contrasts Islam's "white revolution" with the movements that claim to have fought for 
women's right in contemporary history. He explains that "white" means that, in contrast 
to other women's movements, the Islamic version does not necessarily require women to 
rebel against men or be suspicious and disrespectful of them.
124
 Distrust of and rebellion 
against men was thought in Mutahari's time to be characteristic of women's movements; 
Mutahhari’s notion of a “white revolution” is thus designed to distance himself from 
feminism. 
Mutahhari argues that "woman's Islamic white movement" - which might be more 
accurately termed an "Islamic white movement for women" since women themselves 
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have no role in it - will change attitudes by rejecting absolute male authority over women, 
such as that of fathers over girls in marriage.
125
 He waxes eloquent on the advantages of 
the white movement:  
Islam has done the greatest service to the female sex. This service 
is not only in the area of denying the absolute authority of fathers 
over their daughters. It also recognized women liberty, personality, 
independent thinking and opinions, and their natural rights.
126
 
Mutahhari also takes care to favourably compare Islam's service to women with her gains 
from secular, mainly Western movements: 
The step taken by Islam in serving women's rights is 
fundamentally different from what is being done in the West and 
which others [women’s movements in Iran] follow: first, in the 
area of man and woman's psychological differences; and second, 
while Islam has acquainted women with their rights, it never asks 
them to rebel against the male sex and be suspicious of men. 
127
 
From this perspective, the gender laws of the Shariah, since they are part of the 
“revolutionary” movement, may be regarded as already revolutionized, in addition to 
ideally expressing and conforming to man and woman's inalterable natural and 
psychological attributes. Mutahhari does, however, allow that such laws may be modified 
according to the needs and requirements of different times. Here he is referring to the 
Shiite orientation toward independent reasoning or ijtihad,
128
 which allows jurists to 
deduce rules afresh from the Quran and Hadith based on each scholar's understanding. 
Mutahhari’s idea that laws may change129 makes his discourse very different from that of 
Mawdudi, for whom the law is fixed and timeless. The Ayatollah does not go so far as to 
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point out laws that might be subjected to ijtihad;
 
 but such changes in laws relating to 
women are now taking place slowly and gradually in the Iranian Islamic Republic.
130
 
2.1 Gender Differences in Social Sphere 
We have seen that Mutahhari argues for gender differences and their application 
in Islamic law partly on the basis of man and woman holding different positions and 
responsibilities - and most important, rights - in the framework of the family. 
Interestingly, Mutahhari does not extend differentiation of roles to the social or public 
sphere. There appears to be no “natural” division of social roles. Individuals can achieve 
different positions based on their personal abilities and efforts. Ayatollah Mutahhari is 
quite explicit about this. No one, he maintains, is created to hold a specific position: "No 
individual human being is born to be a worker, a craftsman, a teacher, an officer, a 
soldier, or a minister."
131
 
Although Mutahhari allows that distinct gender roles are only manifested in the 
family and do not apply to the larger society and professional roles, he does not address 
or seem to recognise the impact of "private" gender roles on the possibilities of women in 
the public sphere or potential undermining of gender essentialism by equal social 
activities. One way to look at this is to say that, while Mutahhari is a communitarian in a 
sense that he acknowledges the rights and responsibilities of society, he is also drawn 
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toward individualism and gives rein to this tendency in the perhaps less sensitive public 
sphere.
132
 Mutahhari’s statement cited above about no one being created to play a 
particular social role also attests to his belief in the equal intellectual capacity and full 
humanity of women. 
Mutahhari in fact makes an argument for social equality from the premise of 
humanity by contrasting humans with animals. He talks about animals that live in a sort 
of social setting such as bees. Nature decides which bee takes which position; some are 
created to be masters and some to be workers, some are soldiers and other commanders. 
But in a human social setting, the situation is totally different; there is no natural law 
dividing responsibilities among humans in a society. What Mutahhari seems to be 
suggesting is that since the capabilities and individuality of humans make them superior 
to animals – makes them, in fact, human – each woman as a human has the natural right 
to fulfill her potential.
133
 
The idea of "equal but not-similar" gender roles that has been a staple of some 
Muslim discourse seems designed to mediate between modern notions of equality and 
traditional ideas of difference and hierarchy. By distinguishing between family and social 
gender roles, Mutahhari seems to move this mediating discourse a step further toward 
equality, as can be seen in the following statement: 
All individual [emphasis added] human beings in their social rights 
outside the family realm enjoy both equal and similar positions. 
This means that their primary natural rights are equal and similar. 
All individuals are similarly entitled to enjoy the bounties of 
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creation, to work, to compete, to nominate themselves for social 
positions, to try to acquire such positions in legitimate ways, and to 
demonstrate their intellectual and practical capabilities.
134
 
Mutahhari does, however, admit that individuals who are equal and similar in their 
"primary natural rights" will not remain so through to the finish line: 
[However] this very equality in primary natural rights gradually 
places them in unequal positions in relation to their acquired rights 
(huquq-i iktisabi). This means that all individual human beings are 
entitled to equal work and competition; but when it actually comes 
to the competition, not everybody performs similarly. Some are 
more capable and some less, some are more knowledgeable, more 
competent, and more efficient than others. Consequently, their 
acquired rights become naturally unequal with others, and in this 
situation, granting them all equal acquired rights similar to their 
primary rights constitutes sheer injustice.
135
 
What Mutahhari seems to be undertaking here is a theory of social differentiation that 
disregards gender differences, since he includes all individuals, whether male or female, 
in the competition for positions in society. It turns out, however, that the notions of 
competition and acquired rights are used to mute equality, since the Ayatollah goes on to 
remark that women are generally physically less strong than men and thus tend to fall 
lower as competition goes on. We might add, though Mutahhari himself, as discussed 
above, fails to make the connection that women are also put at a disadvantage in social 
“competition” by their naturally determined positions in the family realm. Their position 
in the family might not preclude them from participation, but it does not encourage them. 
Though Mutahhari’s spirit, and possibly intent, are different from that of Mawdudi (who 
says that, while some women have been outstanding, these are very unusual and women 
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will not finally be able to equal the achievements of outstanding men),
136
 the result is 
effectively the same. It should also be said that excluding women from being judges 
(qadi) in the Shariah and leading congregations and Friday prayers is evidence of natural 
differences still affecting positions in society, or at least positions related to religious 
authority. Of course, the possibility of women leading prayer – a very recent controversy 
- was probably outside the imagination of anyone in Mutahhari’s time; although he does 




Personal experience is relevant here. As a Muslim woman myself who has lived 
in both Muslim and Western environments, I have observed that men and women who 
are used to the idea of different roles and rights in the family are very likely to have an 
unconscious or conscious tendency towards maintaining the same differences in  society. 
Men who are used to holding different positions and rights than women in the family are 
unlikely to willingly share social positions with women, while women themselves are 
likely to feel more comfortable keeping their distance from social positions and thus less 
motivated to compete for such positions. Indeed, gender equality whether in the East or 
West appears to be a kind of ideal, whereas real life is very different, with inequality in 
basic male-female relations radiating out to the family and then society. Mutahhari's 
proposed role division seems simply to add to the perplexity of gender notions and 
practices. 
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It is, however, worth noting that Mutahhari's recognition of women's equality in 
the social realm and their taking social positions is not, as Williams College Professor of 
Religion W. Darrow asserts,
138
 conditioned by a sex-segregated atmosphere in which 
men and women function in all levels of society but each in his or her own sphere. 
Mutahhari does indeed condition women's social presence on their family responsibilities 
and modest dress; but he does not refer at all to segregation. He is, however, cautious 
about "shoulder to shoulder activities": 
Our society today witnesses the damage done as a result of mixed 
relations. Why is it necessary that women perform their activities 
shoulder to shoulder with men? Does this affect the outcome and 




The reference is to the instances from early Islam in which the Prophet recommended 
different files for men and women coming out of the mosque. The Ayatollah prefers 
minimal intermingling between the sexes; although this is seen as a moral 
recommendation rather than an imperative.
140
 He finally recommends a mediate path: 
This is Islam's approach amidst all instances of extremism. As we 
mentioned previously, Islam is aware of the risks of so called "free 
sexual relations" and it is thus very careful when it comes to man 
and woman's relations. Islam promotes man and woman's keeping 
their physical distance as long as it does not lead to excessive 
hardship (haraj) and paralysis (falaj).
141
 
The suggestion seems to be that women and men should observe a reasonable distance, 
behave morally, and practice modest covering. It is nevertheless significant that 
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Mutahhari does not speak of restricting women’s space by force; he does seem to accept 
and even value their social presence, albeit with certain cautions. 
3. Woman: A Member of her Society 
As is clear from the discussion above, woman's social presence outside the family 
realm is really secondary to her position at home, as well as depending on modesty and 
chastity. This emphasis of Mutahhari on woman's principal role being in the family 
should be placed in the context of his times. The circumstances of society in pre-
revolutionary Islam may have contributed to his addressing subjects that were 
fundamental in a sense yet less provocative than, say, specific issues such as reform of 
particular laws. In a situation in which religiously committed Iranians were reluctant to 
send their daughters to public schools, let alone the workplace, Mutahhari probably 
considered that it was most important and productive to focus on women as spouses, 
which was the only option for the majority, while cautiously inserting some more radical 
views. 
A collection of unpublished notes written by Mutahhari on woman's social roles 
discovered after his assassination in 1980 reveal the next step he planned in addressing 
women's issues. The notes appear to date from after the Revolution and were thus written 
in the short space of one year before his death. In these notes, Mutahhari discusses 
women as members of society and their role in decision making. 
The shift in Mutahhari's focus may have been caused by women's widespread and 
indeed dramatic presence in the Revolution, including in demonstrations and 
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underground activities that led to the imprisonment and even death of some.
142
  Women's 
presence in the Islamic Revolution of 1979 is, according to Mutahhari, one of the 
elements that made it unique, as he says in an unfinished article apparently meant to be 
added to a new edition of The Issue of Hijab: 
During the ten years [since the last edition], an astonishing change 
has taken place in the life of Iranians… It is now necessary to 
examine the position and situation of women during these years 
and in the events of the great Islamic Revolution to see what role 
women had in the Revolution and what caused them to play a 
significant part in the events of this unique episode of history. The 
Islamic Revolution in Iran has exceptional characteristics that 
distinguish it from other revolutions in the world, one of which is 




Mutahhari goes on to legitimize the participation of women in the Revolution by citing 
the view of Ayatollah Khomeini both as “Supreme Leader” of the Revolution and marja 
(senior Shiite jurist qualified to  issue fatwas): 
This reality is acknowledged by the great Leader of the 
Revolution, who repeatedly praised and admired the active role of 
women in the Revolution and perhaps counted women's share as 
greater than men's, as he with his remarkable intelligence had 
understood that the Islamic Revolution would not achieve its 
objective without women's contributing their share. He therefore 
considered women's participation in revolutionary manifestations 
and demonstrations as necessary and even as a religious obligation 
in which the consent of fathers and husbands was not required.
144
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It should be noted that both Mutahhari and Ayatollah Khomeini were able to accept the 
legitimacy of women's political participation within the framework of legitimacy of the 
state; that is, they deemed the Islamic State a suitable ground for women to practice rights 
of political participation since its theoretical foundation had been laid by them. 
In another unfinished article titled "The Role of Women in the Contemporary 
History of Iran", Mutahhari discusses woman's role in history, apparently with the 
purpose of comparing it with her role in the Islamic Revolution. This type of endeavour is 
very unusual for a traditionalist, and Mutahhari’s examination actually seems close to the 
feminist idea of recovering women’s history. His argument rests essentially on the notion 
of direct and indirect roles developed in his earlier thought. He states that women have 
always been a source of inspiration for men, even if from behind the scenes. He refers to 
Arabic and Persian epic poems in which men recount brave deeds performed for the sake 
of women. Mutahhari’s “herstory” refers to the early Islamic era when women played 
direct political, cultural, and even military roles; but these, he says (without elaborating 
on possible causes) were gradually diminished. Mutahhari calls the history in which 
women played no role, male history (tarikh-i muzakkar). In male history, woman has 
been an object, at most a precious object that man keeps at home with no social and 
historical role to play. Mutahhari believes that Iran's history beginning a half-century 
before the Revolution (i.e. the time of the Pahlavi dynasty) represents such a male history 
in which women were physically present but had no direct influence. This reading of 
women's presence in the Revolution suggests that one of its accomplishments was to 
reclaim women's public position. Although Mutahhari is mistrustful of feminism as a 
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Western phenomenon,
145
 his views on women's direct and indirect roles in history have a 
somewhat feminist tone. 
Mutahhari is finally opposed to both the model of an object-like woman who is 
confined at home with no direct or indirect role to play; and a woman who plays a direct 
role in society at the expense of her primary role at home or who has undermined her 
moral and religious obligation of veiling and modest behaviour. This certainly raises 
questions about the achievability of the preferred model. One cannot help but conclude 
that the private role tends to obviate the need for further social participation. Mutahhari 
gives permission for full social participation, but then proceeds to restrict and narrow it. 
His model in which women function at a gendered level at home and a gender-free level 
in society is well-intentioned, but would have required further discussion and refinement. 
4. Islamic Modest Dress: Beyond Personal Religious Obligation 
Mutahhari views Islamic modest dress not only as an individual religious 
obligation, but as a phenomenon through which women's social presence is defined, as 
well as a major factor in marital relations. In Mutahhari’s world of thought, the meanings 
of modest dress are manifold; it becomes a kind of keystone to other issues. 
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Mutahhari's main work on the subject, The Issue of Hijab, began as a series of 
lectures for the Islamic Association of Physicians in 1967. Encouraged by the positive 
feedback he received from the readers of his book, Mutahhari elaborated on his motives 
for the work in the preface to the second edition: 
The objective of the writer and also that of the religiously 
committed members of the Islamic Association of Physicians in 
discussing, analyzing, and publishing Mas'alah-i Hijab is that, in 
addition to many deviations in relation to "covering", this and 
other issues related to women have turned into instruments in the 
hands of filthy stooges to make noisy propaganda against Islam. It 
is evident that in such circumstances, youth who are not 




Mutahhari thus aims principally, as in most of his other writings, to appeal to 
Iranian and Muslim youth along with the educated Iranian middleclass, which was at that 
time seeking a version of Islam that was meaningful and relevant to their lives. 
4.1 Veiling Versus Covering 
Mutahhari begins The Issue of Hijab by pointing out that the term hijab (veiling) 
in Arabic, which is now predominantly used to refer to women’s covering, was applied in 
classical and medieval Islam to things that hide, disguise, segregate, or seclude. He says 
that the Quran uses the word hijab to describe the setting of the sun (Q. 38:32) because it 
becomes hidden from our eyes. He also refers to various classical Arabic texts. For 
instance, he cites the words of Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the first Shiite Imam, in which he 
advises one of his governors not to prolong his “seclusion” from his people; Ibn Khaldun, 
the great historian of medieval Islam, where he says in his Muqaddimah that: 
"governments do not consider a separation (hijab) to exist between themselves and the 
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people”; and he also refers to the Arabic term for the diaphragm, al-hijab al-hajiz, 
“barrier that separates”. 147 The point of Mutahhari’s linguistic discussion is to say that 
the term hijab in Arabic is associated with separation, hiding, and seclusion, so that if it 
were used to refer to Muslim women's covering, it would naturally imply the same. For 
this reason, he emphasizes that the word hijab is not used in legal texts in relation to 
women’s clothing. The term employed instead is satr or covering. Satr in relation to 
women’s clothing refers merely to covering certain areas of the body in the presence of 
an unrelated male.
148
 Mutahhari argues that if Islam had intended to obligate women to 
remain secluded in their homes or completely cover when they go out in case of 
necessity, the term hijab would have been the appropriate term. Mutahhari obviously 
favors the term satr. 
4.2 Islamic Modest Dress: Musts and Must-nots 
Prior to presenting his own views on modest dress, Ayatollah Mutahhari refutes 
the views of an un-named "opponent of Islamic covering". It is common for Mutahhari to 
engage in refutation because of his preoccupation with leftist and “eclectic” approaches 
which he believed to be aimed at weakening Islamic beliefs and teachings, especially 
among youth. Here he takes a rational and philosophical rather than scriptural and 
traditional approach in order to meet the critics of veiling on their own ground. 
Mutahhari maintains that opponents of Islamic covering make the error of 
focusing on women's covering in general and attributing it to Islam.
149
 Asceticism, lack 
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of security and social justice, abusing women for economic purposes, men's selfishness 
and envy, and women's lack of self-esteem are examined by Mutahhari as issues assumed 
by critics to have prompted Islamic covering for women. He does not deny the validity of 
some of the critique as it applies to other cultures; but argues that these do not represent 
the entire philosophy of Islam. For instance, he rejects the idea that covering originated 
because of social insecurity so that it should be annulled if security is somehow 
established. At the same time, he argues that insecurity for women is actually greater than 
in the past, as dangers now appear in more frightening forms. Therefore, even if covering 
is assumed to be only justified in the presence of insecurity, it is still much needed. 
Mutahhari not only rejects the idea that women’s covering was instituted in Islam 
for the purpose of economic exploitation (though he sees that it may have been so in 
other cultures), but also takes the opportunity to roundly condemn exploitation as 
contradicting the Islamic legal principles of woman's financial independence and a 
husband’s obligation to provide for all his wife's needs. Similarly, jealousy (hisadat) is 
admitted as a possible reason for covering in patriarchal cultures. But it is not a valid 
reason in Islam; although, Mutahhari says, the praiseworthy emotions of protectiveness 
and honour or “zeal” (ghayrat) are recognized as positive motives, if not the only ones to 
be admitted. Here he draws a somewhat strange conclusion about male and female 
psychology: 
A man very much wants his wife to be chaste and not have 
relations with other men. Such a tendency exists in women too…; 
however, this tendency in our view has a different root from that in 
man. In man, it is ghayrat or a mixture of ghayrat and hisadat, but 
woman's tendency merely originates in hisadat. 
150
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Mutahhari goes on to justify what appears to be a double standard by maintaining that 
man is naturally "zealous" because he needs to know who his biological offspring are. A 
woman’s detestation of her husband having relations with other women, on the other 
hand, is simply envy (hasad). Ghayrat, he says, “is a kind of protection that creation has 
placed in humankind [man] in order to prevent the mixing of bloodlines."
151
  In any case, 
if Islam, as Mutahhari asserts, recommends only healthy and regulated relations between 
men and women in order to secure marital harmony, then men's relations with other 
women is as damaging as women's relations with other men, regardless of the issue of 
bloodlines. “Zeal” also gives men an excuse to restrict women’s movements and space. 
This is a rare misstep for Mutahhari; it seems he is partly trying to explain the 
problematic institution of polygamy. 
The assertion of Mutahhari’s unnamed opponent that veiling and segregation is 
rooted in women’s feeling of inferiority gives him the opportunity to expound Islamic 
views of menstruation. He points to Zoroastrianism and Judaism as two traditions that 
treat menstruating women as unclean objects. This, he says, is not the case in Islam, as 
the Quran merely says: "It is a harmful thing, so keep away from women during 
menstruation, and do not go unto them until they are clean”(Q. 2:222), which he 
interprets as a command to abstain from intercourse during menses not because of 
uncleanliness, but to avoid harming women.
152
 Again, Mutahhari does not deny that 
feelings of inferiority by women or against them may have contributed to them hiding 
themselves; this is definitely not, he says, the rationale of modest covering in Islam. 
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I cannot refrain here from asking if unequal Shariah laws such as those pertaining 
to blood money and inheritance would not cause women to feel inferior and lead to a 
withdrawal from society or other negative reaction. Mutahhari would no doubt answer 
that Islam has different laws for men and women since they are naturally different, while 
speaking of ijtihad and “the requirements of different times” as a means for amending the 
Shariah laws where necessary. 
153
 
Mutahhari now goes on to the important question of whether men have the right 
to visually enjoy women as they like.
154
 The question is important because it concerns 
men’s gaze and the effect it has on women’s space and psychological security and dignity 
in the public sphere. The answer of Islam to this question, Mutahhari believes, is 
obviously negative. A man is allowed to look at a woman's uncovered body for pleasure 
only in the context of marriage.
155
 Beyond that, any kind of enjoyment of women is not 
allowed. On the other hand, it is woman's responsibility, according to Mutahhari, to not 
let men other than her legitimate partner take pleasure from her, which she can 
accomplish chiefly through proper covering of her body. 
One cannot help but notice that Mutahhari’s reasoning here places a 
disproportionate burden on women. It seems that he has anticipated that objection, as he 
also argues that women's uncovering serves men in their pleasure-seeking more than it 
serves women in their freedom in public lives, if it serves at all. Thus his opponents, he 
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says, object to covering out of sympathy for women, but instead do them harm by 
exposing them to lustful eyes. 
Having disposed of possible objections or misconceptions concerning covering, 
Ayatollah Mutahhari goes on to enumerate its advantages. The first of these is what he 
calls “psychological tranquility”. The idea of tranquility is based (as in Mawdudi’s 
parallel exposition in his Purdah) on the idea that unrestricted association between men 
and women causes tremendous sexual stimulation, which leads to an insatiable longing. 
Mutahhari uses the rather amusing metaphor of a fire that burns more hotly the more it is 
fed. Yet he does not see sex as negative. He argues that, while Islam values sexual 
relations, it does not make the error of ignoring or underestimating its power. Rather it 
regulates and balances it through different means, including the modest covering referred 
to in Quran 24:30-31, in which men and women are commanded to lower their eyes and 
guard their modesty. It is worth noting in this context that Mutahhari does not envision 
women’s clothing that is not Islamic but nevertheless not provocative. For Mutahhari, the 
Islamic style of covering, which includes covering the hair, is the proper style of dress 
guaranteeing “psychological tranquility” and other advantages. One senses his limitations 
in not having traveled and encountered other cultures and possibilities. In some way, 
however, this is not a very valid objection, since Mutahhari’s concern was Iran and the 
defense of Islam in that immediate environment. 
Strengthening of family relations, an important consideration in any traditional 
society and key goal of Islam in Mutahhari’s view, is another advantage of Islamic 
modest dress. Since, according to Mutahhari, limiting sexual pleasure to marriage 
strengthens family relations, the function of appropriate covering in ensuring these limits 
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also serve the family. If pleasure through contact or looking is easily available, spouses 
become obstacles rather than a positive focus, leading, Mutahhari says, to resentment. 
This, according to Mutahhari, is one of the reasons that today's young men and women 
(that is the youth of the Iran of his time) refuse to commit themselves to marriage. He 
believes that marriage is encouraged by limited availability of relations, so that it 
becomes sought as an end to a period of waiting and longing; whereas if enjoyment is 
quite freely available, marriage marks the onset of restrictions.
156
 This view is very 
similar to assertions in Mawdudi’s Purdah. Although Mutahhari does not here mention 
other factors contributing to the strengthening of the family relations such as love and 
affection between marriage partners, he does speak about these in his other writings. 
Mutahhari's emphasis on sustaining healthy relations between spouses should not 
avert attention from his views on polygamy and the Shiite institution of temporary 
marriage (mut'ah). Mawdudi “solves the problem” of polygamy by simply not 
mentioning it; his whole scheme seems to assume monogamy, though he also does not 
make that explicit. Mutahhari, however, addresses polygamy at length, though on his own 
terms and while highlighting notions such as the function and wisdom of gender 
differences. 
Mutahhari believes that polygamy is not at odds with human nature. A man 
marrying multiple wives, he believes, does not contradict his nature. However, a woman 
being with more than one man (polyandry) contradicts both man and woman's natures. 
Ayatollah Mutahhari does not explain this; perhaps it has to do with his ideas about 
“zeal” and purity of bloodlines. Crucially, he does not take into consideration if man's 
                                                          
156
 Mutahhari, Huquq-i Zan, 445. 
 Zolghadr 82 
polygamy suits woman's nature. Apparently, if a man happens to marry an additional 
wife, the first or others can do nothing but face it. Nevertheless, Mutahhari asserts that 
Islam takes a distinct and valuable stand on this issue compared to the approach of the 
West, which he believes, has encouraged laxity in sexual relations beyond marriage. The 
rationale, not original with Mutahhari but often heard in apologetic discourse, is 
apparently that it is preferable for a man to marry another wife rather than have relations 
outside of the law. Thus according to Mutahhari, polygamy not only does not violate 
women's rights; it should be, in reality, considered a woman's right and man's 
responsibility, since, he says, single women outnumber men and need to be taken care of. 
Mutahhari makes it clear that he does not advocate or encourage polygamy and 
temporary marriage. He rather insists that they should be viewed as remedies for certain 
social ailments. He points out that polygamy was not invented by Islam; but Islam did not 
annul it either, due to problems for which polygamy, he says, is the only solution such as 
single women outnumbering men: 
Without doubt, the spirit of marital relations, which is union and 
oneness of man and woman, is better provided through 
monogamous marital relations. The question, however, is not to 
choose between monogamy and polygamy. The issue is rather that 
absolute monogamy is threatened as a result of certain social 




Polygamy and temporary marriage are therefore in the view of Mutahhari legitimate 
solutions to unsatisfied sexual needs of both men and women when monogamous 
marriage is not possible: “Absolute monogamy for all families is a fantasy. There are 
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The well-being of society is another benefit Islamic covering is expected to 
provide. Mutahhari believes that in the absence of regulated clothing, sexual feelings are 
bound to be aroused outside the home. The resulting distraction caused by inappropriate 
covering and failure to set limits on relations between men and women then affects 
different activities. He argues that, contrary to the belief of opponents of Islamic covering 
that veiling deprives societies of half their work force, it is unrestricted sexual behavior 
partly caused by lack of appropriate covering that paralyzes workers. Unlike Mawdudi, 
who focuses on the effects of sexual dissipation on men since they are supposedly the 
ones who work and produce, it seems that Mutahhari is thinking of the economic 
contributions of both men and women; or at least, he does not place as much emphasis on 
specific harm to men as Mawdudi, who goes so far as to speak of the effects of 
prostitution and venereal diseases on men’s productivity.159 
Thus sexual continence or discipline of sexuality provided by regulated covering 
of women seems to be viewed by Mutahhari as not only beneficial to the moral fiber of 
society, but economically efficient. In a very large shift from traditional thought, 
Mutahhari further argues that Islamic covering as outlined in the Quran does not require 
women to confine themselves to their homes and be deprived of social activities. The 
Ayatollah does not by any means under-represent modesty and Islamic covering; he 
merely intends that women can function in society while preserving their modesty. 
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Nevertheless, this is one of the great ''moves'' in his thought, as can be seen in the contrast 
to Mawdudi who in his Purdah takes ''hijab'' in the traditional sense, i.e. confinement. 
Mutahhari focuses on clothing rather than confinement; this is why he insists on the term 
satr instead of hijab. The result is a different definition of women’s space; although, it 
should be said, Mutahhari still emphasizes the primacy of women’s home life and duties 
so that a differentiation of spheres remains. 
In the final analysis, Ayatollah Mutahhari tends, as in other aspects of his thought, 
to emphasize both women’s rights and certain limitations or distinctions without 
managing to truly reconcile the two. Thus he states that knowledge is an obligation for 
women as much as it is for men, with no difference in the content and extent of 
education, does not rule out any economic activity for women, and insists on women's 
financial independence. These views suggest a vibrant engagement in society which, 
according to Mutahhari, Islam expects from its female followers while also requiring 
them to observe Islamic covering. Mutahhari insists that both in theory and practice, 
Islamic dress is not intended to deprive women of social freedom and mobility but only 
involves a reasonable degree of covering. 
Mutahhari also believes that women's dignity and value are preserved by modest 
dress. Consistent with his foundational conviction about natural difference between men 
and women, he assumes it to be a fact that men are physically stronger than women – 
although this does not pertain to intellectual differences, as he writes: "Man's physical 
power is certainly superior to woman's, while his superiority in intellect and brain power 
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is at least arguable".
160
 Mutahhari nonetheless believes that even if women are not 
capable of competing with men in strength, their emotional make-up is well beyond that 
of men. These two differences bring him to the conclusion that women are actually better 
off if protected by Islamic covering, since it serves to keep a physical and emotional 
distance from men. Ayatollah Mutahhari thus believes that Islam by promoting modest 
dress in fact responds to women's demand for dignity and value in their relations with 
men. 
The discussion here seems incomplete. Mutahhari does not elaborate on why 
protecting women's dignity and value is so significant for women. His aim, in any case, is 
to convince his audience that although Islam sees women as distinctive, this is not meant 
in a negative way. Any differences are positive in some way, as in the case of emotion. It 
is very important for Mutahhari to present Islam as woman-positive and prove that 
various aspects, if properly understood, actually constitute “rights”. 
Mutahhari reinforces the impression of woman-positivity by speaking of “natural” 
female tendencies and placing these in a favourable light. He believes that chastity, 
modesty, and covering the body are part of a female’s instinctual skills through which she 
maintains and improves her position in relation to men. Understanding that they cannot 
compete with men's physical power, women have detected a weak point in men's nature, 
that being their passion and eagerness for women. Like Mawdudi, Mutahhari maintains 
that man is naturally created to admire and love women, while women are in the position 
of being loved and adored by men. By appealing to nature, Mutahhari attempts to make 
his conclusions appear scientific and inevitable. He also turns to history and “Western 
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This psychological judgment is key to Mutahhari’s statements on marriage and 
divorce. He argues that Islamic law has man propose marriage to woman and not the 
other way around because man is the pursuer. Men’s unfettered right to divorce is 
justified by him on the same grounds.
162
 It is also interesting that the Ayatollah allows 
that this natural and positive reason for covering is likely to have been one of the 
motivations for introducing veiling in other cultures. The nature of women, of course, is 
universal, and so other civilizations must have recognized and dealt with it in similar 
ways. Certainly Mutahhari implies that the modest clothing favoured by Islam would also 
be ideal for the rest of the world; but he does not actually say this and use a universalistic 
or triumphant language as Mawdudi does. 
Though Ayatollah Mutahhari’s exposition has a certain ingenuity, it raises many 
questions. For instance, his talk of preserving women's value and dignity through modest 
clothing is belied by his assertion that modest dress itself causes attraction (the idea being 
that what is hidden is more mysterious).
163
 He gives the impression that for women, 
attracting men is a value and goal in itself. Nor does Mutahhari explain what respect, 
value, and dignity represent in relation to women, although these are not simple words 
with a single meaning in any context, let alone different cultures and times. The basis and 
meaning of morality in what is essentially a moral discussion are not made clear. 
Mutahhari also fails to consider that clothing that preserves women's value, dignity, and 
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so on in some cultures might not mean much in others. Here again we see the limits of a 
thinker living in an all-Muslim environment; although, on the other hand, it should be 
kept in mind that his project is meant to persuade a certain audience at a certain juncture 
in Iran. 
Finally, Mutahhari’s care to make rational arguments for modest dress causes him 
to miss that pious women choose to observe it regardless of the advantages he lists – as 
we can see when women veil outside a Muslim milieu, where Islamic dress may even 
give rise to disrespect. Ayatollah Mutahhari writes about Muslim women, but fails to 
foreground their religious devotion. It may also be said that, by focusing on the functions 
of covering in the family and society - including psychology, economics, and even as a 
‘mysterious’ attraction for men – Mutahhari also reduces a divine obligation to a mere 
instrument for attracting men's respect and attention. One might thus argue that although 
Mutahhari strives to produce a woman-centered interpretation of Islamic covering, his 
account finally represents a male view. 
4.3 Uncovering the Face and Hands and Women's Social Presence 
It is very important for Mutahhari that Islamic covering or modest dress not 
severely impact women’s social presence. This, as suggested above, is a significant 
change from traditional views and possibly his most radical proposition. Without it, 
Mutahhari may not have been able to attract a female audience or convince Iranian youth, 
since Iranian women in his time, though perhaps centered on hearth and home, were not 
usually confined to the house or very limited in their circulation in public space. 
Ayatollah Mutahhari was compelled, in a sense, to acknowledge and accommodate 
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reality. This is the contemporary background
164
 to a steady insistence by Ayatollah 
Mutahhari that, while the female body should be completely covered, women should not 
cover the hands and face. 
It is significant that Mutahhari exempts women's face and hands from covering 
not because they hold no attraction for men, but explicitly in order to allow women to 
maintain a presence in society and public space and avoid imposing an unreasonable 
burden.
165
 He urges women to avoid jewelry and ornament that might make the face and 
hands attractive to men, while men are also asked to avoid casting a lustful gaze on 
women's face and hands. It seems that although sexual attraction exists, freedom for 
women to move about is more important; and therefore the self-restraint of women and 
men also has to be trusted to some degree. 
Mutahhari backs up his argument that the face should remain uncovered with the 
Quran. Quran 24:30 reads: "Say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze 
and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except 
what [must ordinarily] appear thereof.” He notes that, according to most exegetes, the 
exempted “beauty and ornaments” refer to the rings and eye make-up customarily used 
by women. He concludes that this must mean that the face and hands the ornaments adorn 
are consequently exempted, since there is no point or sense in allowing women to leave 
ornaments on their hands and face exposed while they are obligated to conceal those 
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same areas. As for the verse following ( Q. 24:31) that asks women to "draw their scarves 
over their bosoms", Mutahhari believes that it is meant only to define the parts of the 
body to be covered, as it clearly mentions the neck and breast area. If covering the face 
was obligatory, it should have been mentioned as well. Mutahhari also refers to the 
Shariah rule that forbids women from covering their faces during the Haj pilgrimage, 
concluding that exempting the face from covering in a context in which the two sexes 
perform religious rituals together conclusively demonstrates that women do not have to 
conceal their faces in everyday life. 
It remains for Mutahhari to dispose of Quran 33:53, which reads: "And when you 
ask them [the Prophet’s wives] for something, ask them from behind a veil [or “screen”, 
hijab].” Since the verse is widely regarded as a command for Muslim women to cover, it 
is worth considering Mutahhari’s view of it at some length. 
 According to Mutahhari, some Quranic commentators imagined that since the 
Prophet’s wives were veiled, ordinary Muslim women should be veiled as well. He 
believes this assumption to stem from a negative attitude toward women (an assertion he 
does not fully explain). In Mutahhari’s view, the exegetes ignored the fact that veiling by 
the Prophet’s wives was not a matter of modesty; it was rather designed to give them 
dignity through a special status, as the Quran then goes on (Q. 33:32) to say: "O consorts 
of the Prophet, you are not like [other] women." Mutahhari treats the phrase after that 
commands the wives to “remain in their houses” as follows: 
The Prophet’s wives, who are considered to be “Mothers of the 
Believers” and enjoy great respect among Muslims, were subjected 
to this emphatic command because of the possibility that they 
would become political and social tools for selfish and ambitious 
men. Thus the Quran orders them to “remain in their houses”, just 
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as they are forbidden to remarry after the Prophet’s death in order 




In short, in Mutahhari's view, women do not have to go to extremes or be unreasonably 
burdened to preserve their modesty and fulfill their responsibilities in guaranteeing the 
well-being of families and society. They need only follow the “Book of Creation”, as he 
calls it,
167
 and heed the basic rules laid out in the Quran. 
Thus far, we have concentrated on Ayatollah Mutahhari’s prescriptions for female 
dress. Mutahhari also, however, speaks about the male body, a concern that is actually 
found in the Quran itself as it clearly commands both men and women to avert their gaze 
and “guard their private parts” (Q. 24: 30-31). Mutahhari advises women in particular to 
be careful in their contacts, including in verbal encounters with men as he believed that 
women’s voices can be seductive,168 but he also takes into account the power and will of 
men to attract, even if not at length or very explicitly. 
Thus Ayatollah Mutahhari advises men as well as women to observe appropriate 
covering. Men, however, are obligated only to cover their private parts, while women 
should cover their whole bodies, save the hands and face.
169
 Women have a greater 
responsibility, and Mutahhari admits this. The unequal burden, he argues, is not 
degrading, but due to natural differences: 
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The reason that Islam's obligation for covering has specifically 
addressed women is their inclination toward beautifying and 
glamorizing themselves. Man [by nature] is the prey when it comes 
to capturing hearts and minds, while woman is the hunter. 




Men, of course, are different. “Nowhere in the world”, says Mutahhari, do they “dress in 
revealing clothing or use provocative make-up.”171  The gender psychology that forms 
part of the deep structure of Mutahhari’s worldview consequently remains focused on 
women.
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Chapter Two: Woman in the thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik 
The thought of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik is of great significance, having shaped 
Modern Orthodoxy for much of the 20
th
 century. As Dean of the largest institution for 
rabbinical training in North America and probably the world, the Rav’s172 ideas exerted 
great influence on the tradition. It should nevertheless be acknowledged at the outset that 
discussion of gender in the writings of Soloveitchik is not aimed deliberately and 
narrowly at that concern. Rather, his thought on women and gender can be discerned at 
two different levels of his writings, which may be described as gender-relevant, if not 
gender-centered. The first level is in the course of theoretical discussions in which 
Soloveitchik defines fundamental issues related to humanity such as the relation to God 
and to His laws, i.e. the Halakhah,173 along with the human's relation to his or her 
ontological (marital) partner.  It is in this context that the issue of woman and her 
relationship to God and other humans naturally becomes part of the discussion. At this 
level, Soloveitchik employs his knowledge of modern philosophy first acquired in his 
university studies (referred to in the short biography presented in the Introduction) to 
delineate a philosophical perspective on fundamental issues relating to humanity. These 
issues include gender relations and, of course, gender differences, which in turn lead to 
consideration of, gendered roles and responsibilities. All these discussions necessarily 
take place within halakhic categories. It is thus appropriate to infer that the human being, 
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and not woman, is the center of Soloveitchik's gender thought. To put it another way, the 
gender thought of the Rav emerges through his humanistic philosophy. 
At this level, the present chapter focuses on Soloveitchik’s discussion of the 
creation of man and woman, their first sin, and their relation with divinity. I will also 
investigate gender differences in Soloveitchik’s thought as a medium through which 
humanity's goals, aspirations and destiny are defined and realized. 
Soloveitchik's gender views rise to the surface at a second level due to his 
position as a legal decisor and policy maker as he offers his responsa concerning 
questions pertaining to Jewish law. In this realm, his views concerning women's Jewish 
education and ritual (prayer groups) are particularly significant, both in terms of the 
quantity of material available and its depth. Rabbi Soloveitchik, it should be recalled, was 
a major decisor of Modern Orthodoxy. 
1. Soloveitchik's Foundational Thoughts on Gender: An Intellectual Perspective 
Soloveitchik's views on women and gender in the intellectual or philosophical 
sphere are primarily reflected in his reading of the positions and characteristics of man 
and woman in the Torah. His analysis is based on male and female as depicted in the 
Holy Scripture. The creation of the first man and woman along with their different 
attributes and relations are among the elements essential to shaping Soloveitchik's 
worldview. The chief writings in which these are expounded are The Lonely Man of Faith 
and a posthumous compilation of manuscripts prepared for his lectures, titled by the 
editors Family Redeemed: Essays on Family Relations. As explained above, the lectures 
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are not necessarily gender-oriented or chiefly, despite the title, about family relations; but 
these elements lie within them and may be extracted. 
1.1 Creation of Woman According to the Torah 
Soloveitchik's reading of the two accounts in Genesis I and II of the creation of 
the first human beings results in delineation of two divergent aspects or types of 
humanity. These he calls ''Adam the First'' and ''Adam the Second''. The two Adams are a 
creative response to a seeming discrepancy in certain verses in the Torah that relate to the 
creation of man. The first account begins: "So God created man in His own image, in the 
image of God created He him, male and female created He them,” and continues: “And 
God blessed them and God said unto them be fruitful and multiply" (Gen. 1:27-28). The 
second account, found in Gen. 2: 18-23, differs significantly: 
The Lord God said, “it was not good for man to be alone; I will 
make a fitting helper for him.” And the Lord God formed out of 
the earth all the wild beasts and all the birds of the sky, and 
brought them to the man to see what he would call them; and 
whatever the man called each living creature, that would be its 
name. And the man gave names to all the cattle and to the birds of 
the sky and to all the wild beasts; but for Adam no fitting helper 
was found. So the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon the man; and, 
while he slept, He took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh at 
that spot. And the Lord God fashioned the ribs that He had taken 
from the man into a woman; and He brought her to the man. Then 
the man said, “This one at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my 
flesh. This one shall be called woman, for from man she was 
taken.” 
The two accounts verge on being contradictory, and text criticism attributes the Genesis 
passages overall to two different sources and traditions. This is not, however, the place to 
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go into the scholarly account of redaction by different sources,174 except to note that it is 
not, of course, accepted by the tradition or by Soloveitchik, whose concern instead is to 
harmonize the narratives by seeking meaning in difference. His basic argument is that 
each passage describes a different mode of creation leading to different aspects of human 
personality. To put it another way, Adam the First and Adam the Second, as Soloveitchik 
calls them, are in reality two personalities of the human being, and these personalities are 
complementary.175 
Gender first appears in Soloveitchik's reading of the two creation accounts in the 
Torah when he discusses the creation of Eve as one of four apparent discrepancies. His 
division of personalities is not explicitly extended to Eve. He does not speak of “Eve the 
First” and “Eve the Second”, as one might expect, even though she is created differently 
in the two episodes like Adam and with a different relation to him. Difference rather 
refers to difference in relation to Adam. Thus we see that in the account in Genesis 1, 
Adam was never alone, as both male and female were created concurrently; while Adam 
the Second (to use Soloveitchik’s concept) emerged alone, with Eve appearing 
subsequently as his counterpart and helpmate. Adam the First was created to be social 
and gregarious, as the text says, “it was not good for man to be alone”. Male and female 
in the first account are also called upon by their Creator to act together; Adam in this 
account is in need of aid to successfully accomplish the tasks assigned. Thus Eve in 
relation to Adam is a “work partner”, and not “an existential co-participant”, Soloveitchik 
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insists.176 Adam the First, together with Eve, form a “natural community”, as Soloveitchik 
calls it,
177
 in which they can develop their capacity to “fill the earth” as well as “subdue 
it” by establishing “dominion over the fish of the sea, over the fowl of the heaven, and 
over the beasts, and all over the earth” (Gen.1:27). In this narrative, the concern is not the 
ontological relationship between Adam and Eve, but rather their functioning and working 
together. 
Soloveitchik seems convinced that in order for Adam the First and Eve to meet 
God’s expectations and fulfill their responsibilities, they should not be ontologically 
dependent on each other, as that would involve need or loneliness. For their divinely-
determined goals, as Soloveitchik sees it, are majesty and dignity – power and 
sovereignty through their mastering of the world – and these ends are not achievable 
through solitude. As a being seeking dignity, “Adam the First was” therefore “not left 
alone even on the day of creation,” when God ''addressed Himself to both of them as 
inseparable members of one community.” 178 
In contrast to Adam the First, the quest of Adam the Second, according to 
Soloveitchik, is not for dignity and majesty. Rather, he is in quest of a redeemed life, a 
life in which the individual finds his existence worthwhile, as being anchored in 
something stable.179 This redemption is, paradoxically, achieved through surrender as the 
individual allows himself to be “defeated by a higher and truer being.”180 Thus God 
places Adam the Second in Eden and asks him to serve by cultivating and keeping the 
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garden,181 while Adam the First was asked by God to actively "fill the earth and subdue 
it." Note how the lives of the two Adams are different, but that they are not mutually 
exclusive. They are two complementary aspects of one personality, one seeking dignity 
and majesty through mastering, and the other seeking redemption through obedient 
service. 
We have seen how the second Genesis account of Eve differs from the first in that 
she did not emerge simultaneously with Adam, but only after. According to Soloveitchik, 
this happened when Adam the Second became aware of his loneliness in the course of 
naming all the creatures through what the Rav calls the “intellectual gaze,”182 as he 
explains:  
Adam the second is still lonely. He separated himself from his 
environment which became the object of his intellectual gaze. 
"And the man gave names to all beasts and to the fowl of the 
heaven and to every animal of the field; but for Adam no fitting 
helper was found"(Gen. 2:20). He is a citizen of a new world, the 
world of man, but he has no companion with whom to 
communicate and therefore he is existentially insecure.183 
In other words, unlike Adam the First who was provided with a companion at the very 
moment of his creation before he could sense any need, Adam’s dawning mental 
consciousness of the world prompted emotional awareness of his loneliness, following 
which he was introduced to Eve by God. 
Soloveitchik is struck by the fact that the story of woman's creation in the second 
account is told in installments, as he says: 
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After Adam's appearance, God was not concerned with his 
aloneness. Instead, the Torah tells us about something new, 
Paradise. Then, suddenly, after it has reached the event of man 
being enjoined from eating from the tree of knowledge, it 
interrupts the continuous tale and picks up another thread, namely, 
man's loneliness and God's decision to provide him a helper. 
However, the Torah does not proceed directly to tell us about the 
creation of Eve. Instead, while departing from its recording of the 
events leading to the act of creation, the Torah reports another 
event, Adam's naming of the animals and birds. After having 
narrated this event, the Torah resumes the narration about the 
creation of Eve.184 
He explains that by telling the story in this fashion, the Torah is in fact "advising us about 
other events that happened which are indispensable for understanding the drama of 
man."185 This view or approach186 allows him to extract additional meaning from the 
episodic nature of the narrative, and the meaning he finds is that woman was created in 
response to man's growing existential feeling of need for a helper. The reading seems to 
magnify even more the importance of the male-female relationship, and it appears that 
the second story of creation as interpreted by Rabbi Soloveitchik does count woman's 
creation as part of God's plan for confronting and solving the drama of humankind. 
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 Another feature of the second account highlighted by Soloveitchik is God’s 
providing of Adam with a companion as a gesture of redemption. Since, according to 
Soloveitchik, redemption is obtained through sacrifice and defeat, Adam’s 
companionship with Eve should be of the same quality. This is the meaning of episode of 
the rib, 187 as it says in Gen. 2:21 that God: "caused an overpowering sleep to fall upon 
the man and while he slept, He took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh at that spot. 
And the Lord God fashioned the rib that He had taken from the man into a woman…." 
Soloveitchik comments that sacrifice was not necessary for creating Eve in the first 
Genesis account, since the community to be formed was only utilitarian.188 
It is worth noting also that Eve’s creation in the second account involves a 
sacrifice solely by the one who will benefit from redemption and escape existential 
loneliness, i.e. Adam. Soloveitchik's correlation of redemption and sacrifice does not 
suggest that there is redemption for Eve.189 It might thus be concluded that Eve or woman 
at this juncture is only a medium through whom Adam (man) is redeemed and given 
companionship, albeit at a price. Soloveitchik does not, as far as I am aware, directly 
address this difficulty. 
In addition, one could infer an equality and equivalence of Adam and Eve from 
the first Genesis account, since they are created at the same time as partners to rule over 
the rest of the world and God's command is directed to both. 190 Soloveitchik does not 
take care to deny this; but he does not highlight it either. It could be that he does not bring 
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out the point because in this account, human beings are created as an integral part of 
nature, in the same manner as the beasts. Humans are, of course, different in that they are 
formed in the image of God; but at this juncture, they "have not made as yet the 
momentous decision to turn a non-reflective, instinctive existence into a self-conscious 
one".191 In addition, as The Lonely Man of Faith suggested in the second account is 
Soloveitchik’s favoured personality,192 it is likely that the relationship there between 
Adam the Second and Eve the Second would also be the ideal. 
Actualization of human essence and distinctiveness from other creatures occurs 
only in the second account when the human is confronted with “God's moral will” and 
consequently experiences “the birth of a moral awareness”. After man was placed in the 
Garden of Eden, Soloveitchik says, he aspired to an unlimited, constantly advancing 
existence. But then, he suddenly met with God's moral will. On the one hand, this 
confrontation with moral laws limited Adam the Second; but on the other, it was “his first 
rendezvous with God”, in which he informed him of the “divine imperative”.193 The 
divine imperative faced here is different from that delivered to natural man and woman in 
the first account, since the latter only has to do with a natural biological drive, as God 
told them to "be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and subdue it"(Gen. 1:28). 
In the subsequent stage in which man is fully realized, enters into a Covenant with 
God and acquires the maturity to receive moral commands, gender equality and similarity 
is absent in both the mode and purpose of creation. As noted above, the Adam and Eve of 
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the second Genesis account are equal neither in creation, since Adam was created first, 
and Eve was created as a helpmate to relieve Adam’s loneliness (while Adam is not 
mentioned as fulfilling the same purpose in relation to Eve). 
Both Adams, Soloveitchik stresses, are essential in shaping a God-willed human 
personality, such that the rejection of either "would be tantamount to an act of 
disapproval of the divine scheme of creation which was approved by God as being very 
good".194 As one who is faithful to the text of the Scriptures, Soloveitchik is determined 
to give full value to both accounts. His assertion, however, would seem to be limited in 
the realm of individual human personalities. It can be argued that recognition of the two 
aspects does not absolutely extend to the relations of man and woman, whether in the 
family or community level. This may be inferred both from Soloveitchik's lack of 
emphasis on an apparently equal (as some have seen it) creation, partnership, and set of 
responsibilities of Adam and Eve in the first Genesis account, and his focus on existential 
dependence between the two in the second. 
We might then conclude that human beings, whether male or female, are to reflect 
both the “majestic” and “faith” personalities, while in the family and community spheres, 
relations between men and women or spouses should follow the model of the second 
account, which is characterized by non-similarity and non-equality even though humanity 
is equal. Thus the creation story of second Genesis becomes particularly significant, as it 
is associated with ideas of Jewish marriage in the thought of Rabbi Soloveitchik. 
Marriage, the Rav declares, is "not just a successful partnership between identical and 
equal male and female, as achievable in the first account, but an existential community 
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between non-identical and non-equal male and female, as depicted in the second 
account."195 
One can see that Soloveitchik is not at all disturbed by the idea of differences 
between men and women and certainly does not try to minimize them. Rather, 
differences are to be regarded as “part of the plan” as they allow the male and female to 
each bring to the marital relationship their special qualities, complementing each other to 
form the ideal whole. Soloveitchik does not share the concern of critics such as David 
Hartman, who objects: 
The biblical story of Eve's creation and the archetypal resonance of 
that story as the Bible's template for all marriages, appear to imply 
a hierarchy of man over woman embedded within the very fabric 
of creation. The implication is reinforced by the reason given for 
Eve's necessity, her very purpose: to be an ezer ke-negdo (a 
famously oblique and seemingly paradoxical expression, which 
nonetheless clearly marks her, in Soloveitchik's reading, as a 
helper of some kind) to Adam. 196 
Of course, the main loyalty of Rabbi Soloveitchik as a dedicated Talmudist and Orthodox 
theologian is to the divine text, whether it treats genders as similar and equal, or 
dissimilar and partly equal. Such things are not really his concern. The only message on 
the subject he tries to send across is that the accounts do not mean that one sex is more 
valuable than the other. 
In conclusion, although the issue of Adam and Eve and their creation constitutes 
only a part of Soloveitchik’s views concerning women, it has an absolutely fundamental 
position in the study of his thought in relation to gender, since the first male and female 
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are taken to represent the characteristics, qualities, and patterns of relations between all 
men and women. 
1.2 Gender Differences in the Thought of Soloveitchik 
Gender qua gender separate from the family and family relations is not Rabbi 
Soloveitchik’s concern, and thus his thought concerning women and gender is to be 
gleaned from his discussion of marital union. There is rich material here, since gender 
differences are obviously essential to the issues of male-female relationships and roles in 
marriage and what he calls the “parental community”. It is on the basis of divinely 
ordained gender differences that families that are "metaphysical in terms of their 
substance and goals" also stand as an "ontological unity” consisting of “father, mother, 
and child” dedicated to the “realization of the will of God".197 The relational and family 
context of gender is reflected well in the following excerpt: 
Man and woman differ not only physiologically as male and 
female, of whom the first account of creation tells us, but also 
spiritually and personality-wise. This is the way Creator has 
ordained human lonely destiny. Because the woman is not the 
shadow of man but an independent persona, because the woman 
projects a totally different existential image, her companionship 
helps man to liberate himself from his loneliness. In the 
interpersonalistic existential tension both man and woman find 
redemption.198 
Before we go further, Soloveitchik's focus on parental community should be clarified. In 
the union between a man and a woman or in Soloveitchik's words between "I" and 
"thou", a third – a child  - is necessarily expected. The terms “marital” and “parental” 
may thus be used interchangeably; they are in fact one thing, as Soloveitchik emphasized: 
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It is a change of name but not of substance. The marital 
community, notwithstanding the fact that only two people join it at 
the outset it is also a threefold affair. Two join in order to expect a 
third member to enter the same community.199 
This marital-parental community, says Soloveitchik, is "part of the great endless 
community of mesorah, our tradition, whose task is to pass on the covenant from 
generation to generation and millennium to millennium."200 In light of this focus, gender 
differences should be examined in a way that fully acknowledges the matrimonial nature 
or context of gender relations, while not losing sight of their objectives. This could be 
articulated as follows: gender differences are differences springing from gender attributes 
of marital partners, which are only meant to render them suitable for the accomplishment 
of the great task of passing on the covenant from generation to generation. 
 
According to Soloveitchik, gender differences began to emerge with the 
communion between Adam the Second and Eve, resulting in the first marital community. 
Nevertheless, Soloveitchik emphasizes that the two "have a lot in common: otherwise 
Eve could not be a helper".201  Soloveitchik clearly connects Eve’s ability to be Adam's 
helper to her being different. The companionship that helps Adam to liberate himself 
from loneliness is dependent on her being an independent persona and on her "projecting 
a totally different existential image."202 A possible conclusion is that woman might not 
have necessarily reflected an independent existential image “totally different” from man 
were not she assigned the task of helping him. 
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The independence and existential difference Soloveitchik speaks of may be seen 
as very positive, since a woman who is unique and helps man to escape loneliness and 
redeem himself does not depend on him. On the other hand, one could ask why only one 
party (woman) is assigned the task of helping the other liberate himself from loneliness. 
It is also unclear how this is to be reconciled with man and woman's differences 
ordaining the lonely destiny of humans, or both man and woman, as Soloveitchik also 
maintains,203 suffering existential loneliness. The loneliness of both is crucial, in fact, as it 
brings them together in marriage. The sense of shared loneliness of the marital partners is 
clearly expressed in Soloveitchik's assertion that "the cause of marriage is the 
exasperating and desolate feeling of loneliness; the goal of marriage is the redeeming 
experience of life in fellowship."204 
There seems to be tension in general between Soloveitchik’s loyalty to the 
scriptures and his strong advocacy of the idea of man and woman’s equality in humanity. 
He states that: "There is no doubt that in the eyes of halakhah man and woman enjoy an 
equal status and have the same worth as far as their humanitas is concerned";205 but at the 
same time, perhaps because of the scriptural statement, " a man [will] leave his father and 
mother and cling to [be dependent on] his wife'' (Gen. 2:24), he is reluctant to let that 
sentiment be mirrored in the issue of a man and woman being equally each others’ 
helpers.206 This apparently dual approach has attracted criticism, as in the following 
critique by George P. Fletcher: 
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The tendency in Soloveitchik, repeated in Hartman, is to think of 
the entire saga as the story of a male figure seeking female 
companionship. He has this companionship in the first story, he 
longs for it in the second. The loneliness in The Lonely Man of 
Faith is about the experience of men yearning for the 
companionship of women. My critique here is not a feminist 
objection that male scholars ignore the experience of women 
because they think only of men as actors in history. My complaint 
is whether fidelity to the text permits the inference that men suffer 
loneliness while women do not.207 
In this case, it may be said in reply to Fletcher’s objection that his idea that Soloveitchik 
undermines woman's loneliness is not valid. As a matter of fact, Soloveitchik considers 
loneliness the ground for Jewish marriage, as previously explained. The point he is silent 
on, rather, is man and woman mutually needing each other in order to escape loneliness; 
his full acknowledgement of woman's existential loneliness makes his silence on this 
finer point difficult to understand. It could be that the apparent inconsistency is not 
important for Soloveitchik, since his final goal is not to demonstrate thorough equality or 
balance. The reader, in any case, is left with the impression that woman being man’s 
helper without “help” proceeding in the other direction indicates either a superior quality 
that makes her not need help in order to be liberated from existential loneliness, or that 
she is created to serve man. 
1.3 Man and Woman: Aspects of Differences 
Soloveitchik’s views on gender differences are intimately tied to the rights and 
responsibilities of the two sexes in personal and religious affairs, along with their 
standing in marital relations and participation in the larger society. Gender differences, 
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the Rav says, include physical and biological aspects found in the world of animals and 
even plants, while also pertaining to psychological, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions 
that are more exclusive to the human domain. The differences between the sexes, 
Soloveitchik emphasizes, do not affect the value of either. Rather, differences are willed 
by God to enable each gender to accomplish the assigned mission.208 
Soloveitchik is careful to underline the humanity even of biological and sexual 
qualities seemingly shared with other creatures. In human beings, he says, these take on a 
more human quality; sexual physiology transforms into sexual personality, resulting in a 
personality of man and personality of woman. Man and woman consequently have 
different existential experiences; that is to say, man knows that he exists as a man and 
woman knows that she exists as a woman.
209
 We might phrase Soloveitchik’s view thus: 
biology or physiology becomes coloured by the human vessel, and is given meaning by 
human awareness or insight into the biological-physiological condition. The result is that 
"being" is manifested differently in man and woman: 
Man and woman represent not only two sexes with natural 
anatomic and physiological differences but two ideas of 
personality. As biological distinct beings they are called male and 
female, but they are not typical of the human race alone…what is 
characteristic of the world of man is that sex-physiology is 
transformed into sex personality…They are two individualities 
with unique existential experiences. The “I” awareness contains 
the moment of sex-personality. They experience themselves in 
different dimensions. The tremor of being manifests itself 
differently in man and woman.210 
Difference could not be more profound. Soloveitchik goes on to further emphasize 
existential differentiation by situating it at the levels of creation, mystical experience of 
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God, and Halakhah. The details of these levels are interesting as they show how he 
transforms sex difference into a spiritual concern. 
At the level of creation, man and woman, whose physical and spiritual differences 
are actually existential, are overwhelmed by a loneliness that can be remedied only by 
union through marriage. In marriage they find completion, fulfillment, and redemption. 
Soloveitchik states that the marriage union - which he regards as human destiny - would 
fail if man and woman were not different and possessed of separate sexual personalities. 
God created them to be both physically and spiritually different for the purpose of this 
union; and they would not experience the attraction required for it if they were similar.211 
To explain the difference of sexual personality at the level of mystical experience 
of God, Soloveitchik draws on the rich tradition of Jewish mysticism. The mystical 
tradition makes the Feminine and Masculine transcendental by relating them to divine 
cosmic principles of femininity and masculinity. In this connection, Soloveitchik writes 
about how God is experienced by the Jewish people as both father and mother: 
In our God-experience we sense already the dual subjective image 
we have of Him. God is both our father and our mother. Masculine 
and feminine motifs in our approach to and craving for God are of 
great significance for the understanding of our universal religious 
experience. The idea of Shekhinah [divine presence] and Deus 
Absconditus, the Hidden God, reflect the dual character of Being 
as feminine and masculine. 212 
The discussion here is very interesting from the point of view of study of gender and 
religion. One has to ask oneself if the qualities attributed to the Feminine and Masculine 
aspects of divinity simply reveal the attitude of the mind that attributes them; in other 
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words, if a profoundly gendered worldview is being projected onto the cosmos (including 
God), and explanation and justification for gender arrangements then derived back from 
that same projection. Are masculinity and femininity embedded in the dimension being 
contemplated, or are they are products of a human mind organized by its own perception 
of male and female qualities? Might this projection then be used to organize and interpret 
other phenomena, including metaphysical dimensions that it would otherwise be difficult 
to comprehend since they are not naturally and physically graspable? 
Of course, Rabbi Soloveitchik received an already gendered Jewish mysticism; he 
did not invent it. What is important for our main discussion, in any case, is that his 
metaphysics are thoroughly gendered, as is clear from the following statement: 
The principles of creativity and receptivity, acting and being acted 
upon, energizing and absorbing, aggressiveness and toleration, 
initiating and completing, of limitless emanation of a transcendent 
being and measured reflection by the cosmos, are portrayed by the 
dual motif of masculinity and femininity within our religious 
experience.213 
Soloveitchik's doctrine of sex personality based on gender differentiation also emerges in 
the context of Halakhah (the third level discussed here). He argues that the idea of bi-
personality resulting from sexual differentiation expresses itself in the philosophy of 
Halakhah concerning “the complex relationship between the sexes”.214 To put it another 
way, gender difference contributes to the construction of a halakhic gender perception. 
Differentiation of gender personality at the level of Halakhah is founded, in the 
view of Soloveitchik, on two principles. The first is that man and woman are different 
and unique in their existential experiences. They are, as explained above, different 
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personas endowed with distinct qualities and assigned different missions in life. The 
second principle is that man and woman are axiologically equal. We should not look for a 
simple consistency between these two principles in Soloveitchik’s thought. They are each 
completely true by themselves, and the line between them is to be kept firm; the 
“axiological equality” of Man and Woman should not lead to undermining the uniqueness 
of the two sex personalities. Blurring the differences, Soloveitchik argues, negatively 
affects the ability of the spouses to establish a rich and fruitful marriage, for marital union 
is founded on the polarity of dual existential uniqueness.
215
 
It is striking that Soloveitchik is enormously concerned about the danger of 
ignoring gender differences, but not so much with neglecting axiological equality. 
Negligence of the former is equated with destruction of marital union, considered an 
existential disaster for the human personality and Jewish people and a terrible rupture 
with the cosmic and divine order.
216
 He does not, however, go on about the negative 
effects of equality being neglected. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that the Rav steadfastly affirms (axiological) 
equality. He insists that the Halakhah views man and woman as equals as far as their 
humanity is concerned. He also says that both man and woman are worthy of  
"communing with God," which is the greatest fulfillment and highest form of human 
perfection. Soloveitchik affirms that man and woman are both “created in the image of 
God”; they both “joined the covenantal community at Sinai, both are committed to our 
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meta-historical destiny, both crave and search for God, and with both God engages 
dialogue."217 These are strong and emotionally convincing declarations. 
Not surprisingly, there are different views on equality in the modern Jewish 
tradition. For instance, while renowned Jewish feminist theologian Judith Plaskow218 does 
not actually accuse the tradition of misogyny, she does characterize it as male-centered in 
regard to Torah, God, and Israel. She blames this male-centeredness for women's 
“otherness” in the tradition and marginalization of their experience. Her response is to 
encourage a reading of the scripture that would make women a part of the Jewish 
experience;219 although she sometimes seems pessimistic about the prospects of success, 
commenting in her Standing Again at Sinai that, "in a system in which women have been 
projected as other, there is no way within the rules of the system to restore women to full 
personhood."220 
If Soloveitchik were to reply to Plaskow, he might do so on the basis of Genesis 
1:27: “So God created man in his own image…male and female He created them” So 
strongly does he feel that equality is established between male and female by their being 
created in God’s “own image” that he lashes out at what he calls "Greek mythological 
misogynous tradition" and "modern misogynies" (“Greek” and “modern” perhaps 
standing for the secular world): 
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The narrative in the Bible that both male and female were created 
in the image of God suffices to refute the Greek mythological 
misogynous tradition which found its echoes in Socratic and late 
Hellenistic thought and in modern misogynies such as those of 
Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, August Strindberg, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, and Soren Kierkegaard.221 
Soloveitchik goes so far as to suggest that women might in some ways have a superior 
constitution, as he allows that sacrifice and passion may be more characteristic of 
women, while "ability to withdraw from the positions conquered”, “readiness to 
sacrifice”, “giving [oneself] to others” and “craving as a lonely being for communion 
with God"222 are counted as very great virtues. 
Soloveitchik’s view of female prophethood also demonstrates a concern with 
equality.223 We have seen that according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, woman may equally 
commune with God. That God has addressed Himself to women such as Sarah, Deborah, 
Esther, and Miriam, so that they communed with Him at that lofty level is, in 
Soloveitchik’s words, “clear proof" that Torah does not make any axiological difference 
between women and men.224 Again, such assured talk of equality will not convince 
everyone. For Plaskow as a Jewish feminist theologian, these figures, though “strong”, 
are yet another indication of women's otherness in the Torah, as they  "do not receive the 
covenant” nor “pass on lineage."225 In this case, however, Soloveitchik seems to have a 
similar concern, as he stresses the "covenantal role"
226
 of Sarah to the extent of declaring 
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that there is “no covenant” without her, while also granting her a role in passing on the 
lineage, since prophethood passed through her and Abraham.227 
Thus Soloveitchik communicates a very firm and no doubt genuine conviction 
that women are equal to men. Nevertheless, it is necessary to conclude the discussion 
with a reminder of the emphasis he puts on difference. Even if it were to be argued that 
both sides are important for Soloveitchik, he lays out the deep structure of difference 
more extensively and seems more apprehensive about it not being adhered to. The aim of 
differences is, at the same time, to allow the genders to realize themselves and the tasks 
on earth assigned to them by the Creator. Neither of which can occur if man and woman 
duplicate each other.228 
1.4 Gender Differences and the First Sin 
The Genesis episode involving human sin brings another aspect of gender into the 
thought of Rabbi Soloveitchik. According to the Torah, it is Eve who is deceived by the 
serpent and eats from the forbidden tree. Adam is deceived by Eve and goes on to 
commit the same sin because of her: "When the woman saw that the tree was good for 
eating and a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable as a source of wisdom, she 
took of its fruit and ate. She also gave some to her husband and he ate" (Gen.3:7). 
Apart from the issue, critical in itself, of which of the first pair initiated the sin 
and bears greater responsibility, Soloveitchik’s understanding of the episode sheds lights 
on gender differences, since he is convinced that the two sex-personalities sin differently. 
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Though they both ate from the same tree in violation of the same divine command, their 
specific gender attributes inspired different motives. Thus Eve initiated the sin not as a 
result of desire for mastery or passion for power, but because of longing for enjoyment 
and pleasure, as Soloveitchik writes: 
She was the passive personality, the receptive mind, the indulging 
type. She wanted to redeem herself from her sacrificial destiny, 
from selfless involvement in motherhood: she thought she could 
enjoy her status of a mother without employing passional action…. 
She wanted to take everything from nature without giving anything 
in return. She overstressed her receptive role and considered 
herself entitled to enjoy without working for this end since work 
entails withdrawal and self-discipline.229 
Though the serpent told Eve that the fruit of the tree was “desirable” because it could 
“make one wise”, she was motivated by “the aesthetic desirability of knowledge”, rather 
than intellect as a means of achieving mastery over the world: 
The woman is driven by aesthetic motifs even when she engages in 
the intellectual gesture…The aesthete enjoys the cognitive act, 
because there is self-gazing and self-loving involved in learning 
and searching for truth. Not the mechanical utility but the 
recreational aspect, the desire to assure herself of her own worth, 
beckons to Eve if and when she is ready to give herself to a 
theoretical life. She finds delight in knowing.230 
In Soloveitchik’s reading, Eve sharing the fruit with Adam attests to her not being 
interested in gaining power and having mastery over other things; for otherwise, she 
would have kept it all for herself. From Soloveitchik’s account of Eve’s motivations, it 
appears that her aesthetic yearning is not negative in itself. It would rather seem that it is 
an aspect of her feminine personality that is good in itself - that is even an expected part 
of the search for knowledge – but which has in this case gone wrong, perhaps through a 
kind of excess or wrong direction. 
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Unlike Eve, whose fascinating vision was ''orgiastic experience'', Adam, says 
Soloveitchik, was “captivated by the vision of an over-active life dedicated to boundless 
conquest and domination.''231 Again, it appears that this pertains to an aspect of Adam’s 
male personality that is not negative in itself, but has become overbalanced. The result, in 
any case, is that the Divine curse that descended as a result of the initial sin affects “every 
human”: 
Both are engaged in a struggle for existence, but neither will ever 
attain the goal they so passionately pursue… There is no fully 
successful life. Every human work, even the most masterful bears 
the imprint of incompleteness and insufficiency. Everyone must 
live through the experience of failure and distressing frustration. In 
other word, on some fronts man loses the war life declared on 
him.232 
Soloveitchik’s characterization of the curse is interesting. Man and woman are not 
subject to gendered penalties, but rather both equally find that they must face struggles in 
living their lives, which is in reality a reflection of the fact that neither can completely 
fulfill his or her (particular) personalities as Adam and Eve tried to do. It seems that the 
Rav is commenting on the human condition. With this statement, he also seems to be 
trying to avoid negative characterizations of women. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the 
characteristics of Eve and Adam that caused them to commit sin are female and male 
ones shared by all their descendants. One would guess that Soloveitchik has read the 
verses of the Torah through the lens of ideas formed in his conservative environment 
about male and female qualities. The idea of aesthetic enjoyment may be based on Gen. 
3:6 where it says that Eve "saw that the tree was good for eating and a delight to the eyes, 
and that the tree was desirable as a source of wisdom;" but Soloveitchik seems to have 
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added other thoughts about Eve and women either from other sources without mentioning 
them, or his own perceptions of females. It is fair to conclude that Soloveitchik's analysis 
of Eve and Adam's characteristics such as the ones leading to the first sin of humanity 
should be read as gender characteristics in general, and that his analysis represents his a 
priori understanding of women's characteristics in the intellectual, spiritual, and 
psychological realms. 
1.5 Woman in Relation to Divinity 
In the view of Soloveitchik, man and woman's differences in their physical, 
sexual, psychological, and intellectual dimensions are destined by God as part of His plan 
for humanity, both for the purpose of propagation, and more importantly, in order to 
facilitate humanity's journey towards God through forming a marital-parental union: 
Each parental household is dedicated to participate in the march of 
the generations towards that final day on which every being will be 
redeemed and communion between man and God will be 
established, never to be lost.233 
In this context, the relationship to divinity comes to the fore: the God-human relation that 
can tolerably be referred to as "spirituality". The origin of spirituality, according to 
Soloveitchik, should be sought in the story of creation where it affirms that humans were 
created in the image of God. This distinguishing characteristic of human beings, says 
Soloveitchik, was given to both man and woman, as Genesis 1:27 says: "And God 
created man in his image. In the image of God He created him; male and female He 
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created them" (Gen. 1:27). Since both man and woman were given this ''divine gift'', as 
Soloveitchik calls it, they are equally worthy in their spiritual natures.234 
Man and woman being equally worthy in their spirituality does not by any means 
indicate that they are equal (the same) in spirituality. 235 Rather, they are endowed with 
equal spiritual worthiness before God and equally enjoy the distinction of being like God. 
For Soloveitchik, likeness to God is located in human intellect, which is a divine gift 
given to both man and woman (a view, borrowed from Maimonides, which is discussed 
further below). Equal spiritual worthiness, Rabbi Soloveitchik says, is confirmed in the 
Torah where it can be seen that "both bear His image, which is the ultimate criterion of 
value, both may be called to the colors to assume leadership roles, as history-makers, as 
God's messengers."236 
In all this, we again see the Rav’s insistence that women are not to be considered 
inferior. At the same time, he cautions that being created in the image of God does not 
mean being identical in spirituality; although he does not seem to present an outright 
explanation of the difference between spiritual worthiness and equality/being identical, or 
why there would be a difference despite both Adam and Eve being created in God’s 
image. Perhaps what Soloveitchik is getting at is the notion that equal does not have to 
mean that something is similar or the same, but rather pertains to equality within a 
scheme of complementarity as the two come together to virtually represent a more perfect 
being, as he says: "God created a dual human existence, man and woman, because they 
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complement one another [and therefore they] represent two existential destinies, a more 
perfect one."237 
Thus it is evident that the idea of man and woman's substantial differences runs 
strongly through Soloveitchik’s discussion of the spiritual aspect of the human 
personality, despite his conviction that women's spiritual capacity is attested by the 
existence of distinguished figures such as Sarah, Deborah, Miriam, and Esther, who 
functioned in the heart of the tradition as “God's emissaries” at times of crisis and were 
even superior in some way to their prophetic male relatives.238 Even high position and 
achievements of this kind do not seem to suffice to place these very special women in the 
same position as men. They are equally worthy, but do not enjoy the same spirituality. 
Another unequal position preceded by an equal one is encountered in the area of 
man and woman's likeness to God. This means, as clarified above, their equal endowment 
with the gift of intellect as the privilege of being created in the image of God – implying, 
it would seem logical to conclude, intellectual equality. Soloveitchik, however, qualifies 
his estimation of the roles of biblical women who came forward in times of upheaval and 
transition by asserting that “in normal times when routine decisions” were to be made, 
women followed their men. It was only at crucial junctures that they took the lead: 
"When covenantal community finds itself at a crossroads and the choice of alternative 
courses of action is about to be made, a choice that will shape destiny, the biblical women 
come to the scene and play their historical role."239 In other words, women step into the 
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breach only at exceptional moments; although one should not conclude that this happened 
exclusively in the past with biblical women, as Soloveitchik makes clear: 
The greatness of man expresses itself in everyday action when 
situations lend themselves to logical analysis and discursive 
thinking. The greatness of women manifests itself at the time of 
crisis when the situation does not lend itself to piecemeal 
understanding but requires instead instantaneous actions that flow 
from the very depth of a sensitive personality. "God gave women 
binah yeterah, an additional measure of understanding over man" 
(Niddah 45b).240 
Here we see that women’s intellect - or at least their leadership capacity based on God-
given intellect - has a different quality or genius, which becomes ideal in particular 
contexts. At these times, their role is to step forward where men cannot do so quite as 
effectively. 
Soloveitchik is not disturbed by the thought that the great women of the Bible 
played their roles in the shadow of great men, but rather feels that they both achieve 
greatness through playing their male and female roles, as seen in his following statement: 
Providence selected as Divine agent not only Mordecai but Esther 
as well. God willed that both male and female appear as actors on 
the historical stage. Judaism has never discriminated against 
women. From the days of Sarah, the woman was on par with the 
man as history-maker. Both Mordecai and Esther were created in 
the image of God; both were endowed with dignity and majesty; 
both possessed great talent; both were charismatic personae; and 
both were called to service, to make history. God assigned equally 
important roles to Mordecai and Esther because both of them were 
metaphysically and spiritually worthy of the task.241 
Soloveitchik carefully chooses his words in discussing the historical role of women. He 
stresses that Sarah and Esther (for instance) did not have to be men in order to make 
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history as charismatic personalities and enjoy the majesty and dignity humans possess by 
virtue of being created in the image of God. At the same time, he speaks of, "equally 
important roles" (i.e. roles equal in importance, but not the same action) and being 
"metaphysically and spiritually worthy of the task" (equally worthy, but not in exactly the 
same way). There is no doubt that Soloveitchik deeply feels that such women were 
extremely important, but it is necessary to read his statements expressing that sentiment 
in light of his overall view of the nature and destiny of males and females. His rationale 
for what those not convinced of his worldview are likely to regard as inequality is "basic 
differentiation of the sexes": 
The assignments [of the prominent women of past] differed 
because there is a basic differentiation of the sexes, not only 
physiologically, but psychically and spiritually as well. A historical 
masculine role cannot be assigned to women, and vice versa, a 
feminine task must not be imposed upon man.242 
Note how Soloveitchik not only says that roles meant for men are not to be given to 
women, but is also careful to point out that men cannot fulfill women’s roles. This is a 
way of saying that women also have their unique and privileged sphere, a view that does 
indicate respect. It also suggests that differentiation finally extends to all things, including 
even instances of individual heroism in times of crisis. This helps to explain why Biblical 
women such as Sarah and Esther are not recognized as authority figures and are in fact 
accompanied by male authority figures. 
The question of authority is relevant for women today in light of movements in 
Judaism and other religious traditions to allow women to hold formal positions of 
spiritual authority. Why do women not have access to such authority? The answer to this 
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question, like other gender issues, is found in Soloveitchik's emphasis on man and 
woman's planned, all-encompassing differences, which are believed to provide the 
necessary ground for marital union and founding of a family. In this regard, encouraging 
women to remain private serves Soloveitchik's argument by keeping the border between 
men and women's roles and responsibilities at all levels very distinct and within the 
defined framework. Ultimately, despite women being not only equally worthy in 
spirituality but also superior to men in some respects, their primary role as wife and 
mother in the home determines their other roles, even though those may also be important 
in certain ways or under some circumstances. These possibilities in the lives of ordinary 
women, however, are not really discussed. 
Soloveitchik’s thought concerning the spiritual position of a woman compared to 
that of a man is found chiefly in his essay on the covenantal role of Sarah, in which Sarah 
is said to be the mother of all nations, without whom there was no covenant. Soloveitchik 
cites Rashi243 in connection with the conclusion he draws from the story of Sarah and 
Hagar: 
When Abraham hesitated to send away Hagar and Ishmael because 
of Ishmael's baneful influence on Isaac, a divine instruction was 
given to Abraham that "all that Sarah says to you, listen to her 
voice" (Gen. 21:12). Here Rashi infers that Abraham was inferior 
to Sarah in prophecy.244 
Soloveitchik recalls that as Abraham wondered whether his heritage would be transmitted 
through Ishmael as his only son, God replied that Sarah would bear a son who would 
continue the covenant. Soloveitchik concludes from the story that "there can be no 
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covenant without Sarah"245 because the emphasis is on both Isaac and Sarah; that is to 
say,  the covenant can only be transmitted by Isaac as he emerges from both Abraham 
and Sarah, and not through Ishmael as he emerges from Abraham but not from Sarah. 
Note, however, that even though Sarah is elevated to the rank of God's emissary 
and actually becomes superior to Abraham in regard to prophecy, her private role is not 
to be undermined. Soloveitchik fulsomely praises that role and Sarah’s modest demeanor 
at the side of Abraham, as follows: 
When the angels asked Abraham "where is your wife, Sarah?" he 
replied, "here in the tent"(Gen. 18:9), to which Rashi appends, "the 
ministering angels knew, indeed, where our mother Sarah was, but 
they asked this question in order to call attention to her modesty 
[retiring disposition] and so to endear her all the more to her 
husband…she was a private person." The Talmud adds further: 
"from here we learn that private role is honorable for a woman" 
(Yev. 77). Sarah's manner was regarded as praiseworthy.246 
What Soloveitchik implies is that Sarah being less visible was not due to any inferiority. 
Rather, it is a manifestation of her “praiseworthy” manner of being private and even 
“|retiring.” Although we are not told so, it seems that Sarah’s private demeanor and habit 
is not a result of her conforming to what she is told or recommended to do, but her own 
choice, or rather part of her ideal womanly nature. Since keeping modestly to the private 
realm is in the nature of the most prominent and dignified of women, it is how all women 
should behave, rather than crossing to the public and communal sphere. Abraham and 
Sarah are both spiritually worthy, but each functions in a different context, Abraham at a 
communal level and Sarah, basically, at the private level. Soloveitchik’s reading is 
accordingly more about gender role differentiation - about women's private and men's 
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public roles - than spiritual worthiness. The whole of the discussion is finally consistent 
with Soloveitchik’s opposition to women performing as communal rabbis or receiving 
semikha (ordination). 247 
It is also notable that man and woman's differentiated capabilities, including the 
spiritual and intellectual, are ultimately directed toward their marital union. In other 
words, even if woman is endowed with a higher spiritual power that is not meant to 
interfere with her marital and parental roles, but should support and strengthen them, 
rather than lead her to public roles. Sarah represents this ideal, as she remains a private 
person despite her high status and outstanding spiritual capability. 
 
Here we see again how essential marriage is to Soloveitchik's thought on women 
and gender. Understanding of the Rav’s views on women's position seems to pass 
through family and marital relations, and it is to this subject that we will now turn. 
2. Marriage in the Thought of Soloveitchik 
As was argued previously, gender views and women's issues in particular are not 
Soloveitchik's main concern. These rather find their meaning in connection with family 
relations. Family is traditionally formed through marriage, and thus no discussion of 
women is possible without examining his thoughts on that subject. 
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2.1 Marriage and the Individuality of Woman 
The two Biblical stories of creation discussed above also effectively offer two 
accounts of marriage, which Rabbi Soloveitchik draws upon to discuss how marriage is 
suited to the nature, qualifications, and teleological purposes of First and Second Adam 
and the respective Eves. In the first Genesis account, man and woman meet at the 
moment of their creation without having longed for each other. They are also both 
assigned a single task as God commands them (Gen. 1:28) to "Be fruitful and multiply." 
The second account communicates a completely different impression of the meeting of 
man and woman. Man has a dawning feeling of loneliness as he names all creatures, and 
God approves his feeling by telling him that ''It is not good that the man be alone,” 
subsequently declaring: “I shall make him a helpmate opposite him" (Gen. 2:18). 
Soloveitchik also refers to two basic theories of marriage which he finds relevant 
to his marriage discussion as “the Bible operates with the same motifs,” he has 
discovered.
248
 These theories are based on different value systems, or perhaps it is better 
to say different views or dimensions of marriage. One proposes an outer-directed 
axiology for marriage, and the other an inner-directed axiology; Soloveitchik calls these 
transeunt and immanent. 249 In the first instance, the institution of marriage finds meaning 
“outside of the matrimonial union,” being only committed to “the welfare of the group”; 
marriage is in the service of society. Noting that he intends to place matrimonial union in 
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“the natural scheme of things,” Soloveitchik illustrates the meaning of outer-directed, 
transeunt marriage through the process of pollination of plants and seasonal mating in the 
world of animals. In nature, the existence of individual animals and plants makes sense, 
as Soloveitchik states: “only in the context of the species and its continuation and 
survival.” Thus also, marriage seen as a natural, transeunt institution is valued as a means 
of survival of the human species.250 
The inner-directed, subjective-immanent theory of marriage, on the other hand, 
considers that the chief value of marriage lies in creation of “a personal experience” that 
enhances the lives of the two individuals bound in matrimonial union. This view 
acknowledges the human “thirst for love and fellowship.” Immanent marriage, 
Soloveitchik explains, responds to the human need for “personalistic union”, “sharing 
destiny with somebody of the opposite sex” and living in community. Such fulfillment of 
the individual wedded partners is central, rather than procreation, so that a childless 
marriage, in this context, is also to be deemed meaningful and sacred.251 
Soloveitchik expands also on the Torah’s accounts of marriage differ in terms of 
their incentives and goals, and also in terms of the relationship between the two parties 
involved in the marriage. In the first account, similar to the transeunt approach, marriage 
is promoted as a means of procreation. Soloveitchik describes the position of two 
individuals engaged in this type of marital union:  
In this context the individual instead of acting spontaneously reacts 
compulsively to the mechanical pressure of its own insensate 
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The language seems pejorative, but this aspect of marriage is essential, even though one 
immediately senses from Soloveitchik’s exposition that it is finally not what makes it 
noble. It is interesting that Rabbi Soloveitchik in some way de-privileges the Genesis 
account that Jewish feminists take as evidence of gender equality. 
The second account of the creation offers a different meaning of marriage based 
on “the desire of the human individuals” rather than promoting only “the need of the 
race.” Soloveitchik comments that the reproductive urge is omitted in the second account 
in order to highlight the importance of fulfillment of two individual personae in marital 
union: 
According to the second account God was concerned not with the 
couple's biological motives and goals, with the meeting of male 
and female for the express purpose of procreation but with spiritual 




The physical reproductive and sexual urge in man and woman, although not mentioned in 
the second account, is neither denied. This hidden aspect receives significant attention 
from Soloveitchik. He believes that it is exactly based on this aspect that Halakhah has 
merged the two accounts of man's creation, where biology and teleology are wonderfully 
interwoven254 so that the reproductive urge is elevated from the animal to the human 
level, as he eloquently writes: 
The instinctive roar of the animal driven by biological pressure and 
pushed mechanically to the female in order to reproduce becomes a 
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human metaphysical cry of lonely man and lonely woman for 
fatherhood and motherhood.255 
This is Soloveitchik's way of defining a union in which the physical and natural needs of 
human beings are acknowledged, while being different from the natural biological urges 
of animals. It is in fact a humanized version of male and female's natural productive urge: 
man and woman, in this halakhic view, aspire and long to have children when they 
engage in marital union. Elevation of human procreation as a mere natural urge in the 
service of the race to a spiritual purposiveness promoted by the Halakhah is reflected in 
the following statement: 
Procreation is not only a biological capacity with which God 
provided man but also a halakhic commitment with which God 
charged man. The mechanical motivation and biological push have 
been sublimated and raised to a level of ethical meaningfulness and 
intentionality. We no longer deal with mechanical motives but with 
spiritual purposiveness. "Man and woman" replace "male and 
female" and their meeting presses for a more exalted togetherness 
experience, one whose aim is not only the survival of the race but 
also the formation and extension of a small, modest community.256 
In the view of Soloveitchik, parenthood is a human's metaphysical cry when he engages 
in marital union, and is the main factor in the redemption of human's instinctual desire. 
The logical conclusion would seem to be that individuals are not redeemed and complete 
if they are not parents, let alone unmarried. This approach might work well to 
theoretically explain and justify the human's natural needs, but it does at the same time 
raise a concern. If this is the underlying assumption, then it seems that in this merged 
halakhic approach too, the individuality of man and woman as persons is compromised. 
This was exactly the reason Soloveitchik did not find the transeunt approach to marriage 
and man and woman's union in the first account of the Torah compelling, as he criticized 
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In this suggested merged view, the individuality of man and woman who join 
together to escape their existential loneliness is compromised in the compelling name of 
redemption. An individual should be either a mother or a father to be redeemed from his 
or her existential loneliness. In this view, "existential completeness is possible only in a 
community of three personae."
258
 
By committing themselves to marriage, two individuals who once felt existential 
loneliness and were redeemed from that loneliness still suffer an existential 
incompleteness and loneliness. This time, having a child can redeem the couples from 
their "loneliness experience, which is a characteristic of a shattered and imperfect 
existence."
259
 This assumption places an immense weight on the essentiality of the 
existence of a child resulting from marital union of a man and a woman, without which, 
the individual man and woman would never be complete. 
As far as I understand, this approach is not much different from the transeunt 
theory of marriage when it comes to preserving and respecting the individuality of man 
and woman. The transeunt approach to marriage denies the individuality of man and 
woman by its collectivist approach, while this halakhic perspective, which was believed 
by Soloveitchik to address the individuality of man and woman, falls into exactly the 
same trap. To be more explicit, an individual can never find self-fulfillment if he or she is 
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not in reality attached to another individual of the opposite sex. This attachment needs to 
be further developed with the birth of a child as the third member of the community in 
order for the individual members to be completed and redeemed. Soloveitchik defines 
this process of self-fulfillment of the individuals thus: 
The halakhah says marriage fulfills a basic need of the human 
personality, namely, the need for existence in community. 
However, this community can be attained only through the quorum 
required by God in his original scheme of creation. The quorum 
consists of three people, and one of the three is a child. In the 




Soloveitchik criticizes the transeunt approach towards marriage for being collectivist and 
positivist-naturalistic. However, his halakhic outlook by suggesting parenthood as the 
sole means of completeness for man and woman does, though not viewing marriage from 
a positivist-naturalistic view, end by viewing marriage from a collectivist perspective, 
whether Soloveitchik likes it or not. By stressing that redemption and completeness of 
individuals are only possible through existential attachment to another individual by 
marriage and further through the existence of a child resulting from that marriage, this 
approach also prefers and prioritizes the community and collective body of family over 
individuals. In fact, in this system, man and woman as individuals can never be redeemed 
unless they are married and have children. 
Acknowledging the reality that some couples are not naturally able to have 
children, Soloveitchik still strongly stresses the significance of parenthood while offering 
his sympathy to childless couples. He assure them that there are halakhic solutions that 
compensate for their childlessness through “helping others, by contributing towards the 
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strengthening of the covenantal community [and] by exposing children of other parents to 
the words of God”.261 
However when one reads Soloveitchik’s views on parenthood, there is no doubt 
that he privileges family and community, despite his critical view of the positivist-
naturalistic side of marriage. Basically, the Rav is a collectivist; for instance, he clearly 
states that an individual can never find self-fulfillment if he or she is not attached to 
another individual of the opposite sex. At the same time, he acknowledges the importance 
of the individual and his or her spiritual fulfillment; this is in fact a central concern in his 
thought. The individualism seems to come from the philosophical side of his thought, 
since the modern Western philosophy on which he draws (along with the ideals of 
modern Western society) is essentially individualistic; while the collectivism is 
traditional, deriving both from the texts of the tradition and concern for the integrity and 
long-term survival of the Jewish community. Concerning the latter, Soloveitchik stresses 
that the whole system of marriage in the halakhic view should be interpreted in normative 
terms and as part of the divine commandments. 
Soloveitchik’s analysis of marriage opens up another discussion that of the 
different roles, responsibilities, and rights of man and woman as individuals equally 
blessed with God's imperative in the family and marital realm. That discussion, as 
remarked previously, is based on the idea of natural biological, psychological, and 
spiritual differences that fit the two sexes for an enduring marital relationship. 
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2.2 Marriage and Sexual Pleasure: A Halakhic Perspective 
Marriage begins with a natural attraction towards the opposite sex; but the 
halakhic view of sexual pleasure laid out by Rabbi Soloveitchik does not end there. He 
discusses different forms of human sexual life, relating them to, and evaluating them 
through, accounts in the Torah. As seen in the discussion in the previous section, it is a 
common method of Soloveitchik to employ his knowledge of modern philosophical 
categories within halakhic boundaries in order to formulate his own halakhic-centered 
philosophical perspective on an issue. In relation to sexual pleasure, he speaks of the 
categories of natural-paradisiacal, aphrodite-hedonic, and redeemed sexual life, each of 
which will be described briefly here. 
Natural-paradisiacal sexual life as described by Soloveitchik is stimulated by 
organic demands guided by “the general functionality” of the body. Sexuality at this level 
is merely a function; there is a biological motivation, but no real intentionality, 
personalization, or awareness of the mutual personal relationship rather than only "it-it" 
(object and object) relations. It is somewhat like an animal eating, with the difference 
that, though impersonalized, there must be two parties involved.262 Soloveitchik refers to 
the similarities and discrepancies between Genesis 1:27-28, which concerns the creation 
of the human and his tasks, and Genesis 1:22, concerning the creation of animals. In both, 
the word “blessed” refers to an instinctive sexual drive. That drive is different from 
vegetative regeneration, which does not receive blessing since it does not involve the 
"sexual hunger and tension" found in animal and human beings. 
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According to Soloveitchik, the aphrodite-hedonic level of human sexuality is 
developed through repeated experience, because of which a human becomes attracted to a 
specific object that seems to more easily and pleasantly satisfy the urge. At this level, the 
human being becomes aware of individual preferences; although individualization, if it 
can be called that at this level, represents an "I-it" rather than "I-thou" relation.263 
Finally, redeemed sexual activity is aimed at “passion for an existence in 
sympathy.” Through the medium of sexual action, though it is carnal, the unique 
individual fulfills his eternal longing to escape loneliness through sharing “his personal 
existence with others.” At this level there is a complete fusion of the erotic and 
psychological or metaphysical, so that lovers yearn for each other even when the sexual 
urge is absent. Most significantly, the relationship is fully personalized; "I" recognizes 
the existence of "thou", creating a solid foundation for marriage: “[As for] the essence 
and the meaning of the institution of marriage, I would say that through marriage the 
miraculous transition from the I-it contact to an I-thou relationship occurs.”264 
Although Soloveitchik is often praised for his careful choice of the words, so 
necessary when doing the job of reconciling different aspects of, or perspectives on, a 
reality, his use of the phrase "miraculous transition" in the statement above might be seen 
as resulting in an ambiguity. This is because the term "transition" draws the reader 
toward the conclusion that the human sexual relation exists primarily as a contact in 
which one party views the other as a depersonalized "it" and that it is marriage that 
finally facilitates the "transition" to "I-thou" sexual contact. It would therefore seem that 
                                                          
263
 Soloveitchik, Family Redeemed, 89-93; Soloveitchik gives prostitution as an example and marks a 
distance from the first level by noting that participants sometimes try to avoid pregnancy.   
264
 Soloveitchik, Family Redeemed, 95. 
 Zolghadr 132 
sexual need and desire, rather than the existential loneliness of man and woman as 
primarily advocated by Soloveitchik, is the motivational force – at least initially - behind 
bringing man and woman together in a marital bond. The tension between the human as 
an inherently sexual being and necessity that sex be confined to marriage is not entirely 
resolved. 
Soloveitchik’s scheme also does not address the reality of marriages that do not 
meet expectations in upgrading male-female relations from “I-it” to “I-thou”. His account 
of gender relationships and marriage is, of course, idealizing and prescriptive rather than 
intended to engage directly with human problems and the great variety of human realities. 
However, even if we accept this, tension remains in the theory itself, since Soloveitchik 
proposes that marriage is primarily motivated by a sense of existential loneliness in two 
individualized persons, with desire serving to make this unique attachment strong and 
enduring; but his view of sexuality makes it seem that desire is a necessary initial 
motivation. To put it another way, it appears that marriage would then begin with the "I-
it" contact, rather than being founded from the outset on the "I-thou" relationship that is 
said to constitute its essence. 
Personalization of individuals resulting from marriage is so significant in the 
thought of Soloveitchik that he connects its challenges to the harsh reaction of the Torah 
and Judaism to promiscuity (zenut): 
Promiscuity is perhaps the most abhorrent phenomenon of the 
heathen world against which the Bible mercilessly fought, because 
in every form of indiscriminate sex-activity the personal moment is 
lost and the element of dominion emerges. The "I" enjoys the "it". 
The experience is not shared with another "I"; it remains an 
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isolated dreary experience, animal-like in seclusion and 
loneliness.265 
However, it goes without saying that although Soloveitchik sees personalization as the 
kernel of a relationship, out-of-wedlock sexual relations of two individuals who feel 
lonely without each other and love and long for each other is as devastating for the family 
and society as relations between a personalized "I" and a depersonalized "it", if not more 
so. Thus the necessity of the frame of marriage rather than personalization seems to be 
truly the ultimate issue. It may be that Soloveitchik believes that personalization cannot 
possibly take place outside that frame; although he does not, as far as I am aware, 
elaborate on this despite it posing an evident challenge to the theories he has constructed. 
It could be that the negative effects of non-marital relations are simply taken for granted, 
so that there is no need to raise them. 
Soloveitchik further grounds his view of sexuality in the text of the Torah by 
pointing to a difference between Genesis 1:22, according to which "God blessed them 
[animals], saying be fruitful and multiply", and Genesis 1:28, which reads: "God blessed 
them [humans] and God said to them be fruitful and multiply". Though apparently a 
minor variation, the addition of "God said to them" in the second passage marks, in the 
view of Soloveitchik, a major turning point at which man gains awareness of his 
personality - a crossroads, in effect, at which the sexualities of animals and humans part 
ways. For “said to them” indicates a divine address to man, through which he is granted 
the privilege of (potentially) transcending instinctual, mechanical, impersonal sexual 
relations and enabled to ascend  to self-experience, as Soloveitchik writes: 
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Through the dialogue God addresses Himself to man; God 
confronts man and speaks to him, and through this conversation it 
begins suddenly to dawn upon man who he is. Man is spoken to, 
and through speech he becomes a person.266 
Thus the human emerges as an “ethico-religious personality” in two stages of 
development. First, he is granted power over nature, leading to a discovery of self 
through dawning consciousness; and then God addresses him with an imperative (“be 
fruitful and multiply”), resulting in a discovery of himself as an ethical being, i.e. one 
who is given commands and faced with responding to them. In the first phase, power and 
dominion is accompanied by sensuality so that the powerful "I" does not recognize a 
personalized "thou", simply demanding surrender. This is the level of aphrodite-hedonic 
sexual relations. However, as Adam is subsequently confronted with the divine 
imperative, he finds not only himself, but Eve, leading to the emergence of the "I-thou" 
relation and what Soloveitchik describes as a "redeemed sexual life".267 
This account of the development of human sexuality elaborated by Soloveitchik, 
in which personal development recapitulates the developments of Genesis, leads to the 
conclusion that the human personality as an "I" and ethico-religious being emerges only 
in light of sexuality-mindedness. Sex is God's distinct blessing upon man as it appears in 
the course of a divine dialogue, providing him with a sex drive. 
Soloveitchik’s argument here also sheds light on the different positions of male 
and female. Eve as the representative of the female gender is absent at the defining 
moment when ethico-religious personality is formed. The drama seems to concern Adam 
alone: 
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Adam who was born in sensuality, in his drive and aptitude for 
dominion over the world he enjoys, found only himself, not the 
other self. Powerful man does not recognize the existence of the 
thou since the whole of creation serves him exclusively. He 
demands from the thou total surrender and depersonalization. The 
Adam who was bolstered by the charge "replenish the earth and 
subdue it" (Gen. 1:28) had no companion; he was insanely shut up 
in himself. He could not discover Eve as a self.268 
Even if Eve, as Soloveitchik says, is equally worthy in her spirituality since she was, like 
Adam, created in the image of God, she is still "it" until Adam develops his ethico-
religious personality and finds her to make her thou. Action and development proceeds 
initially from Adam: 
Adam who emerged out of confrontation with God, with an 
overpowering will that challenges and summons, who was advised 
by God and to whom God communicated the mystery of the ought 
of the norm, found not only himself but Eve as well.269 
Eve acquires an ethico-religious personality only in the course of events through Adam's 
finding and recognition. This is apparently the reason that Eve, representing the female 
gender, appears always in Soloveitchik's discussions as a thou and not an I. The second-
person address in itself suggests reception of action, a certain passivity. This 
configuration, as one would expect, affects Soloveitchik's gender views and his view of 
marital relations in particular. 
2.3 Centrality of Halakhah in Marriage 
The theories of marriage and sexuality discussed above seem to be primarily 
aimed at making clear "what marriage is not". We learn that is not a mere depersonalized 
sexual relation; nor a relation in which a personalized individual relates to another as a 
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depersonalized it-object; nor does it exist solely for the benefit of community and 
perpetuation of the human race. For exposition of “what-marriage-is”, Soloveitchik turns 
to the teachings of the Torah and Halakhah. 
Marriage in the vision of Soloveitchik is an institution willed by God, embracing 
two existentially attached individuals who feel lonely without each other and come 
together for the purposes of self-fulfillment and completeness, as well as the collectivist 
goal of survival of the race. Rabbi Soloveitchik, however, goes further than this in 
valorizing the marriage relationship. Marriage, in the halakhic sense, is said to be a heroic 
act leading to holiness and redemption. As Soloveitchik says: "to act heroically means to 
sanctify urges by allowing their expression only within a framework of norms."270 The 
element of heroism enters because man is a natural being with strong natural urges, so 
that conforming to norms necessarily involves challenges and sacrifice.271 Note here that 
natural urges such as sex are not to be entirely frustrated or set aside. Rather, they should 
be heeded and satisfied, but in a sanctified manner determined by divine norms. The 
consequent halakhic approach to human naturalness in the vision of Soloveitchik is 
expressed in his dictum: "man experiences both oneness and otherness with nature".272 
That is, humans are part of nature, but not dominated by it; they are biological, but have 
made the transition to personality. According to Soloveitchik, Halakhah presents humans 
with the challenge of placing nature in a framework of norms, while also supplying 
guidance and discipline to help them face that challenge. Ultimately, the confrontation 
with God's will and endeavor to heed His norms gives human life structure and meaning. 
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Thus the divine commandment and blessing "be fruitful and multiply" refers to both a 
human capacity and halakhic commitment. 
The centrality of Halakhah to marriage in the thought of Soloveitchik is also seen 
in the parental relation in which father; mother; and child come together to form, as 
Soloveitchik says, an "ontological unity dedicated to the realization of the will of God".273 
From this perspective, marriage is necessary in Halakhah because the parental 
community as a halakhic responsibility can be formed only in this way. If the ultimate or 
highest goal is parental community, marriage must be the instrument or means. 
However, while marital and parental unions are believed by Soloveitchik to be 
halakhic commandments equally addressed to men and women who redeem themselves 
through sacrificing (as explained above) natural and instinctual needs, the two do not 
equally share suffering and sacrifice. It is quite clear that women in Soloveitchik’s view 
bear the greater burden of both, since he feels that they naturally suffer more need for a 
husband and children: 
The woman finds herself in a paradoxical predicament. On the one 
hand, she craves for a husband and a child on the other hand this 
which penetrates into the very depths of her personality can be 
fulfilled only by means of pain and suffering.274 
Soloveitchik also describes “the lot of the unmarried woman” as being “far more 
miserable than that of an unmarried man.” In his view, “The impact of sexual loneliness 
upon a woman is more devastating, both physically and mentally, than it is upon a 
man”.275 Motherhood, beginning with sex, is also said to involve more suffering for 
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woman than man, since men, Soloveitchik says, can walk off free, while women cannot 
ever feel happy not being mothers, as much as motherhood involves pain and suffering. 
Thus Soloveitchik depicts women as tragically helpless, unable to escape desire 
for wifehood and motherhood while destined to suffer because of them. The idea 
evidently has roots in the Torah where God says to Eve: "I will greatly multiply your 
sorrow and your conception. In sorrow you shall bring forth children; and your desire 
shall be to your husband, and he shall rule over you" (Gen. 3:16). One cannot help but 
notice that the idea also fits well with the female psychology spoken of elsewhere in 
Soloveitchik’s thought, according to which women are naturally more emotional than 
men. Whereas female emotionality makes woman unique in some ways in a positive 
sense, it also exposes her to special suffering. It might not be far-fetched to see 
Soloveitchik’s statement also to some degree as an acknowledgement of the greater 
travails suffered by women in many real marriage relationships. 
2.4 Marriage as a Covenant 
Citing the Torah's equation of the Covenant between Jews as a community and 
God with the private binding - also known as berit - that unites two individuals, 
Soloveitchik declares that marriage is thus raised to the level of a covenantal 
commitment. Analysis of aspects of the historical covenantal commitment will thus serve 
to shed light on halakhic matrimony and its ideals. 
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Thus according to Soloveitchik, the marriage covenant places the spiritual 
personalities involved in an existential mutual relationship. The partners "belong to each 
other,"276 a characterstic that partakes of the original convenant: 
When God reached the covenant with His chosen community, He 
was concerned not only with the worldly goods He placed at its 
disposal, but with the people as people themselves. He claims not 
only our material but our spiritual possessions as well…We 
became His people in the absolute sense of the word. It is self-
evident that since mutuality is an indispensable element of 
definition of any agreement including the covenantal, the 
personalistic aspect of the latter applies to the commitment 
assumed by God vis-à-vis His people as well. He is our God. 
Hence the chosen community lays existential claims to God as its 
God. The community belongs to God and at the same time God 
belongs to the community.277 
As consistency and permanency are unique attributes of the covenant between God and 
the people of Israel, enduring through overwhelming historical circumstances, so is the 
covenant of marriage to endure. 
Soloveitchik draws contrasts with what he calls the secular approach to marriage. 
As implied in the quotation immediately above, covenantal marriage does not merely 
involve possessions and property, as it supposedly does in a civil contract. The essence of 
covenantal marriage is metaphysical and existential fellowship; whereas in the secular 
world, marriage is a civil institution in which a man and a woman come together (in 
Soloveitchik’s opinion) for pleasure and convenience. Rabbi Soloveitchik also 
differentiates Jewish, covenantal marriage from marriage as a sacrament, for instance as 
practiced by Catholics, cautioning that covenantal agreement does not mean that marriage 
is supernatural in some way so that is has to be solemnized by a priest with special 
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powers. Rather, marriage is an institution established by human beings, with the union 
created and confirmed by the mutual consent of both parties.278 
The similarity between the historical Covenant and covenant of marriage has 
limits – from a theological point of view, as Soloveitchik would no doubt admit, since 
God is not in need of that fulfillment - but also because of the priority of Adam. 
Soloveitchik refers fulfillment and completeness through marriage to Genesis 2:23, as 
follows: 
Married life is an existence in fellowship, togetherness. In it man 
finds completeness and existential fulfillment. The story of the first 
marriage in Genesis confirms this thesis, "and Adam said this is 
now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called 
woman because she was taken out of man."279 
It appears that although man and woman as partners in the historical covenant are 
expected to establish a mutual existential life in fellowship, they are not entirely in a 
position of mutual giving and accepting at a personalistic level. According to the verse, it 
is Adam who finds completeness and fulfillment in the creation of Eve. Thus it might be 
said that the marital covenant is not established on an entirely equal basis, as one partner 
is made from and for the other. 
Adam and Eve, furthermore, are not equal in the sacrifice required (as explained 
above) for redemption. Adam sacrifices a part of his own flesh as a result of the 
loneliness he had suffered due to the absence of Eve, while Eve, having been supplied 
with a companion at the moment she came into existence and not being present when the 
creatures were named, does not feel incomplete and unfulfilled. Again, the basic problem 
                                                          
278
 Ibid., 46. 
279
 Ibid., 47. 
 Zolghadr 141 
is that Adam is the actor in the action of the Genesis text, whereas Soloveitchik wants to 
give Eve (and consequently women) a more active part. Faithfulness to the text does not 
allow Soloveitchik to bridge the gap; although to do so would be less demanding than for 
feminists, since he is not seeking complete equality or sameness. 
Nevertheless it must be said that, whatever the challenges involved in 
interpretation of the text, Soloveitchik does place very great emphasis on mutual 
fulfillment of man and woman in marriage, and this should be taken seriously. Perhaps 
we might say that reciprocal fulfillment appears after the establishment of marriage, even 
if not entirely in the process of its original establishment. Soloveitchik’s belief in 
mutuality is evident in his enumeration of six characteristics of covenantal marriage 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
First, “covenantal marriage is a sacrificial community,” requiring sacrifice from 
both parties. Sacrifice here signifies giving up easily attainable pleasure that is 
gratification outside marriage, in favour of commitment. Second, covenantal marriage is 
also “a hedonic, pleasure-oriented community;” it must not consist exclusively of 
spiritual fellowship. Celibacy, Soloveitchik notes, is disapproved of by the Halakhah to 
the extent that refusal or inability on the part of either spouse to provide sexual 
fulfillment constitutes grounds for divorce. Third, “covenantal marriage is a natural 
procreative community.” Both partners have an undeniable right to parenthood in the 
marriage, as parenthood is part of God’s plan. Covenantal marriage is, fourthly, 
cooperative, in the sense that the partners are subject to civil and economic duties and 
form an economic unit, without barriers between their wealth so that they are freed from 
their loneliness also in this sphere. Soloveitchik is speaking of the establishment of a 
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household in which both the marriage partners are responsible and dependent in their 
own ways, in which the husband provides for his wife and the wife runs the house. He 
believes that when both partners work and are independent of each other, marriage 
beomes like a business partnership rather than what he calls “economic community”, and 
finally does not work. 
The fifth characteristic of covenantal marriage - as constituting “a community of 
affection and appreciation” - is very important. The relationship of the partners is 
founded on and strengthened by gratitude. Here Soloveitchik applies his philosophy of 
discovering the “thou” in one’s partner, commenting that in marriage, one discovers the 
reality of “thou” and finds it to be worthy of amity and love. Because of this 
characteristic, man and woman share not only sexual pleasure, but their very destiny and 
existence. The sixth characteristic is that “a covenantal marriage is an educational 
community.” The household should be a school in which parents educate their children, 
preparing them for the challenges they will face in life. For parents are teachers and 
guides, a deliberate spiritual activity the Halakhah deems much more important than the 
purely natural act of childbearing and being a father or mother. 
Note in all this that it is still halakhically determined ''gender differences'' that 
ultimately determine woman's position and role in the marriage. This is clearly exhibited 
in the instances in covenantal marriage in which such difference plays a role in assigning 
tasks in the family, such as distinct economic roles for men and women and distinct roles 
for the parents in educating their children. 280 Though covenantal marriage is marked by  
mutual, personalistic, and existential relations along with permanency, that does not make 
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it any different from halakhic marriage, at least as far as woman's position in practice 
within the marriage is concerned. 
2.5 Termination of Marriage in the View of Soloveitchik 
As discussed above, the covenantal character of marriage suggests permanency, 
constancy, and indissolubility. As such, it is not expected that it be terminated. On the 
other hand, Judaism does not rule out divorce as a lawful termination of marriage, even if 
that might appear to undermine the covenantal nature of the marriage community. Having 
introduced and very much stressed the idea of covenantal marriage Soloveitchik is thus 
compelled to address a seeming discrepancy between the covenantal character of 
marriage and legitimacy of divorce. His discussion of divorce is chiefly aimed at 
explaining this point and justifying separation of two partners whose commitment to each 
other in marital agreement was supposedly everlasting. Rabbi Soloveitchik’s views on 
legal aspects of Jewish divorce (including the agunahh issue, discussed below) are also 
effectively replies to its critics. 
Soloveitchik's response involves a philosophical analysis of human personality 
along with discussion of the concept of the sacred. When faced with this difficult legal 
issue, the Rav resorts to philosophy or a kind of philosophized psychology along with 
theology so that the issue is placed in a different, wider perspective. 
In regard to human personality, Soloveitchik speaks of its dialectical character, 
involving two opposite aspects, the “numinous” and “kerygmatic”. The so-called 
numinous personality, according to Soloveitchik, represents the secluded and lonely 
human being who never commits himself to the Other because he does not venture out of 
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seclusion. The numinous, lonely man is “inner-directed” and continuously withdraws; he 
is “mute” so that he does not involve himself in dialogue or social interaction.281 
The kerygmatic personality, on the other hand, is an eager communicator with the 
Other, striving to overcome barriers between them. The kerygmatic personality is not 
only social; it is the very basis of society, since any group or institution of two or more 
people springs from it. It is this aspect of the human personality, and not the whole of it, 
that commits to the Other in marriage, as Soloveitchik explains by referring to the 
original gender pair:  
Adam and Eve became wedded partners; yet only the kerygmatic 
personality took the vow of fidelity and constancy. Numinous 
Adam and Eve never contracted matrimony since they never met 
and never were cognizant of each other.282 
The crucial point here is that since commitment to matrimony does not involve the whole 
but only part of the human personality (remembering that the joining of personalities as 
Soloveitchik describes it is essential to the marital union), commitment can change; and 
thus it is permitted to terminate the relationship. This is the core argument of Rabbi 
Soloveitchik's philosophical justification of the legal permissibility of divorce. 
Having drawn parallels between the marriage covenant and historical covenantal 
communion between God and the people of Israel, Soloveitchik has to differentiate 
between them on this point. He assures his readers that the Covenant cannot ever be 
broken or ended, since communion between God and His people is “all-embracing” so 
that the whole of the human being, including the numinous personality, is committed.
283
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He explains further that communion in this case is established not only through an 
objectified, externalized ''I and thou'', but also through communion between the 
numinous, lonely man, with the numinous, lonely God.
284
 
Thus we see that the invention of categories and devising of abstract concepts to 
address human and in this case legal realities turns marital incompatibility with all its 
causes and variations into an intricate philosophical undertaking. Even in the very real 
issue of divorce, there is an idealizing tendency in Soloveitchik’s thought, a tendency to 
step back from actual human difficulties. We saw the same approach in his consideration 
of marriage, as he focuses on what the personalities of the partners contribute to the 
marital relation, on internal and theoretical mechanisms rather than the realities of 
marriage as a social institution. This is not to deny the significance and necessity of 
addressing divorce at the level of human personality, which is in itself an essential 
element of causes and effects, but only to draw attention to the fact that practical 
considerations are not really included by Soloveitchik– whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, it is hard to know. 
As for the sacred ground or what I have called the “theology” of divorce, 
Soloveitchik begins by recalling that the holiness of marriage in Judaism is confirmed in 
the Hebrew term “sanctification” (kiddushin) that designates the betrothal ceremony. This 
is an indication that the marriage agreement is viewed in Halakhah as being of a sacred 
character, as the partners commit themselves to creating a sacred relationship. “Sacred” 
here refers to the sacrifice by two individuals of their sexual desires – not meaning, of 
course, asceticism, but the discipline and channeling of desire into the marriage that 
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serves to make it “holy” since, as Soloveitchik explains, "sacrifice and holiness are 
synonymous concepts in Judaism.''285 
Here Rabbi Solovietchik does emphasize reality. He says that the holy is "born 
out of man's actions and experiences,"286 so that “the moment of sacredness is eliminated” 
the instant man “adopts a coarse attitude towards the hallowed object.”287 Holiness, it 
seems, is a constant practice, no doubt laborious, and an attainment; one could hardly 
describe the everyday reality of marriage better. 
Here we may pause in our consideration of divorce to consider Soloveitchik’s use 
of the idea of sanctity to tackle the issue of the physical partition (mechitza) that 
traditionally divides men and women in synagogues. He strongly objects to removal of 
the mechitza favoured by some, on the ground that it violates the sanctity of the 
synagogue. He goes so far as to recommend that worshippers prefer avoiding a “mixed” 
synagogue over fulfillment of certain other important halakhic obligations: 
Synagogue with a mixed seating arrangement forfeits its sanctity 
and its Halachic status of mikdash me'at [a Sanctuary-in-
miniature], and is unfit for prayer and abodah she-beleb [the 
service of the heart]. With full cognizance of the implications of 
such a Halachic decision, I would still advise every orthodox Jew 
to forego tefillah b'tzibbur [group prayer] even on Rosh Hashanah 
and Yom Kippur, rather than enter a synagogue with mixed 
pews.288 
To put it another way, the synagogue is a holy place not inherently, but because certain 
things are done; because of a certain correct practice and endeavor. When these are 
interrupted or violated, holiness departs. Note the parallel with marriage and divorce. 
                                                          
285
 Ibid., 63. 
286




 Joseph B. Soloveitchi, The Sanctity of the Synagogue, ed. Baruch Litvin (New Jersey: Ktav 
Publishing House, 1987), 110. 
 Zolghadr 147 
When sanctity is violated by the marriage partners – when certain acts are committed or 
omitted – the contract is also “profaned”289 and covenantal sanctity removed, making it 
liable to termination, as the Rav puts it: 
Divorce is only the formal validation of an act of disintegration 
which took place before, the conclusion of a process of profanation 
of the marriage institution which divested it of its permanency and 
constancy.290  
Soloveitchik here recalls that the only violation of the marriage contract that removes 
holiness and thus according to Halakhah warrants divorce is adultery. He refers both to 
the Torah, where it says: "if he finds in her an ervat davar [i.e. “some indecency”]” 
(Deut. 24:1) and Mishnah, in which divorce is also limited to instances of ervat davar 
(Gittin 9:10). If adultery is committed, the marriage has already been effectively 
annulled, and divorce is warranted. Soloveitchik is thus faced with finding a way to 
justify divorce for reasons other than adultery – a delicate maneuver because of his 
faithfulness to the Halakhah. This he does by expanding on the meaning of ervat davar.  
He is, however, fairly cautious in this, confining himself to drawing on Jewish sources, 
rather than freely philosophizing. That Rabbi Soloveitchik deploys his philosophical 
knowledge and acumen to strengthen marriage but not to provide an “easy escape” from 
it is a further indication of the tremendous value he places on marriage and family. 
Thus Soloveitchik notes that adultery can be defined in its literal sense and strictly 
halakhic terms, as it is by Beit Shammai,291 so that only “legal blame” for actual adultery 
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justifies divorce.
292
 Ervat davar can also, however, be understood in a wider sense as Beit 
Hillel defines it, extending even to spoiling the husband’s dish (i.e. food or cooking).293 
Soloveitchik favours the wider margin of interpretation seen in the second opinion, but 
for the purpose of allowing the couple to part if absolutely necessary rather than allowing 
men to divorce freely. Thus, somewhat in the manner of Maimonides,294 he speaks of 
dislike or aversion as giving a way out of marriage – although he does not like the 
Rambam aim particularly at women and states it in negative terms by talking about the 
corrupting effects of aversion, as follows: 
The corruption of the sexual feeling manifesting itself in the dislike 
which one wedded partner feels towards the other, in the sexual 
disgust and aversion, is considered adultery since the element of 
faithfulness and dedication is missing from the marriage. The mere 
desire for separation and divorce implies treachery and an 
adulterous motif which deprives the marriage of its sanctity.295 
Soloveitchik carefully refers his opinion to Rabbi Akiva,296 commenting that Akiva 
“raises the meaning of ervat davar to the moral level.”297 His discussion of divorce in 
Family Redeemed finally ends (as redacted by others, of course) with condemnation of 
divorce as he remarks that “Talmudic scholars deplored the separation of husband and 
wife” and gives examples.298 Thus while the Rav is able to contemplate divorce, he 
narrows this possible exit by condemning it morally, and in fact uses the idea of  “mental 
adultery” to warn against feelings that could lead to separation. 
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I will now turn to the issue of agunah, a halakhic term for a Jewish woman who is 
"chained" to her marriage. Soloveitchik addresses the problem of “chained” women not 
as part of a larger discussion of the legal aspects of divorce - since, it seems, he prefers 
not to emphasize the breaking of marriages - but rather for the purpose of protecting the 
Halakhah in the face of controversy. 
The classic case of agunahh is when a man who has left on a journey or to go to 
war never returns, leaving the wife with neither a husband nor a divorce. Today, 
however, it more commonly refers to a woman whose husband refuses to grant her a get 
(a bill of divorce), is unable to do so, or will only give her the get if she turns over 
custody of the children, pays, or some other condition she is unwilling or unable to meet. 
Without a get, which can be granted only by the husband, there is no Jewish divorce, a 
subsequent marriage will not be recognized by the rabbinical court or community, and 
perhaps most damaging, children of the agunahh woman born from a subsequent 
relationship will be considered illegitimate and unable to marry a Jew. 
The predicament of the agunah has been a perennial problem for the Jewish 
community, since it causes grief not only to women affected, but the community in 
general. One strategy to prevent women becoming agunah is to include grounds for 
divorce in a pre-nuptial agreement; but the halakhic ruling itself has so far not been 
modified. Soloveitchik's own reaction to an attempt in 1970 CE by Rabbi Immanuel 
Rackman299 to address the problem throws light on obstacles to treating it. This is not the 
place to go into the details of Rackman's proposal. It is sufficient for our purpose to say 
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that he considers the presumption of the Talmud (BT Yevamot 118b) that it is 
“preferable” for a women to “live as two bodies than to dwell in widowhood,” so that a 
woman wanting to escape her marriage should be kept in it with the expectation or hope 
that she might come to her senses and change her mind, to be a “historically conditioned 
observation” rather than “meta-historical truth.”300  
It was precisely the idea that the Halakhah is historically conditioned - the 
premise on which Rackman’s whole argument rests - that provoked a harsh reaction from 
Soloveitchik. Soloveitchik is loathed to question the validity of a halakhic ruling in any 
time and context, due to his unshakeable faith in the applicability of the words of the 
Sages of the past, as he says: 
Not only the halakhos [the entire Jewish law and tradition], but 
also the hazakos [a traditional presumption or concept that is 
considered strong even if it is not an actual law] which the 
traditional sages have introduced, are indestructible. For the 
hazakos which the Rabbis spoke of rest not on trenchant 
psychological patterns, but upon permanent ontological principles 
rooted in the very depth of the…metaphysical human personality - 
which is as changeless as the heavens above. 
301
 
Thus in the impassioned conviction of Rabbi Soloveitchik, the hazaka of "better dwell 
with two bodies” has nothing to do with changing social conditions, but is rather based on 
God’s statement in Genesis 3:16: "I will greatly multiply the pain…and thy desire shall 
be for thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." That solitude is more terrible for a 
woman than a man, and a spinster than a bachelor, according to Soloveitchik, a fact both 
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“psychological” and “existential” which is accurately reflected in the tradition and cannot 
be legislated away.302 
Soloveitchik's strenuous objection to Rackman's proposition has a great deal to do 
with faithfulness to the tradition. He evidently fears that reassessing the foundational, 
“indestructible” hazakos will lead finally to the destruction of Judaism – to, as he puts it, 
“self-destruction and suicide.”303 We may note, however, as a possible indication of 
Soloveitchik's position, that the Rav’s sister reports concerning their esteemed father 
Rabbi Moses Soloveitchik that he was by no means indifferent to the misery and virtual 
imprisonment of agunah women. In her volume, The Soloveitchik Heritage: A 
Daughter's Memoir, Shulamith Soloveitchik Meiselman describes how her father strove 
mightily to address the problem.304 She tells of the help he gave to individual women, 
including his struggle to secure the status of widow for women whose husbands had 
fallen in battle in WWI; although she also remembers that where no proof of death could 
finally be obtained, “the woman remained an agunah,” for Rabbi Soloveitchik “never 
deviated from the halakhah.”305 
Soloveitchik, as we have seen, asserts that men and women are existentially 
lonely and long for each other, and that woman, moreover, is man's helper in escaping his 
loneliness. Soloveitchik’s thoughts on divorce seem not to have been incorporated into 
this philosophical system, and consequently go in a different direction. His philosophy of 
marriage presents a man and woman desirous of meeting each other and joining in 
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marital union; but when divorce is considered, we see that a woman has much greater 
need of a husband than a man does of a wife. The idea of mutual existential need that is at 
the heart of Soloveitchik’s philosophy of covenantal marriage and creation of the first 
gender pair is not carried through. 
3. Soloveitchik: A Legal Decisor 
Rabbi Soloveitchik is chiefly known for his intellectual and academic contribution 
to Modern Orthodoxy. His thought described above on woman’s creation, nature, and 
marital and parental roles may be regarded as his contribution in this regard. Soloveitchik 
is also, however, known for his role as a leading legal decisor (posekh) of Modern 
Orthodoxy. In this regard, his position towards Jewish education for women and women's 
prayer groups will be examined as instances of either new initiatives or reactionary 
positions in relation to issues and questions of concern for women. Soloveitchik’s 
responsa show different tendencies. He initiated women's Torah education, but also 
discussed women's prayer groups and ordination as rabbis in reaction to growing trends 
in other Jewish denominations. He heeded the forces of the modern world in some ways, 
while resolving to stand against them. 
3.1 Women's Jewish Education 
Jewish education of a child, as traditionally defined, has a twofold gender 
implication. First, it is primarily a father's role in Judaism to teach Torah to his children; 
and second, only boys are supposed to be instructed in Torah. Teaching of the Torah to 
women is the subject of a Talmudic dispute between Ben Azzai and Rabbi Eliezar, two 
rabbinic Sages living in the first century CE whose views are recorded in the Mishnah.  
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The former, it is reported, claimed that a father must teach his daughter Torah, while the 
latter asserted that to do so would be like teaching her tiflut (triviality or immorality).306  
Interpretation of the word tiflut is important here, since later deliberations on the issue 
revolve mainly around different interpretations of this key term. This is not to say that all 
interpretations are aimed at different understandings and rulings. For instance, 
Maimonides, who seems to be an important source for Soloveitchik, argues that although 
women can study Torah, such study is still not advisable, for the following reasons: 
A woman who studies Torah is rewarded, but not as much as a 
man is, for the reason that she has not been commanded to learn. 
Anyone who does something voluntarily is not rewarded as much 
as someone who is obligated to do it is. Even though she is 
rewarded for learning, the Sages commanded that one should not 
teach Torah to one's daughter, for the reason that most women 
don't have the mentality for learning, and they think of Torah 
matters as being nonsensical. The Sages said that teaching one's 
daughter Torah is like teaching her trivialities. This is talking only 
about the Oral Torah, but one nevertheless shouldn't teach her the 
Written Torah either, but if one did it is not like teaching her 
trivialities.307 
This is the heritage Soloveitchik draws on in formulating his position towards women's 
Jewish education as an Orthodox rabbi and Talmudist. His position can be examined in 
two parts: first, the roles of the parents in the context of an expanded view of what 
constitutes education; and second, Talmud education for women. 
In considering the parents’ role in their children’s education, Soloveitchik draws 
on the concepts of the natural and covenantal communities formed by “majestic” Adam 
and Eve in the first Genesis account,  and “dignified” Adam and Eve in the second. In the 
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natural community, in his view, women are completely absorbed in their destined roles as 
mothers, while the role of the father is much less so that he stands as a rather distant 
figure. In covenantal community, on the other hand, the father according to Soloveitchik 
"moves to the center where mother has been all along." Thus it seems that once the stage 
of an infant’s life requiring purely maternal nurturing has passed, the father joins in so 
that the two together can create an educational environment in which the child is taught 
and trained to be a Jew. 
At this point, the mother and father have distinct missions based on gendered 
personalities. Judaism, Soloveitchik believes, has both intellectual and experiential 
elements, both of which the child needs training in, and one of the parents dominates in 
each of these spheres. Thus the covenantal mother provides the experience needed by the 
child of the "beauty, grandeur, warmth, and tenderness of Judaism";308 she, for instance, 
provides her children with the experience of Shabbat and prayers while the father has the 
responsibility of providing instruction about Shabbat and teaching recitation of prayer. 
Fathers are responsible for the intellectual upbringing of the child overall and ensuring 
that they are thoroughly acquainted with the principles of Judaism as a system of thought 
and values. The central point here in relation to women is that gender differences dictate 
different roles in the child's upbringing. Ultimately, both parents have responsibilities, 
and the reader receives the impression that Soloveitchik genuinely values the role of 
mothers. He does, however, seem to privilege the educational activity of the father 
somewhat, as can be seen in the following passage: 
The halakhah entrusted education to the father - and what is the 
educational gesture if not an act of granting independence to the 
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young person and training the latter to live with dignity and 
responsibility and in freedom? The father was charged with this 
task because it fits into the framework of paternal concern. The 
mother was relieved of the educational duties since she 
instinctively resents her child's adulthood and the independence 
that education is supposed to promote and foster.309 
Soloveitchik’s contribution to women's Talmud education came through action, in his 
founding of the Maimonides School. As recounted in the Introduction to this thesis, in 
1937 CE, a mere five years after his immigration to America, the Rav and his wife Tonya 
Soloveitchik (1904-1967 CE) founded the Maimonides School as a co-educational 
Modern Orthodox Jewish day school in Brookline, Massachusetts. Founding of the 
school marked an unprecedented innovation in Orthodox Judaism, first by establishing a 
co-educational system for all grades and second by introducing a curriculum in which 
boys and girls were equal even regarding Talmud study, so that girls were instructed in 
the conceptual principles of Talmud and Jewish law far beyond the traditionally required 
regulations concerning purity and food. Moreover, Soloveitchik as rosh yeshiva (Dean of 
Talmudic studies) of Yeshiva University supported a program of Talmud study for 
women in Stern College of Yeshiva University. 
The establishment of an egalitarian position for man and woman is not, however, 
likely to have been Soloveitchik's intention in advocating women's Jewish education. He 
did not provide a rationale for his progressive stance, but his other writings lay out views 
that emphasize essential gender differences, including between the roles of men and 
women in Jewish education. In addition to the views on education of children related 
above,  Soloveitchik's remarks in "A Tribute to the Rebbitzen of Talne" demonstrate his 
insistence on role differentiation rather than egalitarianism. He maintains that the father's 
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task is to inculcate "discipline of thought as well as discipline of action" in his child, 
whereas mothers are to train children emotionally and spiritually in order to help them 
"feel the presence of God to appreciate mitzvoth and spiritual values to enjoy the warmth 
of a dedicated life."310 Such a conception of the role of females does not seem to lead 
naturally to promoting extensive Talmud study for women. Soloveitchik's silence about 
his motivations have consequently given rise to speculation. 
Among those who have attempted to provide explanations are Mayer Twersky311 
and Walter Wurzberger.312 Citing Soloveitchik’s very strong stand on the mechitza issue, 
Twersky cautions that his approach towards intensive Talmud study for women is not 
shaped by revisionism or a desire for reform.313 Twersky’s conclusion is that Soloveitchik 
is neither a modernist figure nor an ultra-orthodox rabbi. He attributes this apparent 
ambiguity - or transcending - of positions to the Rav’s commitment to the truth of the 
Torah. According to Twersky, that commitment prompts Soloveitchik to take up 
seemingly opposite positions, because, he says, the truth has an unalloyed unity that often 
"manifests itself in a variety of guises." Twersky is finally convinced that Soloveitchik's 
apparently “modern” position on women's education reflects his Torah intuition as much 
as his orthodox stance in regard to mechizta, that the stance is necessary to "provide a 
firm foundation for faith" and in fact originates in the Halakhah: 
The prohibition of teaching Torah she-Baal Pe to women relates to 
optional study. If ever circumstances dictate that study of Torah 
she-Baal Pe is necessary to provide a firm foundation for faith, 
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such study becomes obligatory and obviously lies beyond the pale 
of any prohibition.314 
The idea of “Torah intuition” is important in Twersky’s exposition. He describes 
it as "a special intuitive sense for the true intent and meaning of the masora [tradition]," 
which enabled the Rav to discern and draw upon its “internal dynamics” in order to 
“guide Jewry in its confrontation with modernity."315 Torah intuition, Twersky argues, 
allows sages to comprehend realities lying beyond what is commonly perceivable from 
the scriptures.316 
Although Twersky clearly believes that Soloveitchik understood contemporary 
issues well, his hesitation in associating him with a modernist approach is evident. 
Wurzberger, on the other hand, does not hesitate to call the Rav’s approach "modern", at 
least in relation to certain specific issues, including women’s Jewish education. 
Wurzberger is convinced that the true Torah scholar “addresses the realities of the world 
rather than seeks an escape from them."317 Addressing the realities of the world'' despite 
stringent halakhic rulings is what makes Soloveitchik the posek par excellence of modern 
Orthodoxy, in Wurzberger’s view. Nevertheless, he warns that this does not indicate 
"willingness to make all sorts of concessions to modernity at the expense of genuine 
religious commitment" and coins the term, "post-modern Orthodoxy." Soloveitchik, he 
declares, would never espouse "a moderate brand of halakhic Judaism which lacks the 
fervor and passion associated with the Haredi community [right-wing Orthodoxy]."318 
Rather the Rav, in Wurzberger’s view, was engaged in an “uncompromising 
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confrontation of modernity,"319 to the extent that he “consistently issued rulings that 
surpass in stringency those of right-wing authorities,"320 “right-wing” here referring to 
those who demand total isolation from modern, secular culture. 
Despite the extreme reluctance of Twersky as well as Wurzberger to suggest that 
modern conditions had any effect on Soloveitchik, it is not far-fetched to judge that his 
promotion of women's intensive Jewish education - which is certainly open to question in 
light of the tradition – resulted from subjective elements introduced by the realities of the 
modern world. Wurzberger believes that Soloveitchik was convinced that under 
contemporary conditions, it was necessary to confront the challenges of modernity rather 
than attempt to escape from them as perhaps a ''naïve traditionalism'' would have done. 
Both Twersky and Wurzberger admit this in their own, rather circuitous way. They say, 
for instance, that Jewish women must be provided with the intellectual resources needed 
to appreciate the meaning of halakhic Judaism, since familiarity with the injunctions and 
prohibitions of religious observance are no longer adequate; and Wurzberger in particular 
speaks of the need for Jewish mothers to be equipped with a real understanding of the 
halakhic process and thus genuine Jewish perspective in order to provide proper guidance 
for their children.321 
An important proposition here is that Soloveitchik’s approach to women's 
education is directed not at seeking equal rights for women,
322
 but rather the greater 
purpose of deeply attaching them to the tradition and, perhaps above all, bringing up 
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Halakhah-sensitive children. This is no doubt true. Soloveitchik constantly exhorts Jews 
to live a halakhic life, a goal to be secured mainly through halakhic upbringing, while it is 
mothers who spend the most time with their children and may in some or many instances 
influence them more than fathers. The growing likelihood of women and future mothers 
being exposed to secular education that might weaken their Jewish commitment could 
have also prompted Rabbi Soloveitchik to offer Torah learning. The move, it seems, is 
finally pragmatic and aimed at fortifying rather than altering the tradition. It is worth 
recalling here that Soloveitchik himself believed that halakhic decision-making is not 
purely mechanical, but highly creative.323 
Thus we see that Soloveitchik has a twofold position towards women's Talmud 
education in the theoretical and practical realms, in which the former does not seem to 
support the latter, while the latter seems to have been established primarily for the sake of 
preserving the principles of the former. This circumstance appears to indicate that 
understanding the realities of the world or needs of the time is a key factor in 
Soloveitchik's revolutionary step towards women's Talmud proficiency (a matter that will 
be taken up again the third chapter). 
3.2 Women's Prayer Groups 
Rabbi Soloveitchik characterizes prayer as "a basic experiential category in 
Judaism." According to Soloveitchik, it was through prayer that the Jewish sages 
achieved a covenant with God and through which all Jews, women included, eventually 
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realize that covenant.324  There is, however, a difference between the prayers of the two 
sexes. Woman’s prayer is more a personal and private obligation; although a woman is 
permitted to participate in congregational prayers when convenient, she is absolutely not 
obliged to pray in public or in a congregation. For men, on the other hand, prayer 
definitely has a strong and obligatory communal and public dimension. 
The background to this position is Soloveitchik's emphasis on man and woman's 
equal spiritual worth along with their non-identical spirituality. Briefly put, woman's 
private and personal prayer corresponds to her private role, while man's public and 
congregational prayer accords with his public role. Therefore, although men and women 
are equally obligated to fulfill the basic requirement of praying and both have the 
possibility and capacity, without discrimination, to realize their covenant with God 
through prayer, women are not obligated to offer prayer in “the context of communal 
services (tefilla be-tsibbur).”325 This halakhic difference, however, is not a reflection of 
inferiority according to Soloveitchik. Rather, it merely reaffirms proper halakhic gender 
role differentiation, based on natural gender differences. 
The result in practice of the idea of gender differences necessitating different 
settings or milieu for men and women's prayer is that ritual services in the synagogue are 
almost exclusively male-oriented.
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reserved for public worship,327 is to be constituted only by men; women are ineligible to 
be counted in the minyan. These restrictions have the effect of furthering the male-
centeredness of (traditional) synagogues. 
The establishment of women's prayer groups (tefillah) in the early 1970s may be 
viewed as a sign of women's dissatisfaction with male domination of synagogue services, 
or at least as an attempt to increase their dynamic presence and participation in prayer, an 
activity at the very heart of Jewish ritual. Women (from Orthodox and Conservative 
congregations) began gathering together in all-female groups on a regular basis to 
conduct prayer services. The exclusively feminine and conspicuously public nature of the 
movement served to underline the issues of both male exclusivity of the tefillah and 
preference for women’s prayer being confined to the private sphere. It is important to 
keep in mind that the women’s tefillah movement manifested a desire not to agitate 
outside the tradition, but rather to react and work within it – or one might say, somewhat 
on its periphery. The call for women’s tefillah was, in short, not primarily a social 
movement, but a profoundly religious undertaking demanding recognition of Jewish 
women’s religiosity and right to pray. As such, it was entertained by women who wished 
to remain (or regard themselves as remaining) within the parameters of traditional 
Judaism, including Jewish Orthodoxy, by committing themselves to not violating 
Halakhah.328 
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Nevertheless, the formation of tefillah groups may be regarded as a demand to re-
examine women's roles in Judaism fuelled by social realities. It does not seem far-fetched 
to relate the movement to the growth of opportunities for higher education in Jewish 
studies for women. It is surely logical from the point of view of human psychology that a 
woman who feels that she possesses the privilege of studying the Torah and Talmud will 
begin to imagine an even wider active and conspicuous presence for herself in Jewish 
religious life.329 Considering Soloveitchik's pivotal role in providing women with higher 
Torah education, one might consider that he unwittingly contributed to the formation of 
women’s prayer groups as an unforeseen consequence of his activities. 
The coincidence in time of the women's prayer movement with the Women's 
Liberation Movement of the 1960s might lead one to suspect the influence of the former. 
The inspiration, if there was one, is likely to have been indirect, in view of the religious 
nature of the tefillah movement and care for faithfulness to Jewish tradition. 
Nevertheless, it is not far-fetched to think that the message of “women’s liberation” that 
women should take the initiative in various spheres and the conviction of religious 
feminists in particular - whether Jewish or not - that women should have access to and 
interpret texts came together in some way with Rabbi Soloveitchik's endorsement of 
intensive Talmud study, with the result that Jewish women who now had access to 
profound knowledge of the Halakhah discovered that there was no clear halakhic 
prohibition against them forming such groups - or if they thought there was opposition, 
were prepared to question it and ask for change. There were, indeed, women attracted to 
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the movement whose commitment to feminism over-rode commitment to Halakhah; but 
the majority remained focused on halakhic observance.330 
Reactions to women's prayer groups across the Jewish tradition have ranged from 
complete leniency to stringent opposition, with mediate positions authorizing women’s 
tefillah under certain conditions. Thus some authorities allow women to hold prayer 
services, including those involving texts and recitation that normally require a minyan; 
others staunchly oppose women's prayer, whether they include texts requiring minyan or 
not; and still others permit it provided the minyan requirement is not violated,331 thus in 
effect finding spaces for women’s prayer in the existing structures of Jewish liturgy. 
Soloveitchik's own stance on the issue, as reflected exclusively in his responsa, was that 
prayer should be authorized, but in a limited and carefully structured manner. Not 
surprisingly for a Halakhah fideist, Rabbi Soloveitchik rules that women can join 
together to conduct group prayer only if they conform fully to the Law, which involves 
not reciting parts of the Torah that require a minyan quorum in congregational prayer. 
Soloveitchik did authorize an all-female prayer group at the Maimonides School, again 
provided that halakhic restrictions were strictly observed. He was, nonetheless, very 
hesitant to allow and approve women's tefilla groups as a general practice. 
It is interesting that, despite Soloveitchik's emphasis in his pronouncements 
concerning women’s tefilla on conformity to Halakah, his hesitation was not finally 
based on halakhic prohibition. He did not actually pronounce women's tefilla  ''forbidden'' 
(assur), even refusing to put his name to the responsum of five other RIETS Yeshiva 
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deans opposing it on halakhic grounds. According to Aryeh and Dov Frimer, his 
motivation, though not fully expressed, was rather adherence to traditional Jewish 
customs (minhagim), especially concerning the forms of the rituals and synagogue 
service. Supporters of the movement argued that women participating in prayer groups 
gained access to spiritual experience and development through enhanced fulfillment of a 
mitzvah  (commandment of God); but Soloveitchik thought this was not so, because such 
prayer would lack certain criteria for the validity of congregational prayer such as the 
minyan and recitation of particular parts of the Scripture; here we see his concern with 
the integrity of the synagogue service. It appears that Soloveitchik was above all not very 
confident of women's motivations for promoting and creating prayer groups; and 
questioning motivations, as the Frimers also point out, effectively throws the whole 
enterprise, including the goal of “spiritual enhancement”, into doubt. He seems to have 
felt that fully authorizing women’s prayer groups might lead to calls for further 
modifications in traditional norms. He was, in short, concerned about the intrusion of 
certain social agendas and egalitarianism. Thus while Soloveitchik ventured to allow 
women’s prayer in the Maimonides School, he instructed his rabbinical students - of 
whom there were many, as related in the first chapter – to avoid allowing women's prayer 
groups in their synagogues. 332 
Soloveitchik also appears to de-authenticate women’s spiritual feeling when 
dealing with the issue of women donning the tallit, i.e. rectangular, fringed prayer shawl. 
In reply to a woman who asked if she could put on the tallit for prayer, he advised that 
such ''a major departure from the tradition'' should be contemplated in gradual stages. He 
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told the woman to begin with a four-cornered garment without tzitzit (the ritual fringes), 
and then report back in three months. She did return, and spoke of the “most exhilarating 
experience” of her life. Soloveitchik's response to her excitement was apparently 
dismissive, as he commented: ''For three months you have been wearing a garment that 
has no religious or halakhic significance, so your exhilaration has come from something 
other than a mitzvah."333 Perhaps the woman’s enthusiasm raised an alarm, and a more 
muted response would have reassured the Rabbi that she was not intending to finally 
exceed the bounds of tradition. 
Soloveitchik did indeed authorize limited and structured women's tefilla, 
apparently not because he was happy with the idea, but because he judged that women 
would proceed in any case. This cautious and vigilant stance seems to have been intended 
to prevent halakhic violation of the prayer ritual, thus somewhat as the lesser of two evils 
or “safety valve”. Once again, we see the primacy of Halakhah in Soloveitchik’s thought. 
It is extremely important that halakhic lines not be crossed; nor can they be transcended 
through spiritual enthusiasm.334 
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Chapter Three: Comparative Analysis of Gender Thought of Ayatollah 
Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik 
In the two preceding chapters, I examine the views on women and gender of 
Ayatollah Morteza Mutahhari and Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, two prominent figures 
of twentieth-century Islam and Judaism whose legacy and influence continues to this day. 
I have extracted the gender thought of each from their wider worldviews with the 
intention of engaging in a comparison. I will begin by briefly reminding the reader of the 
rationale for this exercise as discussed in the Introduction. 
There is, to begin, the lack of material comparing gender and the subject of 
women in Judaism and Islam. A potentially valuable stimulant for conversation about the 
two closely-related traditions from the point of view of gender remains underdeveloped. 
Second, with regard to Mutahhari in particular, the scholarly and quasi-scholarly 
literature, whether published in or outside Iran, is not very strong. Thus an analytical 
rather than simply admiring or cursory examination is, I believe, a contribution in itself. I 
hope that the first chapter, even when taken alone, helps to establish the place of 
Mutahhari as a creative and indeed courageous thinker in the field of gender, as in others.  
Third, placing Ayatollah Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik alongside each other, 
noticing certain similarities and differences, and reflecting on these stimulates thought 
about both figures and the traditions they spring from. While more weight is put in the 
comparison on Mutahhari, it is expected that it will also be of some use in relation to 
Soloveitchik. Such an exercise, however, requires a basis for comparison, and I have thus 
chosen two clerical thinkers engaged in trying to strike a balance between the demands of 
contemporary conditions and desire to defend and preserve either Islam or Judaism. I 
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obviously do not assert that the two scholars have influenced each other; the fact that 
there cannot have been any influence actually makes the comparison less problematic, 
since we do not have to involve ourselves in speculating about diffusion. At the same 
time, because they come from two historically parallel traditions, they share some similar 
concerns – for example, integrity of a system of religious law – and express themselves 
through certain common themes – for instance, creation of Adam and Eve and female 
prophets - and this enables us to bring them into conversation. 
The discussion in this chapter is organized around three broad resemblances that 
provide a basis for comparison of thinkers who might otherwise be considered poles apart 
religiously and geographically. First, the chief and primary concern in the gender-related 
discussions of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik is not gender itself. The concern is rather to 
define and defend the foundational thought, teachings, and rulings of their traditions. 
Second, the issue of women from the viewpoint of Mutahhari and especially Soloveitchik 
is part of the question of the human being and meaning of humanity. In the Islamic and 
Jewish worldviews defined by Mutahhari and Soloveitchik, the human being is the centre 
and goal of creation; the whole world is created for humanity. Although human beings 
have been created to fulfill their destiny through a journey to God, this is only a part of 
the picture, so that the two outlooks may finally be characterized as humanistic. Women 
in both cases are primarily considered in this humanistic, holistic context. Third, 
Mutahhari and Soloveitchik’s thought about women centers around the notion of inherent 
gender differences. Man and woman have been created to be different, which God has 
done for particular, higher purposes; and because of these differences, males and females 
are subjected to a whole set of different rights, responsibilities, and rulings, along with 
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different positions in the family and society. These three broad similarities shape the 
gender views of each figure; although they are not given equal weight for each figure in 
the discussion below, as the emphasis varies in each system. 
Two outstanding differences in the thought of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik are 
their mode of approaching gender and the ways they see their traditions responding to 
evolving times and circumstances. In brief, Mutahhari’s approach and tone is more 
defensive, polemical and political than that of Soloveitchik; and Soloveitchik seems less 
ready than Mutahhari to contemplate change in the tradition in response to changes in 
society or pressure from the broader Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish community. I 
have discussed these two differences under separate headings because they are 
particularly striking. I do not mean at all to say that they are the only differences. Rather, 
I have used the three categories of broad similarity listed above as contexts or launching 
points to discuss many more. It is finally the divergences between Mutahhari and 
Soloveitchik, whether evident or subtle that are the most useful in drawing attention to 
features and implications of each world of thought that might otherwise not have been 
noticed. 
1. Points of Similarities 
1.1 Gender: Not a Primary Concern 
Ayatollah Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik both discuss women's issues not out 
of concern for gender qua gender, but ultimately for the purpose of defining the positions 
and approaches of their respective traditions. Key to this approach is the full confidence 
each seems to have in the way his tradition approaches women's positions and rights. 
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Since neither believes that major change is needed - or even that change is possible if the 
tradition is to remain true to itself and the divine wisdom that inspired it - there is no 
reason to focus on women alone. Rather, traditional thought concerning women and 
gender need only be affirmed, with the goal of defending a deeply embedded aspect of 
the system that has become vulnerable in the face of contemporary pressures and 
critiques. 
As a result, the gender thought of both these figures is somewhat idealizing, a 
tendency I have commented on several times in the two previous chapters. Although they 
do, as I have also mentioned, show awareness of and concern for some problems women 
encounter in their lives, it appears that since both were engaged in a defense or project of 
preservation, they felt that admitting the existence of grave problems would be 
tantamount to confessing “fatal flaws” in their religions. It is partly because serious 
consideration of the position of women in religion is really about discussing problems 
that the discourse of these two figures is not focused solely or directly on women. 
Within these limits, Mutahhari is somewhat more focused on gender than 
Soloveitchik. Soloveitchik did not write or lecture directly on gender issues. He was not 
specifically interested in gender or in women in particular. It can be fairly stated that it is 
the interest of a researcher like myself that leads to extracting gender views from 
Soloveitchik’s thought.  This, however, must be done on the basis not only of his wider 
worldview as expressed in his writings, but also his actions. It should be understood that 
Rabbi Soloveitchik’s actions are not necessarily reflected in his writings. Extracting his 
views is not easy or straightforward because most of what is available is actually not the 
Rav’s own words. Rather, the published material has been either transcribed from 
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existing tapes, which are mainly in Hebrew or Yiddish, or from what was passed on 
through his students. This indirect transmission of knowledge brings up the possibility of 
its being affected by the personal views of those involved in this process, and my 
exposition in this work should be received with this caution in mind.    
Mutahhari, on the other hand, began to address the issue of women quite early in 
his scholarly career. In a lecture delivered between 1966 and 1977 and only recently 
discovered and published, he considers women's capacity to stand as a legal witness 
(shahid), judge (qazi), and resort (marja) issuing fatwas to be followed by believers, as 
well as political participation. As a cleric discussing such issues, Mutahhari was ahead of 
his time; although we see that he was also led by his audience, as the lecture in question 
(delivered to the Islamic Association of Physicians) takes the form of replies to questions. 
In another series of lectures delivered in 1969 CE on Karbala,
335
 Mutahhari discusses 
women's role in religious history, arguing that there are what he calls he “distortions” in 
the record which underplay their contributions. The subject of women’s history was to be 
further developed in his later, better-known works, principally The Issue of Hijab and 
Rights of Women in Islam, and subsequently continued into the brief time he lived during 
the post- revolutionary era in his unfinished article, "The Role of Women in the 
Contemporary History of Iran". 
It is at the same time quite evident that Mutahhari discusses women as part of an 
attempt to clear Islam of the accusation that it views women as inferior. He is determined 
to develop his own definition of the position of women in Islam in order to counter such 
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claims, which seem to have wounded him deeply; the whole premise of The Issue of 
Hijab, as we have seen, is that it answers the “propaganda” against Islam of un-named 
“filthy stooges”. In the final analysis, the most important thing for Mutahhari is not that 
the definition of Islam he offers in reply to such “propaganda” be traditional or modern, 
but that it be effective as a reply or retort, while also showing itself to be authentic, a 
requirement he meets primarily by citing the Quran. His thought is, nevertheless, quite 
progressive. While this is certainly enabled by openness in his personal attitudes and 
flexibility in his thought, it is also due to his strategy of replying to a “modern” critique in 
its own terms. Thus, while it is true that Mutahhari paid attention to women's issues to a 
degree that was unprecedented among Shiite clerics – which has not, in fact, been 
equaled to this day – we cannot consider that he was motivated by gender awareness or 
set out to raise such awareness in his audience. His writings rather display ''awareness of 
gender for the sake of Islam.” 
Mutahhari was also reacting to the concerns of religious intellectuals, along with a 
small emerging feminist movement
336
 and secular critique such as the article in Zan-i Ruz 
that led to his composing Rights of Women in Islam. With his modern approach and 
cautiously critical exposition of traditional Islam, he was well placed to answer to such 
concerns and critiques. There was a vacuum at the time in Iran in thought concerning 
women that needed to filled through rational discourse that would be accessible to a wide 
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audience, which Mutahhari as a public intellectual and cleric was uniquely equipped to 
do. 
Mutahhari’s stance on Shariah family law is strong evidence that his primary care 
was to defend Islam rather than to consider the position of women in and for itself.  In the 
Introduction to the second edition of his Woman's Rights in Islam, he writes: 
I will examine the Islamic laws it has been suggested be modified 
relating to the couple's rights and their relationship; and I will 
prove that within these laws, delicate psychological, natural and 
social considerations are taken into account. I will also prove that 
man and woman's human dignity are equally considered in these 
laws and that if appropriately implemented, they are the best 
guarantors of strong family relations.
337
 
Mutahhari was determined to advocate for Shariah law because it was the object of 
secularizing, apparently Westernizing reform. That reform, since it had to do with family 
law, revolved around altering the position of women; and thus his advocacy also 
necessarily focused on that point. As the reformers introduced new civil laws aimed  - in 
their view - at securing more rights for women, Mutahhari was compelled to demonstrate 
that it was actually Islam that offered the most “rights” (huquq). Note also the assertion in 
the passage quoted above that the law accords “scientifically” with human psychology 
and sociology; the implication is that since Shariah family law has a scientific basis, to 
remove it is irrational and would damage society. Mutahhari’s “scientific” argument is in 
fact logically the leading one. 
Since Mutahhari’s aim is to defend the integrity of the tradition and demonstrate 
its viability, he takes this very strong and uniform position on gender laws even though 
they are the chief source of controversy over the position of women in Islam. One senses 
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from Mutahhari’s discussions of legal subjects such as polygamy, divorce, and temporary 
marriage that he has gotten himself into a bit of a bind by insisting on the complete 
rightness of the law. It seems that he might have wanted to minimize polygamy even 
more than he does,
 338
 for the sake of the integrity of families if not women,
 
and perhaps 
also curb men’s divorce and temporary marriage (mut‘ah, a peculiarly Shiite institution); 
but he is forced to defend these and other articles of the Shariah on principle. 
The Ayatollah’s commitment to defense of the tradition also results in an 
ambiguous relation with feminism. At times, Mutahhari sounds like a feminist himself, 
accusing human societies throughout history, including Islamic ones, of devaluing and 
oppressing women. He points his finger at men - although he also says that they acted out 
of ignorance rather than malice. In the following passage included in a collection of 
Mutahhari’s “notes”, he praises the struggles of feminists: 
In our opinion, part of this current movement [referring to nahzat-i 
zanan, “the movement of women”] has indeed sought recognition 
of women's rights and has fought, as it still does, men's ignorance 
as a cause of women's oppression; thus it may be endorsed. This 
has been the case, for instance, in supporting woman's self-
determination and fighting to liberate her from the absolute 
guardianship of her father or mother, which can result in a young 
woman being married to a seventy-year old man or marrying off a 
girl without her permission. [The movement may be endorsed] in 
its support of women's education and its fight against confusion 
over man and woman's shame and dishonor, such as differentiating 
between the obscene nature of man and woman's illicit sexual 
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relationships [i.e. considering a woman having sex outside 
marriage more shameful than a man doing the same].
339
 
One would imagine a “note” to represent something like a stray or preliminary thought. 
In such a moment, it seems, a deeper sentiment of Mutahhari is revealed. He cares about 
women in real situations: women lacking education, brides married off without their 
express consent, a woman married against her will to an elderly man, women bearing a 
burden of shame seldom heaped on men. He goes as far as to “endorse”340 feminism – 
whatever he understood that to be – because it opposes such injustices. 
In Mutahhari’s published writing directed at his Iranian audience, however, his 
assessment of feminism is again subordinated to his defensive, polemical purpose and an 
idealized portrayal of Islam. While allowing that feminism does address important issues, 
he says that it has at the same time created other problems for women. As one might 
expect, he proceeds to offer an Islamic solution that treats the same problems of women 
and more, without inadvertently causing others. Thus it seems that, similar to his 
assessment of the UN Declaration of Human Rights,
341
 any virtue that might be possessed 
by a non-Islamic movement is more perfectly owned by Islam, as Mutahhari says: 
Islam has done the greatest service to the female sex. This service 
was not limited to the rejection of absolute control of fathers over 
girls [as previously mentioned]; it also gave women freedom, 
personhood, independent thinking and [the right to] opinion.
342
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It is Islam, in the view of Mutahhari, that initiated the “women’s movement” fourteen 
centuries ago, and which is still capable of leading it: 
No doubt, we in our country need a movement for women; but 
what we need is an Islamic white movement, not a dark, black 
European movement… a movement that originates from the lofty 
teachings of Islam, not a movement in which the decisive laws of 
Islam come under attack… We need a movement that launches a 
through and logical [mantiqi; probably meaning “rational”] 
investigation into the extent to which the teachings of Islam are 
implemented in societies that call themselves Islamic.
343
 
And further:  
With the help of God…. after examining all the relevant topics, we 
will offer an evaluation of the woman's Islamic movement. The 
Iranian woman then will see that she can establish a movement that 
is novel, accepted by the world, and logical [rational], and which is 
at the same time based on her own fourteen-century old, 




Mutahhari’s rhetoric in this series of passages is skillfully constructed. The progress 
apparently made in the West is subsumed into Islam by claiming that it originally 
belonged to the Muslim tradition (a very common strategy of modern Muslim discourse 
in relation to women and other issues); the existence of problems in Iran and Islamic 
societies is attributed to the perfect teachings of the religion not being completely 
implemented (thus what is needed is not reform, but return); and the whole package is 
wrapped up with a strong appeal to cultural authenticity and national dignity (“without 
having to stretch begging hands toward the West”). Mutahhari seems in the last quoted 
passage to give agency to “the Iranian woman”, who will herself “establish a movement”; 
but the ultimate purpose of the movement, we see, is to demonstrate the autonomy and 
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worth of Muslim “philosophy” so that it will be “accepted by the world”, that is to say, 
Western claims to superiority over Islam will be disproved. 
Mutahhari's arguments concerning gender are thus intended to convince his 
audience, at a time in Iran when several different kinds of thought were on offer, that 
Islam is rational, scientific, progressive, culturally authentic and not only equal to but 
better than Western models.  These propositions are not about women’s issues, but rather 
demonstrated through them. In his writings on women, Mutahhari generally defends or 
exalts Islam, rather than attacking Judaism, Christianity, or Western civilization; but he 
does seize on the Biblical account of the creation of the first woman and her sin to accuse 
Western civilization of fostering a negative attitude toward woman based on the idea that 
she was created from man, with a natural propensity for deception. In this case too, the 
Quran has a better alternative (as related in Chapter One) that shows Islam to be more 
rational and progressive. 
Ayatollah Mutahhari's discussion took another turn after the Revolution with the 
prospect of establishing an Islamic state in Iran. If his chief concern related to the issue of 
women before 1979 CE was to utilize it to demonstrate the viability and superiority of 
Islam, his concern after was that it posed a potential threat to the newly established Shiite 
state that had pledged to restore Islamic culture and values. He feared that the issue of 
women could impact the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, and recalls that Ayatollah 
Khomeini had anticipated his concern: 
When I had a private meeting with the Imam [Ayatollah 
Khomeini] in Paris [where Ayatollah Khomeini resided in exile 
from 1978] to discuss the issues that Westerners might have with 
the future state of Iran and named some, he added, "The issue of 
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All of this is not to minimize Mutahhari’s achievement as a high-ranking Shiite cleric 
who lectured and wrote about women while also reaching out to address women 
themselves. Again, what I rather mean to say is that he wrote on women with the prime 
objective of defending Islam. Although he was genuinely concerned about women and 
recognized to some degree that they had been oppressed, those impulses were 
subordinate to his desire to present an idealized picture of the tradition that would win a 
struggle for hearts and minds. 
Gender is positioned differently in the thought of Soloveitchik than in that of 
Mutahhari. Both, as we shall see in the next section of the chapter, define women in the 
context of humanity and its relation to the divine. For Mutahhari, however, the Islamic or, 
as he presents it, Quranic account of woman as a human being is one proof among others 
of the excellence of Islam. The first concern is not humanity, but the demonstration that 
women are considered fully human; and that in turn is important because of something 
that has to be proved about Islam. In Soloveitchik’s thought, on the other hand, the 
human being is absolutely central, and his thought is organized around that pole. The 
Halakhah, in turn, is the central element of Soloveitchik’s thought on humanity, while 
gender issues are an inescapable part of being human, since two-gendered humanity 
comes together in a marital-parental community as part of the mission to realize the ideal 
world and proceed toward God through Halakhah. 
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The relation of Soloveitchik’s views concerning women to his religious 
anthropology is examined in the next section. In this part, I will address the importance of 
Halakhah and its priority over women’s issues. 
In the view of Rabbi Soloveitchik, Halakhah as the body of Jewish laws that 
reflects divine norms, commands and the Divine Will signals the significance of humans, 
as he writes: 
And let the Halakhah itself be proof. God commanded man and the 
very command itself carries with it the endorsement of man's 
existence… The fact that God linked Himself with man and 
prescribed for him laws, statutes, and judgments bears witness that 




As long as the human being does not encounter Halakhah, he remains in his natural state 
as man-natura and a man of species; it is the encounter with the Law that elevates him to 
the position of man-persona and a man of God. Soloveitchik further believes that: "the 
man who does not live according to the Halakhah and who does not participate in the 
realization [through Halakhah] of the ideal world is of no worth."
347
 
The importance of Halakhah is seen in Soloveitchik's reliance upon it in defining 
gender attributes and roles, along with, of course, legal issues. His approach to gender 
echoes the Halakhah and reminds us of its central place in his thought, rather than 
indicating sensitivity to women’s issues as such.  And in turn, as in the structure outlined 
above, concerns about the Halakhah are linked to humanity overall - the human’s identity  
and dilemma in modern times, along with the danger of the Torah and Halakhah losing 
their place in the lives of Jews and the Jewish community. These are the prior 
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preoccupations of Soloveitchik’s discussion of gender. He addresses the subject of 
women for the purpose of defining the view of Halakhah on humanity and issues related 
to that, among them family relations and thus, inevitably, gender and women. It is as if 
Halakhah comes, structurally speaking, first in Soloveitchik’s thought, and issues 
concerning women last - although it cannot be denied that those issues are extremely 
important to that structure and to the Law. Thus it is the Halakhah as reflected in the 
textual tradition, including the Torah and sayings of the sages, that ultimately shapes 
Soloveitchik’s thought concerning women, even if there are other levels of thought 
(humanity, family, and so on) between. 
The centrality of the Halakhah in Soloveitchik's thought concerning gender can be 
divided into what I would call theoretical and legal aspects. These aspects are distinct yet 
interwoven. The first concerns the Halakhah's vision for humanity as explicated by 
Soloveitchik; and the second concerns the positions of the sexes based on gender 
differences, which are aimed at realization of that vision. 
At the “theoretical” level, Soloveitchik determines man and woman's positions in 
the context of the goals Halakhah defines for humanity as two parts of a whole. The 
genders must each function in their halakhically defined positions. Soloveitchik's 
halakhic gender role division in the family marks the centrality of the Halakhah in his 
gender thought. He relies on the Halakhah to spell out this concept in practical terms as 
he develops his concept of covenantal marriage in which the complementary roles of 
husband and wife are mirrored in their economic and educational activities in the family. 
He emphasizes that a covenantal marriage is a cooperative community in which "man and 
woman are bound by mutual civil and economic duties." Those duties are laid out in the 
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following passage  (note how they are described as being dictated  “by law” and the use 
of the imperative to point to Halakhic commands): 
Economic community is very important for the success of the 
marriage. What is important psychologically is the fact that the 
family constitutes an economic unit in which both are dependent 
upon each other. The husband, according to the law, is the 
provider, and the wife is the housekeeper. The husband must 
support and sustain the wife and she in turn is supposed to run the 




The passage also confirms that Soloveitchik’s focus is not on the personality or role of 
either wife or husband, but on their functioning together, so that they not only “need” but 
“are dependent” on each other. Men in patriarchal systems who are breadwinners and feel 
they have authority in the family are likely to consider themselves absolute leaders. In 
light of this human fact, Soloveitchik’s emphasis on balance in complementarity may be 
taken as an exhortation or warning to men to acknowledge and respect the roles of their 
wives. This does seem to indicate a direct concern with the lives of women. 
That said, the halakhic gendered division of roles in the family is so crucial in the 
view of Soloveitchik that any violation is thought to affect its functionality: 
The unworkability of some modern marriages is attributable to the 
fact that, in many case, the economic community does not exist. 
Both the husband and the wife provide, and each one is 
independent of the other.
349
 
It is, however, interesting to see that Soloveitchik is not as concerned with gendered roles 
in the education of Jewish children in the home as in the economy of the household. That 
is to say, while he declares that gendered roles for both are required by the Halakhah, he 
does not warn of a complete breakdown of the system resulting in “unworkability” in 
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case lines are crossed in education, as he does for male breadwinning and female 
housekeeping. This might be explained in light of his revolutionary approach towards 
women's Talmud education. A woman who has access to an intensive and equal Talmud 
education is unlikely to be deemed ineligible to communicate intellectual aspects of the 
Talmud to her children (supposedly the father's role) in addition to the experiential 
aspects supposedly reserved for her.  Come to think of it, it is unlikely that a father also 
would not communicate ‘experiential’ aspects in the course of providing intellectual 
education; so the boundary between the two roles is perhaps not so clear-cut. In any case, 
it seems that in the question of children’s education, the division of roles Soloveitchik 
believes is demanded by Halakhah is at least slightly attenuated, even if he does not say 
so explicitly. 
Soloveitchik’s apparently softer attitude toward gendering of parental education 
may also be due to its finally not having as great a potential impact on halakhically 
defined gender roles and space as blurring of roles in the household economy. The softer 
attitude toward education, in other words, is further evidence of the precedence of 
Halakhah over women’s issues, since blurring of roles in this area does not have a very 
great impact, whereas Soloveitchik is unyielding in his condemnation of violation of 
gendered roles in the household economy, since that would lead to contravening women's 
private role. This is because economy is, for the most part, a social affair; that is to say, 
an individual who engages in economic affairs needs necessarily to build mutual social 
relations outside the home. A woman in such position is very likely to give up her 
halakhically-preferred private role, while women's Talmud education does not necessarily 
lead to the same result. 
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Gendering of space  - or perhaps more exactly, gendered orientation to a public or 
private life - is a central principle of Halakhah, as suggested by the story of Sarah as 
recounted by Soloveitchik.
350
 Private roles are not only praised and recommended, but 
promoted and enforced, for instance through opposition to women’s prayer groups and 
women holding positions of authority in the synagogue. 
Moving finally to the legal aspects of Halakhah, we see that integrity of the Law 
is a consideration that is prior to women’s issues in Soloveitchik's legal views as well. 
This is evident in his approach to the agunah issue. He is well aware of the agunah 
woman's dilemma and even strives to prevent the situation from occurring; but once it 
does, the application of this halakhot (legal ruling) is inescapable. As a result of the 
structural priority of Halakhah in Soloveitchik's thought, he does not take issue with the 
position defined for women in Torah, Talmud, and Mishnah. Wishing to devotedly 
surrender to the Halakhah, he assumes that it is in harmony with his inclination, seen in 
his philosophy, to value and respect women, and proceeds accordingly. The chief aim and 
overwhelming impulse, again, is to define the position of Halakhah on gender, rather than 
discuss gender as an issue. 
One consequence of the focus of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik’s thought as 
described above is that while they try – genuinely and in good faith, I believe - to 
discourse on woman-positive aspects of Islam and Judaism, this does not always fit 
smoothly into their other thought. To put it another way, Mutahhari and Soloveitchik 
would like both to affirm the high position of women and defend the tradition as it is.  To 
do both these things, however, requires adjustment on one or both sides, or it involves 
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settling with or  - more likely - not noticing inconsistencies.  Since the leading concern 
for both Mutahhari and Soloveitchik is the tradition and issues related to it concerning the 
community or nation, that tends to wins out, and issues related to women are 
overshadowed or not fully worked out.  A prominent example of this disjunction in both 
Mutahhari’s and Soloveitchik’s writings is the failure to fully or satisfactorily explain 
how women’s spiritual worth or equality can be squared with certain scriptural passages 
and distinctive familial and social roles. Both figures make valiant attempts to deal with 
the problem – Mutahhari being more willing to reinterpret the scriptures and openly 
assert a public role than Soloveitchik – but more flexibility or at least explanation is 
needed. 
Problems of this kind are probably inevitable in religious thought that attempts to 
bridge different ideals.  Such bridging is necessary in the transitional times and 
circumstances Mutahhari and Soloveitchik lived through, but it is a difficult task. In the 
case of Mutahhari at least,
351
 one senses that he was himself a transitional figure, or that 
his thought – as suggested by his posthumously discovered writings – was still in 
development and could have gone much further.  However, I feel that a further and in 
some ways deeper matter prevented the Ayatollah and the Rabbi from making women an 
issue in itself rather than “for something else”. This is their maleness. 
 I gather from my study of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik that the chief barrier to 
focusing on women as an issue in itself and for its own sake is difficulty in understanding 
female experience and emotions – in short, empathy. This is seen, for instance, in 
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Mutahhari’s psychological analysis of polygamy, which does not take into account the 
feelings of a woman unwillingly faced with co-wives. In the chapter on Mutahhari, I also 
referred to my own experience as a female with a family to highlight the issue of the 
emotional or psychological effect of a woman feeling that her life must be ideally 
centered on the family. Mutahhari seems to believe that the roles he prescribes for 
women in the family can easily go together with social, public roles.  This is dubious not 
only practically (which he seems partly to recognize), but also emotionally. 
Soloveitchik’s response to the woman who wished to experience prayer with a tallit 
prayer shawl bearing the ritual fringes seems to me to be a striking manifestation of lack 
of emotional understanding. Although a deeply religious man himself and more aware 
than anyone of the importance of prayer in the Judaic tradition, he could not comprehend 
the joy of a female soul that saw an open door after feeling it had been excluded from full 
communion with God. 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the two scholars do demonstrate 
empathy with women at some points. Maleness is not an absolute condition. For instance, 
Mutahhari acknowledges the historical oppression of women. He realizes the 
disastrousness of divorce for women and sharply criticizes men who abuse the 
unrestricted divorce that is allowed for husbands in Muslim law. Soloveitchik, according 
to the account written by his daughter, went to very great lengths to free women suffering 
the predicament of agunah status. Empathy in both scholars, however, is limited by 
commitment to religious law, a subject I will return to in the last part of the chapter. 
1.2 Gender: A Humanity Issue 
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The human being stands at the centre of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik's religious 
and philosophical thought because of the special place occupied in Judaism and Islam by 
humanity in the created world. Earlier in the thesis, I described the worldviews of the two 
clerical scholars as humanistic. By this, I do not mean that they draw on humanistic 
strands of the Islamic or Jewish traditions as they developed over the centuries (though in 
their roles as philosophers in particular, they may do that); but rather that they build on 
the story of the creation of the first humans contained in the Torah and Quran to develop 
the idea of a human-centered world. It is also important that both the Jewish and Islamic 
creation myths (myth referring to “a sacred narrative which explains how the world and 
humanity reached their present state”).352 are historical; that is, they are used as a 
“paradigm for history” that expresses “the moral truth of human spiritual existence.”353 It 
is this aspect that allows Mutahhari and Soloveitchik to link the creation myth to real 
human relations and present-day society. It is also important that the creation myth in the 
scriptures of the two traditions is part of a sacred history with a communal focus; as 
Goodman suggests, “communal engagement” is deeply embedded in both “Biblical 
Judaism and Quranic Islam”.354 This prompts Soloveitchik and Mutahhari to produce a 
community-centered reading of creation that speaks to the life and condition of the 
present Jewish and Muslim communities.  While the communal focus is more explicit in 
Soloveitchik with his elaboration on the original “community” formed by Adam and Eve, 
Mutahhari also suggests that creation marked the beginning of a society created by God 
to function in a certain way. 
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Of the two scholars, Soloveitchik places the greater emphasis on the creation 
story, due, I believe, to the interiorized rather than political nature of his discourse 
(discussed in the penultimate section below). Thus much has already been said in the 
chapter devoted to him about the accounts of creation in the Torah. It will be useful 
before proceeding to fill in more of the Quranic account
355
 that is the background to 
Mutahhari’s discussion. According to the Quran (Q. 2:30), the human being is the 
vicegerent (khalif) of God on earth, as God said: “Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: I 
will create a vicegerent on earth.” Despite their faults, humans are central to the plan for 
creation. Therefore when the angels objected to God: “Will you place therein [on the 
earth] one who will make mischief and shed blood while we celebrate your praises and 
glorify you?”, God replied: “I know what you do not know”  Quran 6:165 emphasizes 
both the special dignity and heavy responsibility of human beings, as it says: 
It is He who has made you [His] vicegerent over the earth; He has 
raised you in ranks, some above others, that he may try you in the 
gifts He hath given you: for thy Lord is quick in punishment: yet 
He is indeed Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. 
Similarly, human beings are described as the only creature to accept the heavy 
responsibility of a “trust’ or moral responsibility offered by God, as He says in Quran 
33:72: “Truly, we offered the trust (amanah) to the heavens and the earth, and the 
mountains, but they declined to bear it and were afraid of it. But man bore it.” From these 
few verses, it can be seen that humans, according to the Quran, are not only the centre of 
creation, but also, similar to Judaism, bound by a kind of covenant with God that makes 
them subject to commands and unfolds through history. The theology of covenant is not 
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as well developed in Islam as it is in Judaism, but the idea has a similar effect of making 
humanity and the human community central to the two traditions. 
Gender issues in the thought of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik that draw on these 
scriptural accounts are subsidiary to their concern with humanity and the human 
community.   In this section, I will trace the relation in their writings between humanity 
and gender. This exists at different levels and with different emphases; it may be said that 
Mutahhari's discussion is built upon his thoughts about humanity, while Soloveitchik's 
discussion is rather born out of it. 
Mutahhari's discussion of women and gender intersects with his notions of 
humanity at two levels.  On a first, more direct level, he discusses the essential humanity 
of woman in the Quran, concluding, as we saw in Chapter One, that she is equal as a 
human since humanity was initially brought into being before gender. His discussion 
culminates in a polemical point:  that the Quran purposefully corrected the views of 
earlier scriptures or traditions that woman was created either from man or for the benefit 
of man. His ultimate conclusion is that since the Quran makes no gender-distinct 
assertions about human values – not even, according to Mutahhari, using gendered 
Arabic language to refer to humans qua humans - the Quran's teachings on humanity are 
gender-neutral or gender-free. 
At a second level, Mutahhari argues for the essentiality of faith in Islam as an 
ideology that promises prosperity for humans convinced of its truth. Teachings related to 
gender, including women's issues such as obligatory covering and laws of personal status 
that treat men and women differently, have thus been defined, Mutahhari says, in the 
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framework of Islam's plan for the prosperity of humanity. At this level (which I would 
regard as the foundational one despite the apparent logical priority of the first), Mutahhari 
extensively lays out the different dimensions of the human being such as inherent 
attributes, similarities and differences with animals, and the purpose of creating human 
beings, eventually concluding that humans are distinguished from other creatures in the 
world by intellect, faith, and will. It is striking that while this anthropological discussion 
serves to distinguish human beings from animals and may suffice them to solve limited  
issues in life, more fundamental issues of existence such as the way to salvation  - even 
the definition of salvation and “prosperity” (sa‘adat, which may mean material prosperity 
but also has overtones of felicity) – are not addressed. This is not where the weight of 
Mutahhari's discussion lies. Perhaps this is why he does not feel moved as Soloveitchik 
does to contemplate gendered faith-personalities. It also true that the language of the 
Quran, which is the primary referent of his discussions, takes care to assign “male 
believers” (mu’minun) and “female believers” (mu’minat) the same religious duties, 
rewards, and punishments,
356
 and that may also have deterred him from speaking of 
gendered faith-personalities. 
Mutahhari does, however, address faith in another way, that is as strong 
conviction in an “ideology”.357 He proposes that humanity needs an ideology, sets out the 
criteria for one that is trustworthy, and argues that Islam uniquely conforms to those 
criteria. He then argues that salvation may be gained only by faith and belief in this 
ideology. It is at this point that Mutahhari’s philosophy of humanity intersects with his 
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gender discussion. As Islam is the ultimate ideology, it is necessary to have faith in all 
aspects of it, including those related to gender and the laws and regulations of Shariah. 
Gender issues are therefore defined by Mutahhari in the following framework: 
Humans cannot attain prosperity without relying on an ideology, as human intellect and 
faith in God cannot entirely ensure prosperity; an ideology must necessarily have certain 
qualities, which Islam possesses fully and perfectly while other systems of thought do 
not; and it is therefore necessary to believe in Islam, including Islamic teachings and laws 
related to women. It is important here that Islam or the ideology of Islam is a “system” - 
nizam, a favourite word of Mutahhari’s appearing in the title of his chief work on women. 
The System of Women’s Rights in Islam. To say that salvation is gained through believing 
in an entire ideology or system means that no part of it may be altered or rejected if it is 
to function as it should. 
At the same time, Mutahhari turns to the Quran to emphasize that Islamic gender 
laws and ethics must not be thought of as representing a low regard for women. Since the 
Quran and Shariah are both part of the ideology that is Islam, the egalitarianism that can 
be seen in the Quran is necessarily proof of the same essential quality in the law. 
Everything is part of Islam's plan for the prosperity of the whole of humanity, including 
women. Thus gender and issues related to women are absorbed into and somehow 
neutralized by his thought on humanity. 
As for Rabbi Soloveitchik, his discussion of gender is developed as part of his 
theory of human personality, a very different approach from that of Mutahhari, who 
rather views humanity along with gender at the level of society, and present-day society 
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at that.  Nevertheless, the two systems resemble each other in that humanity is the first 
concern, with gender fitted into that picture. Thus Soloveitchik comes across gender in 
searching for the Biblical man in order to find himself (today's human being) in him. It is 
true that Soloveitchik extensively discusses subjects that have great meaning for gender 
such as the creation of Adam and Eve, how each evolved from existence as a natural 
being (man-natura) to becoming a personality (man-persona), the attributes and 
differences of man and woman, and husband-wife and parent-child relation. These, 
however, are seen as constituting fundamental human issues important for understanding 
the human dilemma, and not as gender issues per se. 
As suggested in the previous paragraph, Soloveitchik’s focus on human 
personality as pointing to the meaning of humanity runs parallel with self-reflection. This 
is seen vividly in the following passage in which he speaks of the aims of his essay on 
Adam and Eve (a piece compiled posthumously in Family Redeemed that contains his 
principal thoughts on gender): 
An experiment in a metaphysical and axiological interpretive 
approach to scripture, an exercise in detecting my own self in the 
scriptural portraiture of man, of finding my own acute problems 
and questions, my own torturing anxieties and fears, my own 
inspiring hopes and aspirations in the story of Biblical heroes.
358
 
This statement demonstrates how it is in the course of searching for today's human self in 
Biblical man that Soloveitchik broaches the subject of gender, for the reason that the 
creation stories are gendered accounts, and humanity as part of the living world functions 
as a gendered creature. Again, there is no doubt that gender and women are key to the 
worldview of Soloveitchik and that he would have addressed them in other ways if not 
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through a philosophy of humanity; but in that context, the investigation arises in the 
course of consideration of the human being, and in the final analysis, as part of a search 
for self of – let it be said – a man. 
Nevertheless, when man and woman in the scriptural analysis of Soloveitchik 
come together, it is in an exalted  manner entirely different than for all other living 
creatures. According to Soloveitchik, the relation between man and woman has two 
characteristics that male-female relations in the world of plants and animals lack: first, it 
becomes personal; and second, it confronts God's moral will.  The key point here, of 
course, is not that human male-female relations are different, but that they are very 
special. Through that relation, they become fully human and subjects of the divine 
command. 
The two characteristics of male-female relations Soloveitchik discerns in the 
scriptures and the idea that their meeting and union is key to humanization shape 
Soloveitchik's whole philosophized theology of gender. If gender begins as a kind of sub-
topic, here it surges to the fore; although we are still, of course, speaking about relations 
rather than the female herself.  One has to ask why Soloveitchik dwells and elaborates on 
this aspect of humanity, while Mutahhari has almost nothing to say about it. That, I think, 
has partly again to do with the interiority of Soloveitchik’s thought, as opposed to the 
worldliness of Mutahhari’s approach. It should also not be forgotten that for Soloveitchik, 
male-female (husband-wife) relations are the bedrock of the family, which is, as I 
suggested in Chapter Two, the “survival unit” of the Jewish people as the generations 
march “towards that final day on which every being will be redeemed and communion 
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between man and God will be established”.359 Thus humans participate in the realization 
of God's will as members of marital and parental communities – which are themselves 
metaphysical in substance and goal and the site at which individuals merge existentially - 
making gendered relationship of utmost importance. Mutahhari surely does not fear for 
the survival of Muslims or Islam, and he is concerned with national rather than 
community integrity. Family and personal relations of husband and wife are therefore not 
nearly as important to him. When one looks at Soloveitchik in light of Mutahhari, the 
Rabbi’s emphasis on the family and personal male-female relationship along with his 
interest in the spiritual and metaphysical dimensions becomes even more striking. 
Nor does Mutahhari speak about Islamic education in the family, even though he 
himself was a great educator who often aside his highly specialized juristic and 
philosophical expertise to engage with the public on their own level.  Mutahhari does not 
enter into such a discussion because religious education of children in a Muslim-majority 
country is to be accomplished publicly, as part of a national  culture and political 
commitment, rather than privately, as part of the culture of a minority community and 
commitment to survival of a historically beleaguered people. 
Soloveitchik and Mutahhari’s concepts of the male-female relationship from the 
point of view of the functioning of human society rather than a metaphysical or 
ontological dimension are, however, similar. Each gender is assigned specific gender-
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related tasks so that man and woman each play different roles;
 360
 although they are both, 
the Rabbi and Ayatollah declare, equally human. 
That reading of Soloveitchik seems to be an instance of the disjunction, found in 
the thought of both the Rabbi and the Ayatollah, I spoke about in the previous section 
caused by inconsistency between a sincere desire to assert woman-positivity, and greater 
concerns of one kind or another. Soloveitchik’s greater concern is loyalty to the Torah. 
Another example is the unresolved contradiction or tension between the personalities of 
the Eves of the two Genesis accounts as interpreted by Soloveitchik. As related in 
Chapter Two, the Eve of the first account differs substantially from that of the second in 
her mode of creation, since she was not created at Adam's request or from him, as well as 
in the purpose of her creation, as she was created for exactly the same purpose as Adam 
(to subdue), while the second Eve appears, as Soloveitchik writes: "subsequently as his 
[Adam the second's] helpmate and complement."
361
 
Soloveitchik justifies the two seemingly discrepant accounts of Adam's creation 
by stating that they introduce two aspects of human personality, both of which are 
sanctioned by God; and that the man of faith, furthermore, should oscillate between the 
two and avoid immersing himself entirely in one dimension. However, unlike Adam the 
first, the personality of the Eve of the first account is not considered by Soloveitchik to be 
a halakhically sanctioned personality for the female gender and woman of faith, if such a 
typology can be developed at all. Women are not told to oscillate between the two 
personalities, since the first Eve is not consistent with the gender values of the Halakhah. 
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Unlike Eve of the second account, who is a housekeeper in economic community with 
man, she does not represent the preferred private personality, but rather Adam's work 
partner who participates shoulder to shoulder with him to realize God’s command to 
subdue nature. 
The point I wish to make is that Soloveitchik's justification for man's dual 
personality and admissibility of two types of gender relations suggests a pattern in which 
all elements of the personality are divinely willed, inseparable parts of human nature, 
with none dismissed even though the second account portrays the “redeemed” 
personality. Soloveitchik’s interpretation of the two accounts of Eve does not seem to 
follow that model of human personality. Thus we see clearly that Soloveitchik's principal 
aim is to identify issues related to humanity such as the halakhic essentiality of the 
human's double personality. Only from there does he turn to a halakhically acceptable 
definition of gender attributes. 
1.3 Gender Difference: A Necessity not Discrimination 
The idea that men and women are necessarily different by virtue of their sex is a 
central and essential part of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik’s discussion of gender. In the 
view of both scholars, man and woman are created differently and are thus intended to 
function differently. This is a key similarity between the two, leading not just to 
resemblance but in some cases identical views. 
Mutahhari and Soloveitchik reject the idea of absolute equality between man and 
woman and the undermining of gender differences. This rejection follows another key 
element in their views of gender: the enormous significance of the family. According to 
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both clerical thinkers, formation of the family is the ultimate purpose of the gender 
differences God has planned as part of His creation. In other words, it is the 
establishment of family life that not only justifies gender difference, but also necessitates 
it. 
To clarify: I have remarked above that Soloveitchik places much more emphasis 
than Mutahhari on the family
362
  and male-female encounter that initially creates it.  
While this is true, the family and gendered relationship defining it are still very important 
to the structure of Mutahhari’s thought, since the family for him is the showcase of the 
distinctive, superior Islamic “ideology”, the site where the wisdom and scientific 
functionality of that ideology – including, crucially, gendered Shariah laws – are 
confirmed while he ventures to formulate a less traditional kind of thought for the rest of 
society. 
Nevertheless, Soloveitchik's much greater emphasis on the essentiality of 
parenthood and the parental roles of man and woman (as we saw, he equates marital and 
parental communities) does seem to promote women's domestic and private role more 
than Mutahhari.  Although Mutahhari regards parenthood as a naturally assigned task, he 
does not take care to gender it, even though Shariah clearly does so through the laws of 
child custody.
363
 It could be, in addition to the explanations offered in the previous 
paragraph, that Mutahhari takes the significance of parenthood and male and female 
parental roles for granted, since these things were not (and still are not) questioned in 
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Iranian society, and this was not one of the issues that provoked criticism against the 
Islamic laws and teachings he was determined to defend. In any case, this lesser emphasis 
along with Mutahhari’s less hesitant approach to women's social participation results in a 
slightly different sense of the individuality and personhood of women than in the thought 
of Soloveitchik. 
Both Mutahhari and Soloveitchik firmly believe, at the same time, that man and 
woman are equal in axiological terms, i.e. as far as their humanity or spirituality is 
concerned.
364
 At this level, there is no superiority or inferiority of genders. They protest 
this constantly, and there is some possibility that Mutahhari was led to his discussion of 
humanity by his desire to argue for spiritual equality of the sexes, rather than the 
declaration of equality arising only in the course of his discussion of the creation of 
human beings and their essence. 
How are man and woman's axiological equality at the level of their humanity or 
spirituality reconciled with gender differences at the level of family and society? This is 
accomplished by asserting that equality does not mean similarity. The two figures extend 
this idea to the different laws in Islam and Judaism for men and women; they say that the 
Law is built in spirit on the equal humanity and value of the two genders, but not 
similarity or identically. In the view of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik, it is man and 
woman's naturally designed gender dissimilarities that occasion gendered legal 
approaches, and certainly not inequality. 
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Mutahhari and Soloveitchik do approach gender difference with different 
emphases and objectives. The idea of differences serves Mutahhari’s argument by 
rationalizing and thus justifying the gender attitudes of Islam.  It gives the traditional 
Islamic ideology he aims to defend a basis that is at once divine and scientific, with the 
latter, as I have suggested above, really being the leading argument despite the logical 
priority of the former. Soloveitchik’s perspective, on the other hand, is basically 
theological.  Gender differences, he stresses, are essential to providing humanity with the 
bonds and attachments necessary to form and sustain the existential and ontological 
(marital and parental) communities.  Differences are thus key to maintaining humanity’s 
distinct position (distinct, that is from other creatures and forms of life) in the universe. 
Gender attributes and roles are defined by Soloveitchik directly in relation to human 
issues, including the Divine-human relation; the idea of difference extends for him to the 
cosmic plane. 
Note, however, that the different emphases, whether ideological-scientific or 
theological, do not mean that the impact of gender differences is limited to these spheres. 
Rather, the issue of gender difference is central overall.  Thus both scholars insist that 
such differences are the basis of both an attraction between male and female and a 
functionality secured by complementarity that make family relations not only possible, 
but pleasant, satisfying and strong.  Mutahhari contemplates an equal role for women in 
society and makes some very strong statements in this regard; but the idea of gender 
difference pulls him back so that he ends up speaking, as related in Chapter One, about 
“primary natural rights”, “acquired rights” and the disadvantages of women in social 
“competition” that inevitably cause them to fall behind. He wishes to allow women free 
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movement in public space; but his attempt to do so through skillful re-interpretation of 
the institution of hijab is somewhat undermined by the idea of distinct roles of male and 
female in a human sexual drama in which women attract and are pursued, while men are 
inevitably drawn to pursue.  If we do not see these inconsistencies in relation to gender 
differences in the thought of Rabbi Soloveitchik, that is, I think, because he does not push 
boundaries as much as Mutahhari. 
2. Points of Difference 
In the preceding pages, I have approached the gender thought of Mutahhari and 
Soloveitchik using significant similarities and parallels as launching points. In the next 
two sections, I will begin from differences. These are the different modes by the two 
scholars of approaching issues related to women; and very different stances on the issue 
of what is known in Islamic thought as "the requirements of the times". 
2.1 Mode of Approaching Gender 
Mutahhari’s approach may be described as justificatory and defensive. He 
justifies and defends the position of women in Islam both for the sake of the audience he 
wishes to attract to his views - principally, the youth and educated classes of Iran, 
including women - and critics. To combat the other ideologies such as Marxism or 
leftism, Western liberalism, and what he called “eclecticism”, he offers his own ideology, 
which presents Islam in a fresh and accessible way; although in his mind and 
presentation, of course, he is expounding on original Islam and not anything new. 
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Mutahhari thus defines the position of women in the Quran in order to 
demonstrate the wisdom and progressiveness of Islam, and he examines the gendered 
laws of the Shariah with the aim of proving the rationality and suitability of Islamic laws 
for establishing human happiness and the smooth functioning of society. If these things 
are established, his audience will be persuaded and critics answered. Defense, moreover, 
is not just a strategy; Mutahhari appears to be very sensitive about how Islamic gender 
teachings are perceived and judged and how Islam might appear to Westerners. The West 
is perhaps an additional, imagined audience for his writings. 
To understand this particular preoccupation of Mutahhari, it is necessary to 
appreciate the feeling of having lived, sometimes for a long period, under foreign 
political domination or cultural influence. I am not speaking here only of Iran, for 
Mutahhari identified with Muslims around the world and thus felt their unhappy 
experience with the West to be his own. This is why, although his first audience is 
Iranian, he addresses himself to Muslims in general. It is also necessary to appreciate the 
degree to which Shariah and particularly laws and teachings related to women (including 
veiling) have been portrayed in the West as the cause of Muslim backwardness. Everyone 
is familiar with this image in contemporary times, but it actually goes back to colonial 
figures, missionaries, and colonial policy – for instance, under Lord Cromer in late-
nineteenth century in Egypt.
365
 This is why Mutahhari expends energy on a spirited and 
at the same time somewhat anxious defense. 
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The fact that the position of women had historically been a primary line of attack 
for the West against Islam and the plan (eventually realized) of the Iranian government of 
the time to reform religious laws relating to women in particular results in a greater focus 
on women in the writings of Mutahhari than in those of Soloveitchik.  Mutahhari  
vigorously defended the point at which he felt challenged.  His feeling that he had to 
defend Islam from domestic critics and the West appears also to have put him under 
stress that rendered his positions inconsistent to a degree. He is pressed by criticism of 
Shariah to defend all its laws as they are; while on the other hand, he is drawn by a need 
to demonstrate the modern relevance of Islam to insist that women can move freely in 
public space and play equal social roles. If he had lived some years into the Revolution in 
a sovereign Islamic state, he would, I believe, have gone beyond defense and used his 
knowledge and exceptional skill in interpretation to attempt to harmonize these positions. 
Soloveitchik, in contrast, concentrates on defining (rather than defending) the 
place of women and system of gender norms in Judaism. He does not expend effort to 
justify the laws of the Halakhah and prove that Jewish teachings are the best available 
option. This is not, of course, because he did not think it was so; it was likely because he 
did not find criticism - for instance, by Jewish feminists or non-Jews
366
 - to be very 
strong or relevant. If critique coming from outside the circle of Orthodox Judaism 
concerned him, his reply was to address it constructively at a fundamental level by 
drawing attention to the centrality of the Halakhah and dilemma of the man of faith in 
modern times. 
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Diaspora Jewry and perhaps Orthodox Jews in particular do face the threat of 
assimilation. Soloveitchik himself refers to Christianization, in very emotional terms.
367
  
Thus while he is not openly defensive, one of the reasons he is concerned that the 
Halakhah be preserved is that it is a pillar of the tradition around which the community is 
gathered. He resists change to halakhic rulings such as removal of the mechitza barrier 
between men and women in the synagogue and women's prayer groups also on principle, 
that is for the sake of the integrity of the Law – not, like Mutahhari, as part of a 
retrenchment in the face of criticism. In short, it is fair to conclude that Soloveitchik did 
not address issues related to gender in reaction to any critique, but in order to affirm its 
centrality to Judaism and the lives of Jews.  If he had felt the need to react and defend or 
feared a negative image of Judaism, as Mutahhari certainly did in relation to Islam, it is 
likely he would have addressed the agunah issue more proactively. 
Thus in sum, Mutahhari is much more defensive - or, to put it another way, 
apologetic - than Soloveitchik concerning the tradition and teachings of Islam, along with 
being somewhat more woman-centered. This makes his thought finally more political. 
That characteristic may have been heightened by his modeling his chief work on women, 
The Rights of Women in Islam, on Abu al-Ala Mawdudi’s vitriolic Purdah and the Rights 
of Women in Islam; but it is original with him, as he seeks to demonstrate that Islam, 
since it has an ideal social system, does not need to adopt Western models and 
civilization. His writing on women is ultimately about Western political domination.  The 
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anti-Western polemical nature of the Ayatollah’s writing on women is seen both in his 
denigration (though it is not as complete as Mawdudi’s) of Western gender norms368 and 
his citation of Western pseudo-science. 
The defensive and ultimately political nature of Mutahhari’s gender thought 
comes into sharper focus when placed alongside Soloveitchik’s rather interiorized 
approach. Soloveitchik’s intention is to define the position of the human being in Judaism 
in order to gain insight into the nature and destiny of humanity and formulate a 
philosophy of man on the basis of these insights.
369
  Soloveitchik’s view of humans and 
gendered humans is underpinned by a kind of theosophy and metaphyicized psychology.  
Man and woman are what they are because of the interior realities of gendered human 
beings, their minds and their relations, all of which accord with the destiny of the 
Covenant. Mutahhari, though a devoted student of the Shiite-Islamic mystical philosophy 
known as irfan, does not link his gender thought to the mystical structure of the cosmos, 
save in the one instance in which attempts to explain why women are socially the same  
but spiritually different by referring to the “descending journey from God to creation” 
(involving difference) and “ascending journey from man to God" (involving identicality). 
Soloveitchik and Mutahhari, of course, had different audiences and were in 
different positions in relation to them. Soloveitchik’s activity and concern are basically 
pastoral; he has his Orthodox community, which is already turned toward him as a leader, 
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and he strives to reinforce the norms he believes will help preserve it. This is to be 
achieved primarily through the “survival unit”, all-important for a minority, of the family; 
hence his elaborate existential grounding of the marital and parental community. Rabbi 
Soloveitchik, in short, is a leader and builder of community, and a minority community at 
that. His ultimate concern is for the survival of the Jewish people, which he seeks to 
ensure through the integrity of the family, including as a place where Jewish children are 
brought up properly in the tradition. 
Mutahhari, on the other hand, was not the leader of a particular community, but 
rather an independent scholar with political concerns seeking an audience that potentially 
included the whole of (Shiite Muslim) Iranian society. His mission is therefore to give an 
account of women that is politically persuasive, that can attract and “convert” Iranians, 
whether religiously “orthodox” or not, to his perspective. He also wishes to defend and 
valorize Islam, something that both speaks to his audience and is important for him 
personally. Thus his thought is more exterior in nature. He is less concerned with the 
functioning of the family – not, for instance, touching on the necessity of having children 
and the roles of the mother and father in educating them – and more interested in how 
Islamic gender norms function in and benefit society as a whole, going so far as to 
address the relevance of gender norms to the political-national goals of an efficient 
workforce and “prosperity”. Mutahhari’s scope, in short, is wider. This is why he is led to 
treat women’s space, endeavoring to open it up and rationalize public roles for women. 
Mutahhari’s societal-political rather than family-community focus also goes some 
way toward explaining his concern with the veil, since he uses a fresh interpretation of 
this issue to reconcile his rather different thought concerning women in the private and 
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public spheres.  Soloveitchik’s writings certainly strongly imply that women belong in 
the private sphere, and he is at some points quite explicit about this – for instance, when 
he speaks about proper economic roles of husbands and wives in the family. But his main 
or most explicit discourse about space concerns the separation of men and women in the 
synagogue through the mechitza. When the sexes are separated in the synagogue, that 
space is sanctified, and this is enough to establish a symbolic model for a gendered 
world. Since the Jewish minority, and even more the Jewish Orthodox minority, is 
surrounded by a non-Jewish/non-Orthodox/secular space, careful preservation of that 
model space becomes all the more important. 
Noticing these contrasts between the approaches of the Muslim Shiite cleric and 
the Modern Orthodox Rabbi leads one to think about the possible course of Muslim 
thought in North America and other regions where Muslims have migrated. Muslim 
gender thought in the West, apart from that produced by feminists, is still quite defensive 
and political. Will it be that as Muslims find themselves in a minority position, the more 
“orthodox’ among them will also turn to elaborating a more protective, interior, family- 
and community-focused thought suited to the life and concern for survival of a minority 
community? 
2.2 Requirements of Time 
Changing times and circumstances are inevitably an issue in religious thought that 
seeks to organize and regulate the world, since the views in question originally belong to 
distant historical periods, while many in the tradition will be apt to claim that its 
teachings are timeless. This is a basic problem facing figures such as Ayatollah 
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Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik, two outstanding figures of 20
th
-century Islam and 
Judaism who assert that their traditions are responsive to the needs of humanity of all 
times and that their scriptures are the books of all times. The Ayatollah and Rabbi, as we 
have seen, do not necessarily reject modern thinking and living; but they are not willing, 
at the same time, to compromise the basic teachings of their traditions in the name of 
modern values. Nevertheless, they have dissimilar stances on the issue of “the 
requirements of the times”. 
Mutahhari’s treatment of this issue is extensive, and it is also quite original, 
especially in view of the fact that he was writing before the advent of the 1979 Iranian 
Islamic Revolution when adjustment of laws became a pressing matter due to the need to 
use them in a functioning Islamic state. Rather than relying on complex juristic 
arguments, Mutahhari turns to his brand of popular science or philosophy,
370
 allowing 
him to make a direct and general assertion and communicate in a comprehensible way 
with his audience. He states that Islam acknowledges the requirements of the times, since 
evolution through time is reflected in the nature of humans. The life of an animal, says 
Mutahhari, is guided by instinct, whereas the lives of humans are controlled or guided by 
the power of their intellect and creativity; it is for this reason that innovation and 
advancement are to be expected in human life, but not in the life of animals. Similar to 
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Mutahhari’s argument (in relation to women’s social roles) outlined in Chapter One that 
humans are not, like bees and some other animals, assigned particular functions in 
society, this argument is rhetorically effective as it appeals to the special dignity of 
human beings. 
Note that, while the argument for change is made on the basis of science and 
logic, it is finally divinely willed, since God is the author of creation. Whenever rational 
arguments of this kind are presented, it is to be understood that Islam as a divinely 
sanctioned, perfect message has been sent made by God to accord with the wise plan of 
His creation. (Soloveitchik seems to assume the same principle, for instance, in his 
account of human sexuality; but he is not as explicit about it since it is not nearly as 
important for him that Judaism be “scientific”). Thus, the rational argument having been 
expressed, Mutahhari finds it reflected in a Quranic verse (Q. 48:29) describing the 
followers of the Prophet Muhammad: "Their description in the Gospel
371
 is like a [sown] 
seed which sends forth its shoot, then makes it strong; it then becomes thick, and it stands 
straight on its stem, delighting the sowers." This verse is for Mutahhari evidence of 
Islam's recognition of human capacity for progress and development, as he says: 
Islam is a progressive religion. In order to persuade Muslims to 
keep marching forward under the light of Islam, the Quran has 
employed this parable.  This is an analogy to the society the Quran 
aims at. What the Quran desires is growth. The Quran wants to lay 
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Note also here the emphasis typical of Mutahhari on the Quran. Eschewing not only a 
complex juristic approach but the vast corpus of the Shiite hadith, he goes directly to the 
revelation. This is direct and convincing for his audience – not least because of the 
rhetorical beauty of the Quran – and gives him, like the resort to philosophy and science, 
more freedom in argument, since the tradition of Quranic exegesis, despite an early 
stream that insists on relying on hadiths and Arabic grammar, is quite flexible. As far as I 
am aware, Mutahhari’s interpretation quoted above is original. 
In a parallel approach, Soloveitchik concedes the need to acknowledge changing 
times in the course of his typological examination of human personality in which he 
introduces Adam the first as a personality who aspires to majesty and dignity.  
Comparing humans with the beasts, he remarks: 
The brute is helpless, and therefore, not dignified. Civilized man 
has gained limited control of nature and has become, in certain 
respects, her master, and with his mastery he has attained dignity 
as well. His mastery has made it possible for him to act in 
accordance with his responsibility.
373
 
The human being, who is created in the image of God and thus is creative like God, gains 
dignity and majesty only through roaming the earth and conquering nature. He therefore 
necessarily needs to be a man of his time in order to maintain his majestic and dignified 
position in the universe. 
Both views suggest a God-given capability and tendency to develop, progress and 
conquer areas unimaginable to other creatures. The lofty expectation of humans living up 
to such a position is similarly construed by Mutahhari and Soloveitchik as their 
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traditions’ acknowledgment of the requirements of the times, i.e. the need to be aware of 
current conditions. 
Thus Mutahhari and Soloveitchik, through a fresh interpretation of the scriptures, 
establish dynamism as a principle and ideal.  The intention is to put their traditions in a 
good light by asserting that they can, as God has ordained, confidently meet modern 
times. Both however, have reservations. Mutahhari cautions that not all manifestations of 
human advances are to be valued and admired: 
One should neither fully surrender to all the changes of time, nor 
completely reject them. For it is the human being that shapes his 
time; he can change the time in a good way or in a bad way. The 




He believes, for instance, that discoveries and achievements related to nuclear physics are 
to be greatly praised; but using this technology in an evil way by making nuclear bombs 




Mutahhari does believe, on the other hand, that changes and advances can be 
effectively evaluated through moral discernment. He believes that the human intellect can 
guide humanity in thinking about whether the changes are good or evil. Mutahhari is 
quite precise about this. One should analyze the circumstances that leads to change and 
its consequences, he says, taking into account the source of the new phenomenon, what 
direction it is headed in, what inclination in the nature of human beings has motivated the 
change, and whether it was initiated out of good will or to suit the political, economic, or 
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cultural agendas of corrupt individuals, companies or governments.
376
 There is openness 
to change here and even a kind of program; although the specific examples Mutahhari 
gives relate to science and technology, rather than social change and change related to 
Islam specifically. Change is the object of evaluation by Islam; but we do not at this point 
learn about if and how Islam itself can change. 
Soloveitchik's reservation in regard to human progress already emerges in his 
analysis of the creation story - thus at the heart of his thought. He speaks of Adam the 
first as a representation of the modern man, i.e. one who conforms to his times so that he 
is fully satisfied with the results of his majestic and dignified way of life, to the degree 
that he regards himself as the totality of the human personality and dismisses the other 
part of it, that is to say, Adam the second. Soloveitchik blames Adam the first for 
inflicting a new type of loneliness on the man of faith, a loneliness that is due, as David 




We have so far gathered that “the requirements of the times” in the thought of 
Mutahhari and Soloveitchik are treated in their scripturally-based understandings of the 
human being and his complex personality. Mutahhari maintains that if developments and 
changes are the morally qualified results of human intellect and the exalted soul, they are 
worthy of being followed. Soloveitchik seems to admire human progress and the changes 
that it brings about, on the condition that they do not lead humans to dismiss their faith 
personality. 
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Both figures, however, consider that changes in circumstances are irrelevant and 
alteration senseless in regard to human responsibility before God. Mutahhari and 
Soloveitchik share the view that humans have been subject to God's commandments from 
the dawn of creation, and that they will ever remain so through the obligations of the 
Law, whether the Shariah or Halakhah. Mutahhari consequently stresses the eternality 
and non-susceptibility to abrogation of the Shariah, while Soloveitchik similarly believes 
in the centrality and un-changeability of the Halakhah. 
This is where Mutahhari develops his definition of “the requirements of time” and 
compatibility of Islam with change beyond the level of scientific and technological 
achievement, and also where his thoughts on the subject diverge from those of 
Soloveitchik. Mutahhari states that Islam possesses mechanisms that accommodate 
change occurring with the development of cultures and civilizations. He reconciles this 
assertion with his view that the Shariah is unchangeable by distinguishing between the 
“fixed” (thabit) needs of humans that require fixed laws, and changeable needs that 
require flexible laws  - which are nevertheless to be based on fixed and unchangeable 
principles (usul). According to Mutahhari, the mechanism that distinguishes between 
fixed and changeable needs and determines the laws to apply is ijtihad.
378
 The process of 
ijtihad, according to juristic theory, involves adducing and interpreting relevant texts 
from the Quran along with hadiths (sayings of the Imams), and then using intellect (aql), 
i.e. independent reasoning, to proceed from previously established laws to arrive at fresh, 
rulings that address new situations. 
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To clarify the process of ijtihad, Mutahhari refers to actual examples of how a 
“demand of time” is met without violating the principles and fixed laws of the Shariah. 
For instance, Islam forbids the selling of human blood and stool, for which the proof-
verse of the Quran is:  "And do not consume your property among yourselves for the sake 
of vanity" (2:188).  This verse, Mutahhari says, lays down the fixed principle that people 
are prohibited from engaging in economic activities that consume their wealth involving 
material that is not useable in legitimate and halal ways. Thus at one time it was decided 
that blood and stool could not be bought and sold, because there was no legitimate use for 
them. However, the prohibition may be nullified through ijtihad if these materials can be 
legitimately utilized so that they are no longer “consumed for the sake of vanity". In this 
way, the ruling of the Quran stating a principle remains intact, while its application to a 
specific subject is annulled.  The Ayatollah does emphasize that it is only the high-
ranking clerics, called mujtahids, who are able to arrive at such rulings, as he says: 
“There should always be true experts (mujtahids) to match Islamic principles with new 




Soloveitchik does also speak about human agency in establishment of the law.   
He refers, as one would expect, to the famous story contained in the Babylonian Talmud 
of the Oven of Aknai:  
When there was a dispute between R. Eliezer and the sages 
regarding the purity of the oven of Aknai, a heavenly voice 
declared: why do you disagree with R. Eliezer, seeing that in all 
matters the Halakhah is in accordance with his ruling? R. Joshua 
arose and said: it is not in heaven (Deut. 30:12)… for the Torah 
has already been given from Mount Sinai and we pay no attention 
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to a heavenly voice. And the holy one, blessed be He, smiled in 
that hour and said: my children have defeated me, my children 
have defeated me. 
380
 
The tale and particularly the phrase from Deuteronomy “not in heaven” is traditionally 
taken to mean that once the Halakhah was delivered by God, it was given over to humans 
to be elaborated through scholarly interpretation. The text is in fact a warrant for 
rabbinical authority,
381
 just as the Shiite definition of ijtihad (not just as formulated by 
Mutahhari, but in general) gives interpretive authority to the mujtahids
382
.  Obviously, 
neither scholar means to suggest that the law can be interpreted by believers themselves 
let along female believers; this limitation on possible change should not be forgotten. 
Moreover, Soloveitchik’s remarks on interpretation of Halakhah are really a 
further expansion on his theological thought concerning humanity and fulfillment of the 
Law, rather than a statement about evolution through interpretation. In brief, since 
humans are created in the image of God, they imitate his creativity; the human being is in 
this sense a partner of God in creation, an activity Soloveitchik eloquently describes as a 
"lowering of transcendence into the midst of our turbid, coarse, material world” that takes 
place only  “through the implementation of the ideal Halakhah in the core of reality."383  
Although, as Soloveitchik says in another passage from his Halakhic Man, creative 
interpretation of the Torah is a power God has gifted humans with so that learned and 
insightful scholars of “future generations” may discover a wealth of law under every 
heading (all of which will then stand as an integral part of the oral law),
384
 the lesson 
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communicated is about the divine nature and fullness of that law and necessity of faithful 
adherence to it. 
Finally, the intellectual autonomy and authority Soloveitchik describes seems to 
be limited to the sages of the past such as those of the Talmudic era, to whose judgments 
and laws Soloveitchik bows though he is himself a very distinguished Talmudist.
385
   
Soloveitchik's uncompromising approach towards the hazakos of the sages is evident in 
his harsh reaction to Rackman's proposal that the Talmudic presumption "better dwell 
with two bodies than to dwell as a widow" be modified (see Chapter Two). To demand 
modification of the teachings of the sages equals, in the view of Soloveitchik, destruction 
of the tradition as a whole. Thus it seems that, in reality, he does not accept that laws may 
change with changing times and circumstances; he says quite explicitly apropos of the 
Rackman controversy that the hazakos of the Rabbis “rest… upon permanent ontological 
principles rooted in the very depth of the…metaphysical human personality - which is as 
changeless as the heavens above”.386 To mark the sayings of the sages in this way with 
the seal of unchangability implies that they are beyond the rules of this material world 
just as the Torah is as a divine scripture - although Soloveitchik, in light of the doctrine 
encapsulated in the story of the Oven of Aknai, is unlikely to admit this. 
Here is an opportune place to return to Mutahhari, as his views on the authority of 
the high-ranking authorities of early Islam are quite different from those of Soloveitchik 
on the authority of the sages.  Mutahhari certainly does not overlook the sayings of the 
Shiite Imams and Prophet as a source of law and does occasionally makes use of hadiths. 
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At the same time, he cautions that not all hadiths are valid or necessarily applicable in all 
times.
387
  This is, generally speaking,
388
 in accord with the overall approach of Muslim 
scholars, which is to examine hadiths for authenticity, usually on the basis of reliability of 
the transmitters.  Moreover, Twelver Usuli Shiites (the majority group of Shiites, to 
which Ayatollah Mutahhari belongs) look at hadiths to some degree through the lens of 
reason (aql), which may allow for greater flexibility (I say “to some degree” and “may 
allow” because approaches vary389).  In addition, as already mentioned, Mutahhari tends 
to rely on the Quran rather than hadith; this is a typical strategy of Islamic modernists in 
general, whether Sunnite or Shiite, since not having to deal with numerous hadiths allows 
more flexibility in thought. And finally, Muslim exegesis of the Quran, especially but not 
exclusively in modern times, is not weighted by the exegesis of the past. More than in 
law, scholars are not expected to adhere to or cite earlier authorities; and Mutahhari 
would have been considered to possess even more authority of his own because he had 
reached the rank of mujtahid. 
Further research would be required to make any general statement comparing 
contemporary (Orthodox) rabbinic initiative in relation to the Talmud and Halakhah, and 
the initiative of Muslim or Shiite scholars in relation to the hadiths, law and exegesis of 
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the Quran. Concerning Soloveitchik and Mutahhari, however, it does appear that the 
Rabbi is strongly inclined to affirm the statements and rulings of the sages as an 
indispensible part of the tradition, while  the Ayatollah feels free to use hadith sparingly 
and to quite freely produce his own interpretations of them and of the Quran. 
Having devoted a number of pages to the attitudes of Mutahhari and Soloveitchik 
toward the authority of their past traditions, I will proceed to consider how this is 
connected to their stances on issues relating to women. It should first be said that, 
notwithstanding the difference noted in the previous paragraph, Mutahhari and 
Soloveitchik are on common ground in the close relation of these matters in their thought.  
Any proposition that interpretations and laws might change with the evolution of society 
also leads, sooner or later, to the issue of women.  Conversely, when women and gender 
are considered, the question of changing times and possible change in the status of 
women immediately arises; even though Soloveitchik seems to try to avoid that path 
while Mutahhari intentionally takes it as he includes a discussion of “the requirements of 
the times” in his Rights of Woman in Islam and in fact uses the issue of women as a 
launching point to consider it. 
Within this frame, I find that both Ayatollah Mutahhari and Rabbi Soloveitchik 
make some effort to consider and address issues related women in light of current 
conditions or “the requirements of the times”; but these efforts have certain limits in each 
case. In the remainder of this section of the thesis, I will consider the efforts and limits of 
both figures, hoping to use each to shed light on the other, and finally consider their 
responses to gender and modernity in the context of the unique situations in which they 
lived and taught. 
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I will begin with an example from Mutahhari that shows direct attention to the 
question of evolution and change in the tradition in relation women’s issues. The example 
concerns a very well-known hadith concerning the political authority of women. The 
saying is attributed to the Prophet, and it reads:  "A nation that entrusts leadership to a 
woman shall never prosper".
390
 This hadith has been used up to modern times to argue 
that women cannot be heads of state or hold other high political positions, and thus has 
been the target of many attempts at re-interpretation, not only by modernists but also  
traditionalists.
391
 Mutahhari begins by questioning the authenticity of the tradition
392
 on 
the grounds that it does not actually appear in Shiite sources; although he ends by 
admitting that it has also been cited by Shiite scholars, so that it is not “distant” (and has 
consequently to be taken into consideration).  He then goes on to deal with the hadith by 
questioning its applicability, on the grounds that the meaning of “ruling" has changed 
over time. This assertion involves a very particular reading. Mutahhari observes that in 
the past, entrusting a nation's leadership to a person meant giving them absolute authority 
so that the people had no say whatsoever: "Governments in the past  functioned in a way 
that an individual had absolute authority over people… but the concept of [political] rule 
is different in what is known today as democracy, if democracy is to function according 
to its [basic] principle"
393
 The logic is that even if the tradition is proven to be 
authentically from the Prophet (which it may not be), it is still not applicable today since 
                                                          
390
The hadith is found in Sahih al-Bukhari, one of the six canonical collections of Sunnite Islam, see: 
Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari (Beirut: Bayt al-Afkar al-Dawliyah, [1429]2008), 493. Shiite 
scholars are aware of Sunnite hadiths and sometimes quote them (although the opposite is not true). 
391
 For its use and attempts at interpretation, see: Fadel Mohammed, “Is Historicism a Viable Strategy 
for Islamic Law Reform? The Case of 'Never Shall a Folk Prosper who have Appointed a Woman to Rule 
them',” Islamic Law and Society, 18:2 (2011): 131 -176. 
392
 It would be difficult for Sunnites to question the hadith on the grounds that it is imperfectly 
transmitted and thus possibly inauthentic, since it has been rated “sound” (sahih) by the author of a Sunnite 
canonical text. 
393
 Mutahhari, Zan va Masail-i Qazai va Siyasi, 81. 
 Zolghadr 217 
it pertains to absolute rule; Mutahhari remarks that such rule is not acceptable by men 
either.  Thus he is not convinced that the hadith decisively excludes women's eligibility to 
rule in an Islamic society. 
Mutahhari does not, however, follow through to conclude that women actually 
can hold such positions. Instead, he comments: 
Women holding political positions is not something proven 
efficient in the world today. We cannot say that there is no 
difference between man and woman in this regard and that women 
are as good and capable as men are. We cannot, in other words, say 
that the rules of nature have created women to perform in political 
authority positions. On the contrary, scientific research, at least, 




This sentiment seems entirely at odds with Mutahhari’s view, discussed in Chapter One, 
concerning the similarity and (approximate) equality of the sexes in the social realm. That 
view, strangely enough, began in the series of articles written in exactly the same period 
(between 1966-1967 CE) as the piece under consideration. To recall, he affirms that, "In 
their social rights outside the family realm, all individual human beings [including 
women] enjoy both equal and similar positions'' so that ''all individuals are similarly 
entitled to enjoy the bounties of creation, to work, to compete, to nominate themselves 
for social positions, to try to acquire social positions in legitimate ways, and to 
demonstrate their intellectual and practical capabilities.''
395
 It is true that Mutahhari did at 
the same time acknowledge that not all individuals who were once similar and equal in 
their "primary natural rights" would remain so through to the finish line;
396
 but that is still 
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a long ways from asserting an entirely different constitution and status of the sexes by 
saying that ''nature has not created women as good as men.'' Here it seems that gender 
difference is definitive. 
Mutahhari’s treatment of the appointment of women as judges in Shariah law397 is 
strikingly similar. Traditional Shiite jurists generally reject female judgeship.
398
 Even 
though this position is powerful since it is considered to be supported by consensus, 
Mutahhari takes a critical approach.
399
 He begins by flatly rejecting the majority of the 
hadiths that lay down the prohibition as inauthentic (i.e. imperfectly transmitted and 
attested, and thus possibly or surely not the words of the Imams). Only two hadiths, he 
says, are authentic; and these do not, if read correctly, actually rule out judgeship. This is 
because, while they use the (Arabic) term rajul (literally, “man”) for a judge (qadi), that 
does not refer to maleness as a qualification for judgeship, since rajul, according to a 
principle of Islamic jurisprudence, can refer to both genders; for instance if it is said that 
a rajul who has forgotten which prostration of prayer he is in in the third or fourth 
prostration has to add an extra prostration at the end out of caution (one of several 
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possible rulings in this complicated question) , this really means all believers.
400
  After all 
this, however, the Ayatollah finally submits to tradition by concluding that, "although all 
the hadiths cited [in support of a prohibition on female judgeship] are flawed and 
unsound, it is a question that is agreed upon and accepted in Islamic jurisprudence."
401
 
I would diagnose Mutahhari’s seemingly anomalous conclusion concerning 
female political leadership and hesitation to consider the appointment of women as 
judges as resulting  not exactly from an unwillingness to consider modern conditions, but 
the fact that these matters were not, in his time, in the realm of possibility. His aim in 
considering the two issues was essentially rhetorical. Mutahhari was doubtless aware that 
the hadith "A nation that entrusts leadership to a woman shall never prosper" is a woman-
negative text that is very well-known not only by Islamic scholars but Muslims in 
general. He therefore wanted to refute it, both for the sake of the domestic audience he 
wanted to reach, which was probably uncomfortable with such things,
402
 and to 
demonstrate the advanced nature of Islamic “ideology” as reflected in its views of 
women. (He also manages via the hadith to assert that Islam is favourable to modern 
notions of democracy, a very significant secondary conclusion.)  Similarly, since female 
judgeship in the Shariah was a subject of some discussion in his day, he set out to 
demonstrate that women could be judges in principle. It is the principle of progressivism 
in Islam Mutahhari wishes to establish, and not necessarily access of women to these 
particular positions. 
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The progressivism Mutahhari asserts would certainly not have been tested by 
being put into practice in the Iran of his time, so it remained safely theoretical. Why he 
felt he had to add, despite the theoretical nature of his discussion, that women cannot 
hold high political positions because they are inherently unfit for them and that the 
tradition has finally agreed that women cannot be judges remains a mystery. He may 
have felt these things himself, so that his feelings clashed with his desire to show Islam 
(through the crucial issue of women) to be progressive; or he may have added those 
comments for the benefit of the conservative clerical establishment.  He probably never 
imagined that female leadership and judgeship would become very real issues in an 
Iranian “Islamic Republic” in which his legacy would also be highly regarded. 
Mutahhari’s approach to possible evolution of the tradition overall may be 
described as cautious or careful rather than broad and indiscriminate; his discussions of 
women’s political rule and judgeship are outstanding illustrations only because they are 
so specific. Mutahhari has, at first glance, a more free and flexible attitude to the 
authority of the past than Soloveitchik by virtue of the tradition he has inherited; and he 
also seems personally more willing to look forward and innovate in the Law through the 
ijtihad he proudly declares to be part of the tradition. But the attitudes of the two figures 
are not entirely different. Mutahhari approaches gender and “the requirements of the 
times” not only in a positive, but also negative way. He affirms a woman-positive, 
progressive face of Islam, condemning “irrational” traditionalism and stubborn 
conservatism (jumud-i fikri) that would, out of fear of novelty and innovation, deny basic 
and fundamental rights to women such as education and a social presence. But he also 
rejects the “ignorance” that would throw away everything and imitate the West, in 
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wanton disregard of the religious and cultural values of Muslim societies. In Mutahhari’s 
view, promoting unrestricted, Western-style gender relations, mixing gender roles that 
should be distinct, and rejecting Islamic covering (the veil) and gendered laws of the 
Shariah in the name of women's liberty and equality are misunderstandings of how Islam 
accommodates – as he believes it does - historical and social evolution.  The error of 
those who would take this approach, he believes, lies in imagining that because Western 
technological and scientific advancement is to be admired and followed (something he 
believes himself), so should Western gender culture also be followed.
403
 Similar, it 
seems, to Soloveitchik, Mutahhari finds that technology and science are detachable from 
societal norms, so that the positive fruits of modernity may be enjoyed while traditional 
social structures, including the gender roles and relations that are at the heart of those 
structures, are maintained. 
Mutahhari believes, in sum, that change in gender norms should be approached 
rationally and selectively, rather than dogmatically.  In order to exonerate Islam from 
accusations of mistreating women and imposing out-dated laws and teachings upon them, 
Mutahhari shows that he does not hesitate to review certain laws of the Shariah. This 
should not, however, be taken to mean that he is willing to re-consider basic and central 
norms. He does not, for instance, negotiate women's covering, men's unrestricted right to 
divorce, or women's half-share of inheritance, especially as these are addressed fairly 
explicitly in the Quran. (Note that political leadership and judgeship are not addressed in 
the Quran, and thus involve only hadiths.)  Rather than review these matters, he deploys 
an array of philosophical, psychological and “scientific” arguments  to “prove'”, as he 
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puts it, that these laws suit women's nature and needs. Though he declares that ijtihad is 
to be used as an internal mechanism of the tradition to decide whether each law is 
applicable or not, the decision about whether or not to apply that instrument is controlled 
by larger assumptions. If change is to be effected only through ijtihad applied to discrete 
legal regulations, how does one review and test the larger arguments framing the whole 
world view? 
Ayatollah Mutahhari was at least willing to contemplate altering religious laws in 
light of changing circumstances, albeit as long as the principles are intact. This is not the 
case with Rabbi Soloveitchik.  Although Soloveitchik encourages Jews to meet with 
aspects of modernity related to technology and science as part of their divine 
responsibility to live a dignified and “majestic” life, his insistence on the words of the 
sages as unchangeable sources of the Halakhah discourages accommodation at that level.  
Nevertheless, the Rabbi does, in the result, take changing times into account in his 
treatment of women’s religious education.404  For if Jews are to live a life of Halakhah – 
the same Halakhah that is to remain forever constant – some change in the tradition is 
needed to assure that aim in a new, modern environment. And it is better assured if 
women and mothers possess knowledge of the Torah and Talmud. Surely Soloveitchik 
was conscious here of new challenges necessitating a fresh approach – conscious of the 
“requirements of the times”, to put it in the language of Islam.  Soloveitchik’s decisive 
and revolutionary action in relation to women’s religious education points to this state of 
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mind, I would argue, rather than witnessing to him being actually modern, as Wurzberger 
suggests.
405
 Soloveitchik, however, never made a connection between innovation and a 
mechanism in the Law that would legitimate it, as Mutahhari did. In fact, he never spoke 
out at all about his intentions or theory in regard to women's Talmud education. This 
makes it difficult to interpret his action as pointing to a particular attitude to modernity, 
whereas Mutahhari is explicit about modern times (by which he meant essentially a 
modernity coming from the West) containing both good and bad elements that can be 
separated from each other, analyzed, and either assimilated or rejected. 
Just the same, Soloveitchik made Jewish women’s religious education a reality. 
Even though he did not relate women’s education to the Halakhah, since the lack of 
justification for it in the Law would necessitate a reconsideration that might end by 
casting a shadow on the Halakhah itself, it was done. Soloveitchik’s view of women’s 
prayer groups, though apparently going in the opposite direction, also points to awareness 
of current circumstances, more than any negative attitude to modernity. If he opposed 
women’s prayer groups even in the absence of a definite objection in the Halakhah – 
where they are ruled “not permissible” but not actually “forbidden” (assur) – that was 
possibly because of misgivings about the motivations of the participants and potential 
further path of the movement in an environment in which ideas about women’s liberation 
were circulating. 
Rabbi Soloveitchik has sometimes been seen as a paradoxical figure of Modern 
Orthodoxy, and readers might by this point in the thesis see Ayatollah Mutahhari in the 
same way. Twersky, as we have seen, attributes Soloveitchik’s apparently different 
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stances in relation to women’s Talmud education and the mechizta to "a special intuitive 
sense for the true intent and meaning of the masora [tradition]" that allowed him to draw 
upon its “internal dynamics” in order to “guide Jewry in its confrontation with 
modernity."
406
  This, I find, is also a useful way to understand Mutahhari; he is motivated 
by what he feels to be the essence of the Shariah and Islam, rather than simple 
consistency. Both figures can be understood as functioning, with considerable skill, to 
pilot their communities through modern times while adhering to the spirit of the tradition 
as they perceive it. Mutahhari’s determination, described above, to treat modernity 
selectively and take a middle path between acceptance and rejection is in fact a 
declaration of what he believes to be the spirit of Islam. Like many contemporary Muslim 
thinkers across the spectrum, he sees Islam as representing a middle, moderate path, 
something modern but at the same time not Western, a dynamic, viable tradition with its 
own strength. This heartfelt conviction as much as anything explains his mediating 
position on women’s space (i.e. granting her a social presence while insisting on Islamic 
covering and centering her life in the family). 
This thesis has offered a critical appreciation of the views on gender of Ayatollah 
Morteza Mutahhari, aided by comparison with Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik, while also 
attempting to throw light on Soloveitchik by placing him alongside Mutahhari. A 
properly critical account of thought requires examination not only of context and 
structure, but also apparent limitations and inconsistencies. That has been the approach 
taken here, in contrast  - in the case of Mutahhari at least - to existing literature, which 
tends to be admiring. The thesis has also, however, tried to discern the affective qualities 
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of the gender thought of the two scholars; comparison has been especially useful in this 
regard. Thus I have suggested that Mutahhari’s ideas about women along with those of 
Soloveitchik are ultimately in harmony with their sense of the tradition and its 
fundamental spirit; this is the basic impulse for both, rather than systemization.  I have 
also suggested that difficulty in appreciating the feelings of women sets limits on the 
understanding of both scholars; but they are far from being misogynistic, and feel very 
genuinely, as I have commented numerous times, that women are valuable as human 
beings and have vital, respected roles in religion and society. This leads to the subject 
with which I will close the chapter and thesis: the reception of Soloveitchik and 
Mutahhari’s gender thought by women. 
I have been informed
407
 that Soloveitchik most definitely thought of women as 
part of his audience; not only did he take care to educate women, including his very 
learned wife and daughters, but he also tried to “include female protagonists in his talks.”  
Mutahhari, of course, was initially motivated to write about women for the purpose of 
reaching female readers.  It is surely important when evaluating the gender thought of 
these clerical leaders to acknowledge and appreciate these facts. Even if we find that 
women are not considered in their writings for their own sake, such actions speak 
eloquently.  The educational initiatives of Soloveitchik certainly introduced vibrancy to 
the religious and intellectual lives of Orthodox Jewish women; Gilla Ratzersdorfer 
Rosen’s 2000 essay “God of My Teachers: Learning with Rav Soloveitchik,” in which 
she speaks about the impact on her life of the Rav’s teaching her about the female or 
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maternal aspects of God, is one highly personal document attesting to this.
408
  The essay 
of Shira Wolosky touched upon in Chapter Two demonstrates that Soloveitchik’s 
teachings are also able to strike a chord with Jewish women outside the circle of 
Orthodoxy.  It might not be far-fetched to consider Soloveitchik’s educational endeavors 
as a potential factor in a future Jewish Orthodox “feminism”409 by creating a class of 
practicing Jewish Orthodox women very well versed in the Talmud and used to an 
egalitarian approach to study. I cannot finally judge the effect of Rabbi Soloveitchik’s 
thought and action on the worldview and feelings of his Jewish female audience, but I 
can, as an Iranian Muslim woman, testify to the effect of Ayatollah Mutahhari. I have met 
several Iranian women of the generation that experienced the Islamic Revolution who 
became convinced of the importance of Islam for their lives and society and even the 
necessity and dignity of Islamic covering because of Mutahhari. His writings truly spoke 
to women. This, I believe, is not only because of women’s issues, but also because 
women were as concerned as anyone about the defense and viability of Islam in Iran and 
the modern world, which Mutahhari addressed vigorously.  It should not be forgotten that 
religious women are also deeply dedicated to their religions, and from that point of view, 
addressing their issues in the framework of a discourse aimed at defending or preserving 
the tradition is not inappropriate and can be very powerful. 
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